

FM 3-11.22

**Weapons of Mass
Destruction
Civil Support Team
Tactics, Techniques, and
Procedures**

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Department of the Army**

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Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Team Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures

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Preface

In recent years, the potential for hostile actions in the form of terrorist activities directed toward United States (US) citizens and US interests worldwide has become an increasingly serious threat. In the very recent past, terrorist activities have been brought to the shores of the US. In an effort to counter this threat, the US government (USG) has implemented a number of measures to enhance our national capability to deter, prevent, respond to, and recover from terrorist activities in the US, the District of Columbia (DC), Puerto Rico, and US territories and possessions. The uniqueness of civil support teams (CSTs) employment and support and the enormity of their tasks must be understood; that is, the concept that results in employment of national guard (NG) CSTs manned by both Army and Air National Guard personnel to support local, state (in Title 32 United States Code [USC] status), and federal (Title 10 USC status) response systems.

The CST mission is to support civil authorities at a domestic chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives (CBRNE) incident site by identifying CBRNE agents/substances, assessing current and projected consequences, advising on response measures, and assisting with appropriate requests for additional support.

CSTs work in a high-risk and high-stress environment where attention to detail is paramount to the team's success and survival. Safety is of utmost importance during CST operations where one minor mistake could cause not only team casualties but could also further spread CBRNE materials. As the "governor's 911 force for weapons of mass destruction (WMD)," the CST provides direct support to the "frontline" of local, state, and federal emergency response organizations. CST operations will primarily occur in a nonmilitary environment that may include urban, rural, industrial, or suburban areas, and/or hot or cold weather environments. Additionally, CSTs will operate only within the US, DC, Puerto Rico, and US territories or possessions while in Title 10 or 32 status.

Field Manual (FM) 3-11.22 provides the suggested doctrinal tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) for use by WMD CSTs, which are designed to provide support to local, state, and federal response systems. The TTP will help guide the employment of these teams, and CST capabilities can assist in rendering additional support needed during a CBRNE response. Doctrine represents those fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application. As CSTs use this manual, the reader must also have an understanding of the impact of CBRNE against a target and of the federal and state emergency response system and capabilities.

This manual focuses on the principles of CST operations, the organization of the CSTs, the CST mission, and the command and control (C²) of those teams. It discusses the capabilities and limitations of the teams, information on the concept of CST employment, planning considerations, and support information that can

be provided during a response. It further provides detailed guidance in the form of TTP for the employment and conduct of operations by these teams.

For reference purposes, Appendix A contains a metric conversion chart.

Unless stated otherwise, masculine nouns or pronouns do not refer exclusively to men.

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Chapter 1

Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Team Role and the Threat

In recent decades, the US has dealt with a series of asymmetric threats whose potential for lethality and political, economic, and psychological impact has increased over time. The most recent of these threats include terrorist bombings in New York City and Oklahoma City during the 1990s and the catastrophic destruction of the World Trade Center and significant damage to the Pentagon on 11 September 2001. The use of biological agents (such as anthrax) by terrorists also caused civilian casualties and contamination of US infrastructure (such as US mail distribution centers) in 2001. An adversary may not hesitate to use CBRNE or toxic industrial material (TIM) on a covert or overt basis to accomplish its objectives. Information technology and CBRNE materials have proliferated in recent years, making them more accessible to potential adversaries. The evolving threat has required that leaders and planners conduct assessments (during deliberate and crisis action planning) that analyze the impact of CBRNE on various courses of action (COAs) and the security of the US homeland. Based on the threat, the USG has undertaken measures to improve our nation's ability to respond to domestic and international-based terrorism. In June 1995, Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 39, *US Policy on Terrorism*, delineated the responsibilities for federal agencies in combating terrorism, including domestic incidents. PDD 62, *Combating Terrorism*, issued in May 1998, further defined responsibilities for specific agencies. Both directives call for the establishment of robust, tailored, and rapidly deployable interagency teams that can conduct well-coordinated and highly integrated operations in response to the crisis generated by a terrorist attack (referred to as crisis management) and cope with the consequences that follow (consequence management [CM]).

CIVIL SUPPORT TEAM ROLE FOR SUPPORT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

1-1. In 1998, the Department of Defense (DOD) commissioned a "tiger team" to develop a strategic plan for integrating NG and reserve component (RC) support for response to attacks using WMD. The plan defined a future operational capability based on enhancing RC support to the civil authority in the US in managing the consequences of WMD terrorism. The subsequent approval of the plan by the Deputy Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) as *Defense Reform Initiative Directive Number 25*, together with the *Unified*

Command Plan for Fiscal Year 2000, the *Defense Planning Guidance (2002-2007)*, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) Contingency Plan 0500-98, and the *National Security Strategy* published in September 2002, charges DOD with the support of domestic CM.

1-2. Congress also directed the federal government to enhance its capability to deter, prevent, respond, and recover from terrorist attacks involving WMD and to provide direct support to the front line of local and state emergency response organizations. Beginning in Fiscal Year (FY) 1999, Congress and the DOD provided funding to train, organize, and equip NG WMD CSTs to develop a national military capability to meet the pressing demands of this emerging threat. The locations for the teams are chosen to maximize population coverage, minimize response times within a geographical area, and reduce the overlap with other teams' areas of responsibility. The distribution provides optimal response coverage for the majority of the US population; and over time, additional CSTs will be trained, authorized, and equipped.

1-3. The CSTs are designed to support the civil authorities in the event of a CBRNE emergency. The adjutant general (TAG) of a state employs the CST to support its home state's response (or another state's response) under the supported governor. As the "governor's 911 force for a WMD response," the CST contributes greatly to the overall national response capability for a CBRNE emergency consisting of local, state, and federal tiers.

1-4. The line between crisis management and CM is blurred. CSTs are state assets whose primary mission supports CM. They may support the crisis management mission (upon request by the appropriate authority) by performing tasks such as collecting an evidentiary sample and maintaining the chain of custody until it is delivered to applicable personnel; but this is secondary to their mission of identifying, assessing, advising, and assisting appropriate authorities at an incident site. They generally perform their mission at the state level. If an event is of the magnitude that the DOD becomes involved, the defense coordinating officer (DCO) may call upon a CST for its CM capabilities. Figure 1-1 shows the CM DOD response options. See Appendix B for information on CST utilization for different response options (such as a state emergency). The various CST response options may also generate questions on CST guidance for rules of engagement (ROE), and Appendix C provides guidance on the use of force.

1-5. The CSTs can respond from their respective home stations by air, maritime, and ground transportation to emergencies within a limited amount of time. Any response may require the use of rotary- or fixed-wing aircraft. Limited-capability CST equipment sets can be transported by helicopters; full-capability sets can be airlifted. The actual mode and speed of the deployment are determined by mission, enemy, terrain, troops, time available and civilian considerations (METT-TC).

PURPOSE

1-6. The purpose of the CST is to assess current and projected consequences and identify CBRNE agents and substances. The CST advises on response missions and assists with such measures as requests for additional support. Each team consists of 22 full-time Army and Air National Guardsmen and is




Figure 1-1. Consequence Management, DOD Response Options

broken down into six smaller sections—command, operations, communications, administration and logistics (A&L), medical, and survey—that have been trained and equipped to provide a technical capability to “reach back” to other experts who can assist the incident commander (IC). These teams provide a unique military capability. They can deploy rapidly to a suspected or actual terrorist attack, conduct reconnaissance to determine the effects of the attack, provide situational understanding, provide technical consultation to local authorities on the effects of the attack to minimize the impact, and facilitate follow-on military support through validated civilian requests for assistance. CST deployment and operations are also supported through the use of checklists and timely reporting (see Appendixes D and E).

CAPABILITIES

1-7. The CST provides assessments and presumptive identification to analyze most CBRNE agents and substances. The CST sophisticated detection, analytical, and protective equipment allows for operations to take place in environments that contain many different TIM and CBRNE materials. The personal-protective equipment (PPE) used by CSTs provides more extensive protection (such as Occupational Safety and Health Administration [OSHA] Levels A and B) from hazardous material (HAZMAT) than does the

equipment used by most military units. (Mission-oriented protective posture [MOPP] 4 is the approximate equivalent of OSHA Level C protection.)

1-8. CSTs have a unique ability to assess CBRNE events. This is accomplished through the expertise of personnel and the use of several computer-based modeling programs. In addition, the survey and medical team's high state of training and advanced technology equipment allow for accurate and timely sample collection and identification of CBRNE agents and substances. The CST also provides the ability to act as a CBRNE reconnaissance force that can provide a unique view at the incident site.

1-9. The assessment process also supports deliberate and crisis action planning. For example, see Appendix F for a sample CST operations plan (OPLAN) and warning order (WO). Assessments include the use of intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB) techniques to determine possible adversary COAs. Capabilities and needs assessments also occur to determine what capabilities are needed to support the required response actions. Assessments occur prior to, during, and after an incident. Assessment is an ongoing process that is undertaken to help ensure the safety of personnel and the preservation of property.

1-10. The CST advises the ICs and emergency responders. For example, during exercises and training, the CST can advise leaders and first responders on the hazards and countermeasures associated with a response to a CBRNE incident. During such a response, a CST can recommend measures such as the follow-on capabilities (such as types of units, equipment, and supplies) needed to support mitigation measures at an incident site. Postincident, the CST can advise on measures such as the preparation of a transition plan. This plan helps support the disengagement of military units for redeployment to home stations. The CST state and federal technical reach-back capability enables the commander to obtain subject matter expertise on CBRNE matters and provide situational awareness (SA) to appropriate agencies not at the incident site. See Appendix G for sample reach-back capabilities that could be used to support CST operations.

1-11. The CST assists leaders and emergency responders by providing a capability to coordinate and conduct liaison, if requested, with other response assets. The CST assists the IC in formulating and communicating appropriate requests for additional support. The CST may also provide recommendations on how to integrate the use of follow-on CBRNE response assets.

THREAT

1-12. The traditional view of CBRNE has evolved with the proliferation of improvised CBRNE devices. We have moved into an era where these types of weapons are no longer limited to the purview of typical superpower nations. The technology to produce improvised CBRNE agents continues to spread. The ability to weaponize these agents can also be accomplished by simple (placing anthrax spores in an envelope) or sophisticated (using spray or a bursting device to disseminate TIM) means.

CHEMICAL WEAPONS

1-13. Chemical weapons are generally defined as toxic chemicals and their precursors, except when intended for a purpose not prohibited under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC); a munition or device designed to cause death or other harm through toxic properties; or any equipment specifically designed for use directly in connection with the employment of munitions or devices.

1-14. Chemical agents are also generally grouped according to the potential severity of their effects—lethal and incapacitating agents. Lethal chemical agents are designed to kill or severely injure. Incapacitating agents are chemical substances that are intended to kill, seriously injure, or incapacitate personnel through their physiological effects. Chemical agents can cause psychological and physiological effects. They can cause contamination or damage that will restrict the use of facilities and/or equipment and supplies.

1-15. Chemical compounds such as riot control agents (RCAs) can also be used. To support assessments, see FM 3-11.9 for detailed information on chemical agents. Another key reference is FM 8-285.

Nerve Agents

1-16. Nerve agents, such as tabun and sarin, are generally clear and colorless liquids. These primarily organophosphorus compounds may be absorbed through the skin or inhaled through the respiratory tract. Exposure to a nerve agent may cause widespread systemic effects (such as respiratory failure) and/or death within minutes.

Blood Agents

1-17. Blood agents, such as hydrogen cyanide and cyanogen chloride, are generally colorless liquids widely used in commercial chemical manufacturing. Blood agents interfere with the exchange of oxygen with the cells of the body. These agents enter the body through the respiratory system and act quickly, if inhaled in sufficient quantities. Even though blood agents are fast-acting, they dissipate quickly.

Choking Agents

1-18. Choking agents, such as phosgene and diphosgene, are generally clear and colorless and are highly volatile liquids. Choking agents attack lung tissue and interfere with the exchange of oxygen within the lungs. These agents enter the body through the respiratory system and, if inhaled, act almost immediately. They also cause damage to the eyes.

Blister Agents

1-19. Blister agents, such as mustard, are generally yellow-to-brown, oily substances. The vapor may be colorless with a slight garlic- or mustard-like odor. Blister agents are absorbed through the skin or eyes or inhaled through the respiratory tract. Blister agents burn and blister the skin and will generally persist for hours to days.

BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

1-20. Biological weapons are materials that project, disperse, or disseminate a biological agent, including anthropod vectors. A biological agent is a microorganism that causes disease in personnel, plants, or animals or causes the deterioration of material. Biological agents can cause psychological and physiological effects. They can cause contamination or damage that will restrict the use of facilities and impact the economy.

1-21. One of the dangers of biological weapons is amplified by the fact that exposure to the agents would probably not be diagnosed until symptoms appear. Personal protection generally consists of individual protection and medical measures (such as immunization) or the application of some other postincident medical treatment (such as antibiotics).

1-22. Biological-agent dissemination could be accomplished by such measures as aerosol dissemination or by the use of vectors or bursting devices. Biological agents can be produced in the laboratory or purchased from a number of medical research firms.

1-23. Biological agents include bacteria, viruses, rickettsias, and toxins. These agents can be weaponized to project, disperse, or disseminate biological agents. To support assessments, see FM 3-11.9 for detailed information on biological agents. Another key reference is FM 8-284.

- Bacteria are defined as single-celled, microscopic, plant-like organisms. A possible bacterial agent of concern could include anthrax. A biological warfare (BW) attack with anthrax would probably be delivered by aerosol. Following an incubation period, anthrax affects an individual's respiratory system; and the fatality rate is high following the onset of pulmonary symptom
- Viruses are defined as parasitic organisms that live in the cells of their selected hosts. A possible viral agent of concern includes smallpox. Smallpox can also be delivered as an aerosol. Following an incubation period, smallpox has a high fatality rate and is transmissible from man to man.
- Rickettsias are defined as intracellular, parasitic microorganisms that are intermediate in size between the bacteria and viruses. A possible rickettsia agent of concern could include Rocky Mountain Spotted Fever. Rocky Mountain Spotted Fever can be delivered as an aerosol and has a high fatality rate. The rickettsia agents are not transmissible from man to man.
- Toxins are defined as poisonous substances produced by microorganisms, plants, or animals. A possible toxin of concern includes botulinum.

RADIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

1-24. Radiological materials are used in many industrial and medical occupations and could be readily available to terrorists. Dispersal could occur through the use of radiological-dispersal devices or through simple radiological dispersal. A radiological-dispersal device could be any explosive device intended to spread radioactive material upon detonation and cause physiological or psychological effects or material contamination. As such, they

do not produce the massive blast and thermal effects that are produced by a nuclear detonation. A terrorist could wrap an improvised explosive device (IED) with radiological materials to create an incident in which the initial explosion may kill or injure persons in the immediate vicinity of the device. Following the incident, the possible ingestion and inhalation of the radioactive particles would pose a health risk. Simple radiological dispersal is an act intended to spread radioactive material not involving an explosive device. A terrorist need only disperse radiological material (such as gamma, beta, or alpha emitters) secured from a medical laboratory, industrial plant, or other site.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS

1-25. While the detonation of a nuclear device is perhaps the least likely scenario for a terrorist incident, it has the potential to cause the greatest damage. Effects of a nuclear detonation include thermal, blast, and nuclear radiation.

1-26. Thermal radiation consists of heat and light and results from the nuclear detonation. Thermal radiation can cause widespread injuries in the form of skin burns and retinal damage (flash blindness). Thermal radiation can also cause fires or damage or destroy heat-sensitive and optical systems. The type of weapons burst (air, surface, or subsurface) and the atmospheric conditions influence both the range and intensity of thermal damage.

1-27. Blast effects consist of shock waves, high overpressure, and severe winds that can demolish buildings, destroy equipment, and uproot trees. Though the shock front achieves sufficient strength to devastate most land features, the type of nuclear burst limits the severity of destruction. Blast is not an instantaneous effect. A finite amount of time will elapse between the flash and the arrival of the shock wave relative to a person's distance from the point of detonation (ground zero).

1-28. Nuclear radiation is the most widespread and longest lasting weapons effect that comes from the emission of radioactive products (gamma, beta, and alpha radiation). These appear in two forms: initial and residual radiation. Initial radiation emitted during the first minute after detonation produces deadly gamma rays and neutrons. Residual radiation is the most prevalent in ground bursts. Other nuclear-weapons effects include electromagnetic pulse that can disrupt radio communications and damage electronic equipment. Characteristics of nuclear radiation products include the following.

- Gamma ray radiation is high-energy, electromagnetic radiation emitted by nuclei during nuclear reactions or radioactive decay. These rays have high energy and a short wave length. Gamma rays are potentially lethal to humans, depending on the intensity of the flux.
- Beta radiation is an electron or positron emitted by an atomic nucleus during radioactive decay. Beta radiation can be lethal, depending on the dose and time of exposure; it is easily shielded by aluminum.
- Alpha radiation is a positively charged particle made up of two neutrons and two protons emitted by certain radioactive nuclei.

Alpha radiation can be stopped by light materials (such as a sheet of paper) and pose no direct external radiation threat; however, they can pose a serious health threat if ingested.

1-29. To help support assessments, see FM 4-02.283 for more information on the effects of radiological and nuclear weapons.

TOXIC INDUSTRIAL MATERIAL

1-30. TIMs are substances that may create signs and symptoms similar to nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) exposure. These materials are found throughout the normal transaction of daily business in the US and are transported on our railways, roadways, and waterways. They may or may not be precursors to CBRNE agents. Most of the materials contain volatile organic compounds (VOCs), which are materials that contain hydrocarbons and possibly other hazardous elements. They may be naturally occurring or man-made and may evaporate easily based on agent characteristics. Testing has proven that extended exposure to such materials may lead to debilitating injury. Some are carcinogenic (such as benzene) or mutagenic (such as hexane).

TERRORISM

1-31. Technological innovations and the widening proliferation of CBRNE hardware and scientific expertise increase the likelihood that states, nonstate actors, or transnational groups could threaten the US homeland and population directly and, in times of conflict, deny US access to critical overseas and domestic infrastructure. Terrorism remains one of the deadliest and most persistent threats to US security. The motives, perpetrators, and methods of terrorist groups are evolving in ways that complicate analysis, collection, and counteraction; and they require the ability to respond flexibly and quickly. The rise of a new breed of terrorist, such as Osama bin Laden, who is interested in inflicting mass death and destruction, does not bode well for the future security of US interests. These groups can strike anytime and anywhere, and they are spurred by seemingly unrelated events for which they blame the US. They have a widening global reach and a high degree of proficiency with more sophisticated weapons and tactics.

1-32. There are different definitions of terrorism, and CST leaders remain aware of the different meanings. For example, the terrorism definition as defined in Joint Publication (JP) 1-02 states that terrorism is “the calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological.” However, per the Federal Response Plan (FRP), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) defines a terrorist incident as “a violent act, or an act dangerous to human life, in violation of the criminal laws of the US or of any state, to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof in furtherance of political or social objectives.”

CATEGORIES OF TERRORIST GROUPS

1-33. Terrorists are either non-state-supported (indigenous or transnational), state-supported, or state directed. Non-state-supported terrorist groups are autonomous and receive no significant support from a government. State-supported groups generally operate independently but receive support from one or more governments. This support may include weapons, training, money, intelligence, or safe havens. State-directed terrorist organizations act as agents of a government. Such groups receive intelligence, logistics, and operational support from the sponsoring government, frequently through diplomatic missions.

1-34. Terrorism can be a relatively inexpensive method of carrying out attacks against an enemy or its interests and is potentially deniable. Those who spawn and foster terrorist activities are becoming increasingly sophisticated in obtaining and transferring financial support and in planning future terrorist attacks. CBRNE devices could be employed in future attacks with devastating results. The specific target could include the general public and/or emergency first responders (EFR). Local, state, and federal law enforcement officials monitor suspected terrorist groups and try to prevent or protect against a suspected attack. Additionally, the USG works with other countries to limit the transfer of WMD technologies and sources of support for terrorism.

TERRORIST TACTICS

1-35. A terrorist attack can take several forms, depending on the technological means available to the terrorist, the nature of the political issue motivating the attack, and the points of weakness of the terrorist's target. Bombings are the most frequently used terrorist method in the US. Other possibilities include attacks on transportation facilities and attacks against utilities or other public services.

1-36. The basic types of tactics that terrorist groups can employ include hijackings, kidnappings, bombings, assassinations, armed assaults, and barricade hostage incidents. Objectives and organizational capabilities of a group dictate the tactics it uses. Terrorist groups typically use hijackings, kidnappings, and barricade hostage incidents when the group wishes to force the targeted company or government into negotiations.

1-37. Such incidents increase the level of risk to the terrorist organization and require a mature planning, operations, logistics, and intelligence capability to successfully conduct the operations. Bombings, assassinations, and armed assaults are less risky and generally require less organizational capabilities. These tactics tend to be used to accomplish the following goals:

- Create a climate of fear in a targeted group or nation through a sustained campaign of violence (such as the forwarding of anthrax-laden mail parcels that contaminated US government and corporation facilities and caused fatalities and fear among the general public and government workers).
- Retaliate for previous incidents or situations affecting the terrorist organization or its causes (such as the terrorist assertion that the

destruction of the World Trade Center was revenge because of the presence of US armed forces in the Middle East).

- Degrade or disrupt capabilities that adversely affect terrorist interests (such as Al Qaeda's anticipation that attacks against targets such as the Pentagon and New York City would reduce America's economic power and encourage an "America first" siege mentality and a retreat from foreign commitments critical to our nation's security).
- Eliminate specific individuals or groups (such as BW agent [anthrax] attack against members of US Congress in 2001).

1-38. To attain their goals, terrorist organizations depend on receiving adequate information for planning and executing an operation. Operations security (OPSEC) denies terrorist organizations the information they require for planning. The following paragraphs discuss the terrorist threat to the US and the role of sponsoring nations and terrorist organizations in executing attacks.

TERRORIST OBJECTIVES

1-39. Terrorists intend their activities to have an emotional impact on the target audience, causing it to act in a manner that furthers the group's objectives. Terrorist operations generally are categorized in terms of their associated goals. These goals traditionally could include recognition, coercion, intimidation, provocation, and insurgency support. Early in their life span, terrorist groups often carry out attacks designed to gain recognition. The objective of these attacks may be national and/or international attention for the group and its stated objectives. Groups often mount such attacks that may involve protracted hostage seizures against highly visible symbols of state control (such as national airlines). Groups may use coercion to force individuals, organizations, or governments to act in a desired manner. Using this strategy, terrorists selectively target facilities with the intent of bringing increasing pressure to bear on the targeted activity. Terrorist attacks designed to intimidate are a means of preventing organizations or governments from acting in a defined manner. These attacks could also be launched against critical infrastructures, popular or high profile individuals, or important facilities.

RECOGNIZING A TERRORIST ATTACK

1-40. Recognizing suspicious incidents may be difficult, but units and applicable personnel are being extremely alert to clues and their surroundings. Occupancy location, the type of event, timing of the event, and on-scene warning signs also provide indicators of terrorist activity.

Occupancy or Location

1-41. Symbolic and historical targets include those that represent some organization or event that is particularly offensive in the minds of extremists. These targets are often government-related.

1-42. Public buildings or assembly areas provide the opportunity to cause mass casualties. Some of these public buildings are also symbolic targets, so the terrorist can cause massive casualties and link the owner/operator of the

building or assembly area with danger in the minds of the public. Examples include shopping malls, convention centers, entertainment venues, and tourist destinations.

1-43. Some businesses may conduct operations that are regarded as controversial, and these enterprises may draw the attention of terrorist groups. Abortion clinics, nuclear facilities, and furriers all fall into this category.

1-44. Infrastructure systems include those operations that are necessary for the continued functioning of our society. Major cities contain targets such as power plants, phone companies, water treatment plants, mass transit, and hospitals. Attacks on any of these targets have the potential to disrupt entire regions.

Type of Event

1-45. Certain types of events raise the awareness of possible terrorism involvement. Explosions and/or incendiaries are among the most often used weapons by terrorists. Any bombing or suspicious fire may signify terrorist involvement, especially when combined with location or occupancy factors. Incidents involving firearms are always treated as suspicious.

Timing of the Event

1-46. Government facilities may operate at heightened states of security awareness on significant dates such as April 19. This date is the anniversary of both the fire at the Branch Davidian compound in Waco, Texas, and the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah building in Oklahoma City, and so has become a rallying point for antigovernment extremists. Events that occur on specific days of the week and times are worth treating with suspicion.

On-scene Warning Signs

1-47. On-scene warning signs should always be evaluated for indications that one is dealing with a suspicious incident. Unexplained patterns of illness or deaths can be due to chemical and biological (CB) agents. Some of these substances have recognizable odors and/or tastes. Unexplained signs and symptoms of skin, eye, or airway irritation may be due to chemical contamination, as can unexplained vapor clouds, mists, and plumes. Personnel should keep on the lookout for chemical containers, spray devices, or lab equipment in unusual locations. They should also watch for items or containers that appear out of place or unusual which might indicate a secondary device. Spot fires or fires of unusual behavior may also arouse one's suspicions, as can anything that appears not "normal" for a given incident scene. Indicators of a terrorist CBRNE attack could include—

- Anonymous tips, phone calls, or notes of a threatening nature that may identify groups or carry extremist messages.
- Surveillance of suspicious persons by federal offices or federal employees performing official duties.
- Unidentified or unattended packages, cans, or other containers left in or near government offices.

- Unattended and unoccupied vehicles parked in unauthorized or inappropriate locations, particularly those in proximity to buildings or other structures.
- Requests for plans, blueprints, or engineering specifications for federal buildings or commercially owned buildings that house government offices by those who have no official reason to have them.
- Unauthorized access to unsecured areas by unknown or unidentified persons who have no apparent reason for being there.
- Packages or heavy envelopes (often without a legible return address) that arrive in the mail from unknown senders or that have a peculiar odor or appearance.
- Confrontation with angry, aggressive, belligerent, or threatening persons by federal officials in the performance of their official duties.
- Extreme threats or violent behavior by coworkers who indicate that they may resort to revenge against a group, company, or government agency.

Chapter 2

Fundamentals

Chapter 2 briefly addresses the principles that apply to WMD CST operations, C² of CSTs, emergency management assistance compacts (EMAC), and preparedness/response postures for CSTs.

PRINCIPLES

2-1. WMD CST operations occur under various scenarios and conditions. Regardless, the principles that support conduct of CST operations include objective, unity of effort, legitimacy, perseverance, and security.

OBJECTIVE

2-2. Every CST operation should be directed toward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective(s). The IC or lead local or state agency will provide the objective(s), often after the unit arrives on the scene. All commanders and soldiers must understand the objectives and integrate their efforts with those of the supported civil authorities. Hazards and METT-TC factors determine intermediate or subordinate objectives that must be accomplished.

UNITY OF EFFORT

2-3. CST operations achieve common purpose and direction through unity of command, coordination, and cooperation. To achieve unity of effort, CSTs must have a clear, concise chain of command that maximizes accomplishment of the mission. In all crisis management or CM situations, CSTs will support civil authorities. They must coordinate closely with these authorities and clearly understand the lines of authority and control. Unity of effort also requires coordination and cooperation among the other local, state, and federal agencies involved. CSTs primarily respond to a CBRNE event on orders from their respective governors or TAGs. CSTs may be federalized, in which case they operate under federal military control.

2-4. To support unity of effort, CSTs participate extensively in advance planning, coordinating, and training processes with potential supported and supporting local, state, and federal agencies. The fundamental basis for effective execution is preparation. Sharing doctrine and procedures, providing and receiving training, and rehearsing missions in response to most likely targets foster team building with local, state, and federal civil-military partners.

LEGITIMACY

2-5. Each CST must be aware of the state and/or federal military guidance and the legitimate interests, prerogatives, and authorities of the various levels of civil government and military commands involved; and each CST must act accordingly.

PERSEVERANCE

2-6. CST operations prepare for the measured application of military capabilities in support of assigned missions. CST response operations may require long periods of time to achieve the desired affects and the flexibility to adjust operations, as required, to achieve overall mission success.

SECURITY

2-7. Security enhances freedom of action by reducing vulnerability to hostile acts, influence, or surprise. The inherent right of self-defense against hostile acts or hostile intent applies in all operations. This protection may be exercised against virtually any person, element, or group hostile to the operation (such as terrorists or looters after a CBRNE incident). The IC has overall responsibility for security at the incident site; however, the CST commander is responsible for ensuring adequate security for his unit.

COMMAND AND CONTROL OF CIVIL SUPPORT TEAMS

2-8. The CST prepares for and, on order of the governor of its assigned state through TAG, deploys to perform its mission in support of civil authorities. The CST is responsible for planning and responding in the state area of operation (AO) as its primary response area, throughout the FEMA region that is its secondary response area; and the US, Puerto Rico, and US possessions and territories when assigned to national response status (see Figure 2-1).




Figure 2-1. CST Command, Control, and Coordination

COMMAND AND CONTROL

2-9. The CST is always under the C² of military authorities, yet works in support of the civil authorities, as directed by the governor. The unit will be under the operational control (OPCON) of TAG while at the home station. The CST will be engaged in sustainment, contingency planning/coordination, and predeployment or postdeployment activities.

2-10. When deployed in Title 10 status, the CST will be under the combatant command authority (COCOM) of a C² element designated by the support combatant commander or under the OPCON of a DCO. The team will provide support, within its capabilities, through the designated element to the on-scene commander representing the lead federal agency (LFA).

2-11. The CST may operate under the tactical control (TACON) of another CST while engaged in multiple team operations or extended duration operations.

STATE CONTROL

2-12. The CST, a primary state response force, will normally remain under the control of the governor, through the adjutant general. In this capacity its mission is conducted under the state emergency management framework.

2-13. A CST assigned to a state could operate within its state of assignment or within another state under one of four potential authorities.

Immediate Response

2-14. Under DOD Directive (DODD) 3025.1, imminently serious conditions resulting from any civil emergency or attack may require immediate action by military commanders or responsible officials of other DOD agencies to save lives, prevent human suffering, or mitigate great property damage.

Interstate Compacts

2-15. Several interstate compacts provide for mutual aid between states for disaster response. These agreements occur between the states; however, the states may provide DOD with information on their interstate agreements. The most comprehensive of these, the EMAC, provides habitual relationships that facilitate emergency planning. NG support under EMAC occurs in state active-duty status. Therefore, the EMAC is not applicable to the CSTs who perform their mission exclusively in Title 32 or Title 10 status.

State-To-State Memorandums of Agreements

2-16. In an emergency, the governor or other appropriate officials, according to state laws, could rapidly develop a simple memorandum of agreement (MOA) addressing support by a CST. This process is commonly used by states that are not EMAC signatories but wish to receive or provide support on a case-by-case basis.

Mobilization Under Title 10 United States Code

2-17. A CST could be called to active duty under the mobilization statutes (voluntary mobilization, presidential selective reserve call-up, partial mobilization, or full mobilization) and then be employed as directed by the President of the United States (POTUS) or his designee. (See JP 4-05.1 for more detailed information.) The decision to mobilize CSTs is the responsibility of the POTUS based on a recommendation from the SECDEF. If a CST is mobilized, the unit will be assigned to the C² element of the designated, supported combatant commander.

State-To-State Support Issues

2-18. Several issues must be considered when a CST is requested to provide support to another state. These issues include C², liabilities, and resource implications.

2-19. While in a Title 32 duty status, the CST personnel are under the C² of the governor and TAG of their state. When support is provided across state borders, the losing and gaining governors and TAGs should be cognizant of issues regarding reimbursable charges that may be incurred and the liabilities the state receiving support may assume.

2-20. While operating in Title 32 status, the CSTs can respond operationally to an incident either within its state of assignment or in another state, as directed by authorized state authorities. When deployed under Title 32, the mission will be conducted under the state's emergency management framework or as agreed by the supported and supporting governor in question.

CIVIL SUPPORT TEAM PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE POSTURE

2-21. CSTs will maintain a level of readiness that will allow for a rapid response within objective timelines. The readiness posture of the unit will vary based upon a number of factors, including state requirements, the DOD force protection conditions, the National Guard Bureau (NGB)-assigned operational management (national response) category, or the US Department of Justice (DOJ) Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS) threat condition. The commander also ensures that professional development, leave, training and exercise participation, and administrative requirements are met (consistent with mission requirements).

UNIT RESPONSE POSTURE

2-22. CST response posture is based on threat and alert information. This information is derived from local, state, and federal sources. State and local authorities prescribe response postures based on their requirements. Federal requirements are established in a similar fashion by the Office of Homeland Security, DOJ, and DOD. For example, within DOD, commanders at any level can establish FPC or other threat/alert postures, and subordinate commanders may establish a higher FPC as local conditions warrant.

2-23. The unit response posture will affect the objective for time-on-scene arrival. Other factors that affect response times and capabilities include the

time of day an incident occurs, the distance to an incident site, the method of transport required to arrive on scene, and any other movement factors (such as weather or road restrictions).

2-24. Pre-positioning is a means of employing the CST and decreasing the unit response time. Pre-positioning can be used to support a designated national special security event, such as a national political convention.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE FORCE PROTECTION CONDITIONS

2-25. An increased risk of attack can cause government agencies to establish heightened threat conditions. These threat conditions characterize the risk of terrorist attack, and the advisory system can vary among federal agencies. Specifically, CSTs use and know the DOD FPC system (which can influence a CST that is collocated on a DOD military installation), the NGB operational management program, and the HSAS.

2-26. FPC Normal exists when there is no known threat. The unit has received no notice of an impending incident.

2-27. FPC Alpha exists when there is a general threat of possible terrorist activity against installations and personnel. The exact nature and extent are unpredictable, and circumstances do not fully justify full implementation of FPC Bravo. However, it may be necessary to implement selected FPC Bravo measures because of intelligence or as a deterrent. FPC Alpha must be capable of being maintained indefinitely.

2-28. FPC Bravo exists when an increased and more predictable threat of terrorist activity exists. The measures in this FPC must be capable of being maintained for weeks without causing hardship, affecting operational capability, or aggravating relations with local authorities.

2-29. FPC Charlie exists when an incident occurs or when intelligence is received indicating that some form of terrorist action is imminent. Implementation of this measure for a long period of time will probably create hardship and affect peacetime activities of a unit and its personnel.

2-30. FPC Delta exists when a terrorist incident has occurred or when intelligence indicates that a terrorist action against a specific location is likely. Normally, this FPC is declared as a localized warning.

NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU OPERATIONAL MANAGEMENT PROGRAM

2-31. CST preparation for deployment includes being assigned in one of three NGB-assigned national response categories. The assigned response category prescribes how rapidly a CST must be prepared to deploy to an incident scene outside its home state after an official notification. The three response categories include priority (gold), ready (silver), and standby (bronze):

- Priority response (gold) requires the deployment of an advanced echelon (ADVON) of the CST no later than 90 minutes after official time of notification (N), and the remainder of the CST deploys no later than N + 3 hours.
- Ready response (silver) requires units to focus on preparing for possible priority response missions outside their home state. CSTs in

this phase, once directed, must deploy to the event no later than N + 24 hours.

- Standby response (bronze) requires units to focus on areas such as training requirements and bulk leave. CSTs in this category, once directed, must deploy no later than N + 72 hours.

Chapter 3

Civil Support Team Mission, Organization, and Equipment

Chapter 3 briefly addresses the CST mission, unit organization and capabilities, and primary tasks. A brief summary of their equipment capabilities is included.

MISSION

3-1. The CST mission is to support civil authorities at a domestic CBRNE incident site by identifying CBRNE agents/substances, assessing current and projected consequences, advising on response measures, and assisting with appropriate requests for additional support.

3-2. In response to a CBRNE situation, the CSTs provide a well-trained team to support the state response as a lead element for the NG. The CSTs provide assessment of the current and projected consequences, technical and analytical consultation, and transmission of the situation to higher headquarters (HQ) to assist in requesting follow-on assets.

3-3. The CST is designed to support the state and local emergency response system, but it is not intended to replace those system functions normally performed by the EFR community. Where these systems are in place, formal requests for assistance (RFAs) will flow through them and any support provided will be done in conjunction with support being resourced through the incident command system (ICS).

3-4. The mission of the CST has been developed and congressionally authorized for CM support for an incident or attack involving WMD. Controlling authorities for the CST (such as the governor and TAG) should carefully consider the impact of deploying (such as team recovery/rest time, resupply) the CST in support of non-CBRNE response situations prior to directing such an employment.

3-5. In addition to the response capabilities, the CST brings a number of ancillary capabilities to the state in which it is assigned (or the state to which it is deployed). In particular, the expertise and focus of the unit provides a multidisciplined integration of CBRNE information and a dedicated group assigned to understand the potential response organizations and plans within the state. Preincident coordination with other state and local emergency response agencies and organizations will greatly facilitate a postincident response and can greatly increase statewide preparedness.

MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT

3-6. CSTs deploy to areas within the US, DC, Puerto Rico, and US territories and possessions to accomplish their assigned missions. CST mission planning

(see Chapter 4) helps to ensure effective and efficient execution of identification, assessment, advisement, and assistance support functions.

Identify

3-7. Identify a suspected CBRNE agent. The CST uses its organic capability to identify suspected contaminants. A technical reach-back capability may also be used to support the identification process. The information contributed by the CST could be used to support incident command assessments and decisions. CST planning ensures the readiness of CST survey team elements to be prepared for different types of contamination. The CST also conducts packaging of CBRNE samples as required and transfers chain of custody to the applicable receiving organization. The identification process directly links to the other CST functions (assess, advise, and assist) and provides the commander with a full dimensional picture.

Assess

3-8. Assess a suspected CBRNE event in support of a local IC. The CST rapidly deploys to a suspected or actual terrorist attack, conducts reconnaissance activities to assess the effects of the terrorist attack and provides situational understanding to appropriate command channels. The assessment begins when the unit is notified. CST members use open-source data and classified channels to gather information pertaining to the situation. Upon arrival at the incident site, the command group conducts link-up operations with the IC and initiates the CST assessment of the situation through interviews with civil response personnel. The command group obtains the IC assessment of the situation, performs a unit level review of the occurrences at the scene, and identifies potential or actual impacts. The assessment falls into two categories—general assessment and technical assessment. For both categories, the goal is to determine *who* is involved or affected by the terrorist situation, *what* has happened, *when* it occurred, *where* exactly the affected area is located, and to estimate *why* the attack occurred.

Advise

3-9. Advise civilian responders regarding the appropriate plan. The CST conducts interagency operations to provide technical expertise and consultation to the local authority. Advice includes managing the effects of the attack so that the emergency management authorities can tailor their actions to minimize the impact of the event. The CST takes the results of the assessment and informs the IC on the means and methods to minimize the effects of the event on the civilian populace, and minimize the damage to property. It also advises on methods to keep critical public services operating.

Assist

3-10. Assist emergency response officials and organizations. The CST provides input on the capabilities of potential response assets. This assistance may help emergency response officials prepare RFAs. The CST also provides a full-dimensional picture of the operating environment caused

by the impact of CBRNE use. With this full-dimensional picture, CST personnel can assist in understanding the METT-TC variables in the operating environment. From this understanding, comes the ability to anticipate the impact of specific CBRNE military response actions upon the environment. To assist in this regard, the CST must understand military doctrine and the standing operating procedures (SOP) of the supported unit or activity. To better assist supported civilian agencies and military units, the CSTs must understand the unique cultures and procedures of all civilian and military agencies and organizations with whom they may interface.

OTHER FUNCTIONS

3-11. In addition to the response capabilities, the CST brings a number of ancillary capabilities to the state in which it is assigned. In particular, CST expertise and focus provides a multidiscipline integration of CBRNE information and a dedicated group assigned to understand the potential response organizations and plans within the state. Preincident coordination with other state and local emergency response agencies and organizations can greatly facilitate a postincident response.

CIVIL SUPPORT TEAM ORGANIZATION

3-12. The CST is a high-priority response unit (see Figure 3-1) supporting civil authorities in responding to a CBRNE emergency. The unit is commanded by a lieutenant colonel (LTC) and is staffed with Army National Guard (ARNG) and Air National Guard (ANG) personnel encompassing multiple military occupational specialties (MOSs). The unit is federally resourced, trained, equipped, and sustained with the state NG providing the personnel, stationing, and common support. The adjutant general can employ the CST to support the state response under the direction of the governor or deploy the CST to support another state (under a supported governor).




Figure 3-1. CST Organization

3-13. A total of 22 full-time NG service members are assigned to each CST. CSTs are organized into six functional areas: command, operations, A&L, communications, medical, and survey.

3-14. CST members receive specialized training and state-of-the-art equipment appropriate for their assigned functional areas. This specialized training and equipment enable the team to supplement local and state

response organizations and provide a technical reach-back capability to other experts who may assist the local response.

CIVIL SUPPORT TEAM CAPABILITIES

3-15. The CST supports local ICs and local emergency responders, and provides mutual support to other CST elements. The CST is designed to mirror the functions carried out under the ICS as an inclusive team. The CST accomplishes the following functions:

- Provides and maintains internal C².
- Establishes an operations center to synchronize operations and support interagency forces.
- Furnishes C² forces.
- Provides situational understanding to military command channels.
- Conducts unit level A&L.
- Communicates internally and externally, maintaining tactical, operational, and strategic secure and nonsecure real-time voice, data, and video access.
- Provides high technical analytical collection and presumptive identification.
- Conducts unit level decontamination.

3-16. The CST structure maintains unit integrity and ensures that the team does not burden the IC for required external support. The CST is able to conduct operations independently up to 72 hours with internal supplies and resources, depending on the number and timing of hot-zone entries made. CST functions can integrate into the ICS infrastructure to provide specific support as assigned by the IC.

3-17. The CST is neither designed nor intended to replace functions carried out under the ICS, nor to replace those functions normally performed by the EFR community. Prior coordination with EFRs in the geographic coverage area should help facilitate CST integration into ICS response planning. The CST maintains a level of readiness that allows a rapid response. The CST is provided the means to facilitate a rapid recall and permit an expeditious response to requests for assistance validated by TAG (or his representative) from local or state responders.

3-18. The CSTs were specifically designed to provide advice to ICs, make assessments of the requirements for follow-on forces needed to supplement the response operation, and assist the ICS in developing valid and concise RFAs that can then be expedited through the emergency response system (local, state, and federal).

3-19. The CST provides significant capabilities for CBRNE incident assessment advice and facilitation of RFAs. The team is organized and equipped to rapidly respond to an incident. Most unit equipment is stored in the vehicles for rapid deployment and is designed to be removable for maximum flexibility.

3-20. The unified command suite (UCS) provides a technical support interface with robust communications capability across the varied first-responder and

support agency frequencies to assist the C². Through the UCS, the team can perform reach-back activities to other subject matter experts (SMEs) within a number of agencies and connect to key modeling capabilities and labs throughout the US. This reach-back to technical support provides an additional capability for the IC.

3-21. The Mobile Analytical Laboratory System (MALS) and dismounted analytical platform (DAP) provide an enhanced chemical, radiological, and presumptive biological identification capability. With these capabilities, the CST can perform an added function of serving as on-site observers for other experts from around the country. It can take the samples, readings, and observations that enable responsive and accurate assistance to the IC.

3-22. Team personnel are trained and certified to OSHA standards. The team can provide agent analysis; maintain communications with and between local, state, and federal response forces; and can reach back to automated database processing-based hazard identification, to modeling, and to other experts in a CBRNE response.

CIVIL SUPPORT TEAM SECTIONS

3-23. CST sections include command, operations, medical, communications, survey, and A&L. See Appendixes H through M for more information on CST section operations.

COMMAND SECTION

3-24. The positions in the command section are designated as branch immaterial to support the state adjutant general's ability to fill these positions with the most qualified ARNG or ANG officer. Individuals selected for the command section will be familiar with the concepts of emergency domestic response.

3-25. The command section consists of two personnel:

- Commander: LTC, branch immaterial.
- Deputy Commander: Major (MAJ), branch immaterial.

3-26. The command section performs the following primary tasks (see Appendix H for more information on command section operations):

- Provides C² of the CST.
- Coordinates the actions and approves the plans of all subordinate elements of the CST to ensure that all critical CST functions are performed as rapidly as possible, consistent with law and safety.
- Interfaces with external agencies and organizations central to the accomplishment of the CST mission (such as local response elements, and state and federal agencies).
- Provides advice as required (requested) to the first responder community on appropriate incident responses.
- Executes a reach-back system. This system provides access to SMEs and military units involved in incident responses.

- Facilitates introduction of follow-on DOD forces into a consolidated response team. This mission is conducted in coordination with higher military HQ responsible for incident response.
- Oversees development of the team incident action plan, site safety plan, and risk assessment.
- Ensures that sample collection and handling procedures are conducted safely, accurately documented, and chain of custody is maintained.

OPERATIONS SECTION

3-27. The operations section consists of four personnel:

- Operations officer.
- Senior operations noncommissioned officer (NCO).
- Operations NCO.
- Assistant operations NCO.

3-28. The operations section forms the CST OPCEN, which is the C² node for the unit. The operations section monitors the employment of the unit and manages the unit mission conduct on behalf of the commanding officer (CO). The operations section is the main coordination link with the tactical interagency response forces at the incident site and compiles a common operating picture of civil and military forces conducting terrorism response and CM operations. The operations section supports the CST commander in formulating and communicating concerns related to follow-on support.

3-29. The operations section performs the following primary tasks (see Appendix I for more information on operations section functions):

- Establishes and maintains OPCEN.
- Conducts hazard plume modeling.
- Provides information for vulnerability analysis.
- Facilitates force protection (FP).
- Coordinates air and ground movement of CST.
- Coordinates and directs CBRNE surveys.
- Coordinates and monitors unit training.
- Provides real-time meteorological data.
- Coordinates with the ICS operations personnel.
- Prepares site safety and incident action plans. medical section

MEDICAL SECTION

3-30. The medical section consists of four personnel:

- Physician's assistant.
- Medical operations officer.
- NBC science officer.
- Medical NCO.

3-31. The medical section is responsible for the medical support of the unit and receives and analyzes incident-related samples. The medical section provides medical advice and consultation to the CST CDR, the IC, and, as

directed, to public health agencies and local hospitals on the management of contaminated casualties, or provides an initial medical assessment of the effects of the terrorist incident. The medical section, as required, may also support public health agencies and local hospitals.

3-32. The medical section performs the following primary tasks (see Appendix J for more information on medical section functions):

- Establishes and maintains the medical surveillance and monitoring programs for the unit.
- Conducts lab analysis of incident-related samples.
- Conducts medical reach-back coordination with medical labs and SMEs according to the CST commander's guidance.
- Advises EFRs, the medical community, and public health authorities on health effects and impact of CBRNE contamination.
- Secures and prepares samples for transport and subsequent transfer.
- Ensures the sample chain of custody is maintained.
- Provides emergency medical stability for CST members that can include basic life support (BLS), advanced cardiac life support (ACLS), and advanced trauma life support (ATLS) levels of care.

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

3-33. The communications section consists of two personnel:

- Communications section chief.
- Information systems operator.

3-34. The communications section provides internal and external communications for the unit. The unit interconnects with tactical communications at the incident, transmits situational reports (SITREPs) to the unit's HQ, and reaches back to obtain technical references and advanced modeling. The communications section ensures reliable communications to transmit assessments of the CBRNE situation, provides reach back for information and subject matter expertise, and communicate with higher and supporting HQ.

3-35. The communications section performs the following primary tasks (see Appendix K for more information on communications section functions):

- Provides voice and data communications through a variety of networks designed to support CST operations.
- Maintains communications within the team, with higher HQ, with other responding agencies, and with SMEs.
- Establishes secure communications links, as required.
- Maintains communications security (COMSEC) equipment and keying material for secure communications.
- Augments ICs communications, within capability.

SURVEY SECTION

3-36. The survey section consists of eight personnel:

- Survey section leader (officer).
- NBC reconnaissance NCO.
- Two NBC team chiefs.

- Four NBC NCOs.

3-37. The role of the survey section is to enter an area that may be contaminated by a CBRNE hazard and provide an initial assessment of the type of hazard and concentration and collect a sample to provide to the medical section for further analysis. The survey section will be proficient in operating in teams of two or more members. A two-person (or more) rescue team is on standby to conduct the retrieval of a downed survey member.

3-38. The survey section performs the following primary tasks (see Appendix L for more information on survey section functions):

- Conducts missions in appropriate PPE up to and including Level A.
- Enters a suspected hot zone to conduct search for CBRNE hazards.
- Detects suspected CBR agents. Conducts initial identification of suspect chemical and radiological events.
- Provides initial agent identification information to the CST OPCEN for dissemination to the ICS.
- Collects and preserves incident-related samples for delivery to the MALS/DAP according to chain of custody requirements.
- Identifies, marks and reports contaminated areas.

ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS SECTION

3-39. The A&L section consists of two personnel:

- Logistics NCO.
- Administrative specialist.

3-40. The A&L section provides logistics, administration (ADMIN), technical maintenance, and combat service support (CSS) for the CST. The A&L section works directly with the Defense Consequence Management Support Center for forward area support, emergency resupply, and reconstitution after deployment.

3-41. The A&L section performs the following primary tasks (see Appendix M for more information on A&L section functions):

- Sustains the ability of the CST to conduct operations.
- Maintains logistics status reports.
- Interfaces with the integrated logistics system.
- Procures and stores unit equipment according to command guidance.

LIMITATIONS

3-42. The CST has the following limitations:

- The CST can only conduct self-decontamination (see Appendix N for more information on CST decontamination operations).
- The CST cannot conduct explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) operations.
- The CST can conduct only limited area NBC reconnaissance operations.
- A CST deploys with stocks to sustain full spectrum operations for a limited duration. To sustain extended operations, a deployed CST must receive additional logistical and personnel augmentation.

- The CST may not be employed outside the US, DC, Puerto Rico, and US territories and possessions.

CIVIL SUPPORT TEAM RESPONSE

3-43. To integrate DOD support of other federal assets and attain the widest possible coverage of the continental US (CONUS), a CST was fielded in each of the ten FEMA regions of the US. In October 1999, Congress authorized additional teams to provide coverage and support to other parts of the country.

3-44. CST stationing is designed to support an expeditious response to all major population centers within the CONUS via the unit organic ground transportation. States were selected to optimize population and geographical coverage and to minimize the overlap in response areas of the teams. The resulting distribution of the teams places 90 percent of the nation's population within 250 miles of a team. Factors such as transportation access, facilities, proximity to airlift, and proximity to other state and regional planning organizations are also important stationing considerations.

CIVIL SUPPORT TEAM EQUIPMENT CAPABILITIES/CATEGORIES

3-45. CST units are equipped with standard systems to perform their mission in support of local, state, and federal response officials. This equipment is authorized in their table of distribution and allowances (TDA). All changes to the TDA must be requested through the NGB to help ensure unit standardization. The unit equipment includes—

- PPE including OSHA-approved Levels A, B, and C protective ensembles; MOPP; M40-series protective masks; and self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA).
- Sampling equipment with CB sampling kits and CBRNE detection equipment.
- Analytical equipment, such as the MALS or DAP, to provide analysis of incident-related samples.
- Communications equipment, such as the UCS, to provide enhanced architecture and ensure communications and data connectivity between federal, state, and local response forces. The UCS is a self-contained, air-transportable system that is capable of continuous fixed and mobile operations. Its capabilities include high-frequency, ultrahigh-frequency (UHF), very-high-frequency (VHF), and tactical frequency-modulated (FM) satellite communications; secure phone; facsimile (FAX) copy; telecomputer; printer; teleconference/video; global positioning system (GPS); and an internal and external power generation.

RESPONSE VEHICLES

3-46 The CST is authorized eight vehicles. Two of the trucks are special-purpose vehicles that provide sophisticated communications and MALS platforms.

3-47. The UCS provides communications interface across the varied first responder frequencies and other response organizations.

3-48. The MALS provides analysis of incident-related samples. The MALS or DAP provides the capability to further analyze a broad range of CB contaminants. The medical and survey teams work together to gather and analyze samples. Information derived from survey and sampling operations will be used to assist the IC. The lab includes two work stations, internal and external lighting, sampling collection and preparation kits, a generator, a refrigerator, a microscope with fluorescent capabilities, hand-held assay (HHA) tickets, a gas chromatograph/mass spectrometer (GC/MS), a glove box (MALS) and filter system, and an interface to the UCS for transmission of digital sample information. The DAP consists of a dismounted package, including GC/MS, sampling, collection, and preparation kits; and an HHA.

3-49. With MALS/DAP and UCS, team members can function as on-site observers for experts from around the country and can take the samples, readings, and observations that enable responsive and accurate assistance to the IC.

3-50. The team is organized and equipped to rapidly respond to the scene using unit response vehicles. Most of the equipment is stored in the vehicles for rapid deployment and is designed to be removable for maximum flexibility. The vehicles and equipment should be certified for air transport.

3-51. Due to the sensitive nature and special management of WMD terrorism, military support requires a low signature. The open display of military force may disclose imminent military support or cause undue concern by the civilian population. Hence, the CST maintains a low or discreet military signature using commercial vehicles. Additionally, a cost benefit analysis demonstrated that commercial vehicles were more cost effective than military vehicles. The commercial vehicles are under a General Services Administration (GSA) full-service lease, which includes fuel, wash, maintenance, and replacement. The remaining six vehicles consist of four 9-passenger sport utility vehicles, two 4-wheel-drive pickup trucks, and two cargo vans. The vehicles are equipped with after-market modifications that include emergency lights, bumpers, winches, tow packages, and caps for the trucks.

NONSTANDARD CHEMICAL DEFENSE EQUIPMENT

3-52. CST operations involve working in an environment that contains a multitude of substances and chemicals that are immediately dangerous to life or health (IDLH). Coupled with chemical warfare (CW) and BW agents, military response forces are required to maintain PPE sets above those commonly provided to military forces to provide protection against all hazards. Though exempt from the applicable civil regulations for personal protection, CSTs voluntarily train and equip to civil standards in order to operate in an area containing unknown contamination. Additionally, higher-end detection equipment is required for a greater range of substances, to identify toxic industrial chemicals (TICs) and organic substances versus CW and BW agents. Nonstandard chemical defense equipment (CDE) that is interoperable with the first responders that these units support can be found in Appendix O.

STANDARD EQUIPMENT

3-53. The military standard issue of chemical detection and protection equipment provides the unit with the ability to detect and protect against a number of CBRNE agents.

3-54. The CST is provided with computer equipment to handle automation requirements, modeling, logistics management, and administration. Computer equipment performs a mix of tactical and administrative functions.

3-55. Tactical equipment is also provided to the unit to conduct its mission. For example, light sets (for area illumination), hand trucks, and other equipment support all missions that the unit performs.

Chapter 4

Civil Support Team Operations

Chapter 4 briefly addresses the tiered emergency response system. It discusses CST mission planning, response operations, operational phases, and risk management (RM).

TIERED EMERGENCY RESPONSE SYSTEM

4-1. In the US, response to an emergency is primarily a local responsibility. When faced with emergency incidents or threats of incidents, local governments employ EFRs, including fire, police, and emergency medical services (EMS). They are supported by emergency dispatch systems, emergency managers, or emergency management agencies. When local resources are overwhelmed by an event, or if specific technical capabilities required are not available, local leaders may implement existing mutual aid agreements to request additional support from neighboring communities and seek supplemental assistance through county and state emergency management systems. If the state, including its NG, lacks sufficient assets to mitigate a disaster, in quantity or technical response capability, the governor may request outside assistance (either state or federal). Support from another state may be arranged on a bilateral basis or under existing agreements. If federal, the President directs the federal response to disasters (natural and man-made). For most disasters, the FRP guides the cooperative process that orchestrates the actions of the federal agencies. For an incident involving a CBRNE, assets from all tiers of government may be needed in a nearly simultaneous response to maximize recovery (see Figure 4-1, page 4-2).




Figure 4-1. CSTs in Tiered Response

INCIDENT COMMAND SYSTEM

4-2. The ICS is used by local, state, and federal emergency response communities to manage operations at an incident site. The ICS is designed to facilitate changes in C² responsibilities during a response by providing a common organizational architecture. As more and more responders arrive at a scene, the C² may change hands many times between local responders, state responders, and federal response forces; but the organizational structure will remain the same. Federal law requires the use of ICS for response to HAZMAT incidents (29 CFR 1910.120). See Figure 4-2 and Table 4-1 (page 4-4) for information on the ICS organization and its roles and responsibilities.




Figure 4-2. ICS Organization

STATE EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT RESPONSE

4-3. Though state emergency management systems vary in name and structure, their function is to coordinate response between state, county, and city governments; community businesses; and private organizations. State emergency management agencies will also coordinate with FEMA when available state assets are insufficient to meet incident mitigation requirements.

4-4. The state emergency management agency coordinates movement of state response assets into an incident scene to fill requirements not supported by the local responders.

4-5. States without an assigned CST may request, through the NGB, a CST from another state. States with a CST may request an additional unit, if necessary. These requests may be facilitated by the use of interstate compacts, such as the EMAC. Although compacts facilitate interstate support, they are not mandatory for interstate assistance.

FEDERAL ASSISTANCE

4-6. Local and state governments routinely respond to a wide array of domestic emergencies without any federal assistance. Even some CBRNE incidents may not overwhelm local response capabilities, but they may require technical advice and assistance that is not readily available in local or state agencies. However, a large-scale incident may overwhelm local and state responders, requiring considerable federal assistance.

4-7. RFAs from civil authorities are coordinated through the FRP process. If local or state authorities submit an RFA, FEMA develops a mission assignment and tasks the appropriate primary agency according to 12 functional areas titled emergency support functions (ESFs) in the FRP. If the tasked primary agency needs additional assistance, it may request military support through the on-scene defense coordinating officer or the SECDEF. Military elements capable of providing the necessary response are then sent to the incident area under the OPCON of the DCO or JTF (during a CBRNE incident) to perform the tasks. The CST can aid in developing the requests for assistance that are forwarded to their state coordinating officer.

4-8. The CST may be federalized and deployed as a part of a federal response for an incident in or outside their assigned state.

Table 4-1. Roles and Responsibilities Within the ICS

Command
The IC is the person in charge of an incident, and must be fully qualified to manage the response effort. Initially, the IC will be the senior first responder to arrive at the scene. If the incident escalates and a transfer of command is necessary, the outgoing IC must brief the incoming IC. As the situation progresses, the IC will come from the department with the preponderance of responsibility for the site, such as fire department for fires, explosions, and HAZMAT incidents. Most state and local emergency response systems have formalized the ICS to determine who will fill the critical functions based on the type of incident encountered.
The major responsibilities of the IC include— • Performing C² activities for all personnel and resources responding to the scene. • Establishing and maintaining the incident command post. • Protecting life and property at the scene. • Maintaining accountability for responder and public safety, and task accomplishment. • Establishing and maintaining an effective liaison with outside agencies and organizations, including the EOC when activated.
Planning
In smaller events, the IC is responsible for planning; but when the incident is on a larger scale, the IC establishes the planning section.
The primary responsibilities of the planning section are— • Collecting, evaluating, disseminating, and using information about the development of the incident and the status of resources. • Creating the incident action plan that defines the response activities and resources for a specified time period.
Operations
Similar to the S3, this section carries out the response activities described in the incident action plan.
The primary responsibilities of the operations section are— • Directing and coordinating all operations, ensuring the safety of operations section personnel. • Assisting the IC in developing response goals and objectives for the incident. • Helping implement the incident action plan. • Requesting or release resources through the IC. • Informing the IC of the situation and the resource status throughout the operation.
Logistics
Similar to the S4/G4, this section provides logistical support for the operation.
The primary responsibilities of the logistics section are— • Procuring and staging the required resources for the operation. • Procuring facilities and materials for the operation. • Procuring equipment and the required personnel to operate the equipment for the IC. • Coordinating with volunteers for feeding and caring of ICS and first responder personnel.
Financial/Administrative
This section is responsible for tracking costs and reimbursement accounting. It is very important during operations that may result in a Presidential Declaration.
The primary responsibilities for the financial/administrative section are— • Tracking types of support and information on responding personnel. • Tracking reimbursable rates for people and equipment used at the scene. • Submitting reports to the state for state and federal reimbursements.

REQUESTS FOR SUPPORT

4-9. Local, county, and state officials may request support from TAG or the appropriate state authority according to the assigned state plan. Normally, these requests flow through the same process as other emergency requests for state assistance.

4-10. The state emergency management agency, working in close coordination with the state NG OPCEN (which may or may not be collocated), will process requests for assistance. The governor or his designated representative can approve the request and have the CST deploy to the incident site. CSTs are designed to be initial assets from the state with the ability to communicate using the UCS. They also have an understanding of other specialized response assets available. The CST will most often be deployed to an incident site under other-than-federalized status prior to the declaration of a federal emergency.

4-11. State requests for CST support can originate from the governor's office, officials in an affected community (emergency management center), or from the state NG HQ.

4-12. Federal requests may originate from any federal agency, but they must be validated by the DCO.

4-13. Key questions must be answered and evaluated to ensure the request for CST support is valid and that the team can perform the required functions. Questions that may be asked include—

- Who is making the request?
- What is the request, and is it legal?
- Who normally performs the function?
- What is the “real” requirement? (Who is supported? What needs to be done? Where and when is it needed?)
- Does the CST have the capability to provide support? (With proper assets/equipment? Safely with trained personnel? Legally and cost effectively?)
- Are there any issues or special considerations?
- How much will it cost, and who will pay?
- When is the mission complete?

4-14. Each state develops and publishes validation procedures for requests for CST support and ensures that personnel involved in the mission assignment process are trained on these procedures.

CIVIL SUPPORT TEAM MISSION PLANNING

4-15. This section briefly addresses CBRNE hazard analysis, contingency, logistical support, coordination, process, FP, and communications planning.

HAZARD ANALYSIS AND CONTINGENCY PLANNING

4-16. CST capabilities include contingency planning and assistance, advisement, and assessment support. Participation in local, state, and federal regional planning meetings and exercises can help ensure that the CST

capabilities are understood and applied appropriately. Through the conduct of education, training, and exercises with emergency response personnel and supporting organizations, the CST can have a significant impact on the preparedness of the areas they support.

4-17. CST planning should be coordinated with local emergency action plans, state emergency response plans, and the FRP.

- **Local emergency action plans.** County, city, or community leaders develop plans to manage disaster-related events while informing and coordinating state level emergency assistance. Emergency action plans are developed by first responders and local hospitals to manage fire, injury, and law enforcement actions. Combined CST and first responder training facilitate improved operating procedures and response coordination.
- **State emergency response plan.** State emergency planners prepare coordinated plans to mobilize and make use of state resources (including CSTs).
- **FRP.** The FRP contains 12 functional areas called ESFs. The FRP provides standing mission assignments to designated departments and agencies with primary and support responsibilities to carry out ESF activities.

4-18. CST mission planning includes CBRNE hazard analysis and contingency planning. The analysis assesses the hazard from CBRNE weapons and/or material, including its potential location, quantity, specific physical and chemical hazards, and the possible risk of release. Contingency planning develops comprehensive, coordinated responses to potential CBRNE incidents. The contingency planning builds on the hazard analysis and recognizes that no single public or private sector agency is capable of managing a CBRNE incident by itself.

Hazard Analysis Planning

4-19. CBRNE hazard analysis is one of the foundations of the planning process. It is conducted for potential CBRNE incident situations. In addition to the CBRNE hazard analysis, vulnerabilities (such as, What is susceptible to damage should an incident occur?) must also be examined. A CBRNE hazard analysis provides the following benefits:

- It lets the CST know what to expect.
- It creates an increased awareness of CBRNE hazards.
- It may indicate a need for other preventive actions, such as other monitoring capabilities.
- It increases the probability of successful response operations.

4-20. The CST can assist and advise local and state emergency planners in the CBRNE hazard analysis process. CST capabilities support the hazard analysis process through—

- **CBRNE hazard analysis.** The CST can advise emergency planners on those agents and/or materials that have the potential to cause injury to life or damage to property and the environment. Hazard

analysis may use available information such as the type, location, and quantity of CBRNE material, and the nature of the hazard.

- **CBRNE vulnerability analysis.** The CST may help emergency planners identify what facilities, property, or personnel may be susceptible if a CBRNE incident occurs. A comprehensive CBRNE vulnerability analysis provides information on the size of the vulnerable zones, the population (in terms of numbers, density, and types), and the property or facilities that could be affected.
- **CBRNE risk analysis (RA).** The CST assists emergency planners during their planning on the probability of a CBRNE incident and the consequences that could occur.
- **CBRNE emergency response resources evaluation.** The CST advises emergency planners on potential risks and potential CBRNE emergency response resource requirements. The resource requirements could include personnel, equipment, and supplies necessary for CBRNE mitigation.

4-21. Time and resources will dictate the depth and extent to which the CBRNE hazard analysis can be conducted. The completed analysis enables a better understanding of the potential implications of a CBRNE incident and what resources may be required to achieve a response.

Contingency Planning

4-22. CBRNE planning is a multidisciplined (such as emergency planning, medical, survey) approach that goes beyond the resources and capabilities of any single agency. The CST assists and advises emergency planners in the comprehensive planning process. The CST advises and assists emergency planners, as required, through—

- Participating (if required) as a member of the planning team (such as advising or assisting local emergency planning committees).
- Helping to define and implement planning team tasks (such as identifying CBRNE hazards and assessing response capabilities).
- Helping state or local emergency planners write contingency plans or prepare CST contingency plans.
- Advising on revisions to or maintenance of contingency plans. Based on the availability of new information or data, CSTs can assist in the preparation of revised plans.

4-23. The CST may develop contingency plans and OPORDs (see Appendix F for a sample CST OPORD) in conjunction with other agencies. CST response plans are updated regularly and coordinated with the appropriate response agencies in the region. (See Table 4-2, page 4-8, for sample planning considerations.)

Table 4-2. Sample Planning Considerations

- Establish and maintain coordination with applicable emergency response agencies.
- Identify potential agent release points, high profile facilities, and significant events within the region.
- Identify critical support facilities and resources.
- Identify military assets that could be used in CM.
- Identify primary and alternate transportation routes and staging areas.
- Determine methods for a release and the area or population likely to be affected.
- Outline potential threat scenarios.
- Estimate resupply and equipment requirements.
- Identify sources of key information requirements.
- Obtain detailed maps of the area.
- Coordinate reach-back requirements.
- Conduct liaison with civilian first responders.

LOGISTICAL SUPPORT PLANNING

4-24. The Defense Consequence Management Support Center (CMSUPCEN) is a DOD activity established to supply, sustain, and assist with initial equipment fielding for designated WMD response forces. The Defense CMSUPCEN conducts stock management and warehousing, warranty management, integrated logistics support (ILS), and coordination and monitoring of forward-area resupply and sustainment. The Defense CMSUPCEN uses a life cycle management (LCM) handbook that establishes its concept for performing selected life cycle sustainment tasks for the CSTs. The handbook provides guidance for initial equipment issue and subsequent sustainment of CSTs.

4-25. The Defense CMSUPCEN emergency resupply activity provides environmental, pre-positioned reconstitution and float packages formed into prepackaged, stand-alone sets to be transported to resupply units engaged in operations, contingencies, special-event support, or exercises.

4-26. Certain items of standard military equipment are provided by the state or procured locally at the scene.

COORDINATED PLANNING

4-27. Detailed and coordinated planning results in the preparation and use of SOPs and guidance that support unit operations. Each team develops SOPs that are continually updated to reflect evolving CST doctrine, command guidance, and lessons learned.

4-28. Detailed planning and coordination of CST activities should consider the following to ensure the orderly progression through all phases of CST operations. Coordination topics include—

- Sources of threat information (such as FBI, local law enforcement).
- Detailed maps of the area.
- FP and rules on use of force.
- Security clearance requirements.

- A definitive interaction plan during the preincident phase to enhance the ability of the CST to work with other response organizations during an actual incident response. CST elements working in conjunction with their state military staffs should identify key players in the emergency response community and foster working relationships that will facilitate emergency response activities.
- Joint exercises with first responders and local, state, and federal emergency management organizations in their assigned areas of responsibility (AORs).
- Report frequency and types of reports (see Appendix E for more information on reporting responsibilities and types of reports).
- Detailed and rehearsed checklists (see Appendix D for a sample CST checklist).
- Guidance on use of force (see Appendix C for more information).
- Transition of CST status from Title 32 to Title 10, if required (see Appendix B for more information).

4-29. Participation in the military decision-making process and involvement in the development of plans and orders support coordinated planning. Involvement in the planning process furnishes the CST with advance notification of potential missions, facilitating more detailed planning.

FORCE PROTECTION PLANNING

4-30. FP is a paramount concern of all commanders. CSTs work as small units that interact with a wide variety of agencies (civilian and military). This interaction implies a degree of risk that may be higher than the risks encountered by conventional forces. The risks can, however, be mitigated by a thorough analysis of the environment as it relates to mission requirements and by strict adherence to resultant FP measures.

Operational Security Planning

4-31. Deployed CSTs consider the following sample OPSEC considerations in their FP planning (the list is not all inclusive):

- **Use of force.** Does the use-of-force guidance for individual or unit self-defense ensure the safeguarding of cryptographic materials and sensitive communications equipment?
- **OPSEC.** Is (classified or unclassified) information disclosed that could compromise the mission? Is the unit continually evaluating essential elements of friendly information (EEFI) countermeasures for applicability? OPSEC denies the adversary information critical to the success of friendly military operations. It contributes to the security of Army forces and their ability to surprise enemies and adversaries. OPSEC identifies routine activities that may telegraph friendly intentions, operations, capabilities, or military activities. It acts to suppress, conceal, control, or eliminate their indicators. OPSEC includes counter-surveillance, signal security (SIGSEC), and information security (INFOSEC).
- **Physical security (PHYSEC).** Is access to unit and individual work areas, equipment, documents, and billeting areas controlled? Are

other safeguards (such as guards, barriers, or patrols) available if necessary? Do local PHYSEC measures match the FP condition? PHYSEC planning also addresses key areas such as perimeter security for the incident site (cold, warm, and hot-zones) as provided by the supported ICS and law enforcement organization.

- **Personnel security (PERSEC).** Can the unit or individual vary routines?
- **Law enforcement.** Does liaison exist with local law enforcement? Are law enforcement capabilities sufficient to counter the anticipated threat? Are the locations of civilian police, military police (MP), government agencies, and other safe locations available? Can the unit maintain points of contact (POCs) with organizations in the deployment area?
- **Antiterrorism (AT).** Is an updated threat briefing available? Does a plan exist for coping with a terrorist attack? Has the plan been rehearsed? Does an alert system exist? Can the unit reduce its signature where possible? Is a means in place to identify the location of all personnel?

Communications Security Planning

4-32. COMSEC is protection resulting from all measures designed to (1) deny unauthorized persons information of value that might be derived from the possession and study of telecommunications, or (2) mislead unauthorized persons in their interpretation of the results of such possession and study. Additionally, CSTs apply the planning guidance provided by the NGB on COMSEC matters (See NGB HQ, *Security Classification Guidance for CSTs*, October 2001). Sample COMSEC considerations include the following:

- Cryptosecurity results from the provision of technically sound cryptosystems and their proper use.
- Transmission security results from all measures designed to protect transmissions from interception and exploitation by means other than cryptanalysis.
- Emission security results from all measures taken to deny unauthorized persons information of value that might be derived from intercept and analysis of compromising emanations from cryptoequipment and telecommunications systems.
- PHYSEC of COMSEC materials and information results from all physical measures necessary to safeguard classified equipment, material, and documents from access thereto or observation thereof by unauthorized persons.
- Electronic security is the protection resulting from all measures designed to deny unauthorized persons information of value that might be derived from their interception and study of electromagnetic radiation (such as radar).

Communications Planning

4-33. The primary goal of communications planning is to ensure voice and data (secure and nonsecure) connectivity (internally and externally). The CST must be prepared to coordinate, integrate, and incorporate team communications capability into any incident. CST communications support

differs from the support provided to tactical Commanders in that support requirements for communications planning are generally different for every operation. This is due to a number of factors. For example—

- Communications assets available to ICs at an incident scene will likely differ with each operation. Therefore, there must be an integration of operations and communications support plans. For example, the integration process could include the use of commercial communications to supplement CST communications requirements.
- Connectivity requirements will likely vary with each operation. To perform his duties, the CST commander requires an unbroken chain of communications that links the home station, en route assets, and on-scene assets.
- Interoperability requirements will likely vary with each operation. Standard operability is a key goal; however, a communications link must be achieved in spite of the lack of standardization.
- Security will be required for communications resources. For example, secure communications links will be needed to support CBRNE operations.

4-34. CST communications planning ensures that each section can communicate with on-scene units and support assets and the CST communications link through the IC communications center (COMCEN). Communications planning addresses key areas such as frequency management and restricting access to CST satellite and radio frequencies. Encryption equipment will be accounted for and safeguarded at all times. CST communications planning identifies available radio and telephone communications at an incident site. Planning also considers the availability of mutual-aid radios, programmable scanner radios for monitoring emergency radio frequencies, and access to National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) weather frequencies, if applicable. CST planning further identifies the sources for reach-back data. Additionally, communications planning identifies backup emergency power sources and monitoring of local and national news coverage. Incident operations require frequency management for interoperability. A frequency listing and other information (such as call signs, communications-electronics operating instructions [CEOI], and COMSEC information) are provided for distribution to users. Specific planning considerations should include—

- **Frequency allocation.** Frequency allocations are area-dependent, and net planning must address and implement timely updates to minimize disruptions in the operation when units change their AOs.
- **Reporting.** CSTs must report their organizational and special communications needs so that the applicable C² HQ can address all contingencies. For example, the applicable C² HQ produces (and may transfer) the CEOI electronically, by paper, or by data fill devices to the users.
- **Deconfliction.** Planning must include provisions to prevent interference between collocated radios operating on the same frequency band. For example, the potential for interference exists in frequency-hopping (FH) modes. Communications planners must consider and assess the on-site interference by other FH systems,

such as mobile subscriber equipment. When planning the CEOI, the communications planners consider the types of radios, cryptographic equipment, key lists, and frequency allocations available at the incident for the particular AO.

- **Interoperability.** Equipment interoperability is a major issue in network planning for VHF systems. The planning must cover FH, if applicable, and single channel (SC) modes of operations. Therefore, plans should address (if applicable) interfaces between SC and FH radios or lateral placement of interoperable radios.
- **Cryptographic management.** Planning addresses the necessity for security and interoperability of cryptographic materials (such as key lists and devices).
- **Network requirements.** The initial OPLAN and the unit SOP help to determine the type of net needed. The network plan should answer such questions as the following:
 - What type of information is to be passed (such as data, voice, or both)?
 - Does the unit require communications with users normally not in its network? Is the network a common user or a designated membership net?
 - Is retransmission needed to extend the network range?
 - Is a net radio interface required?
- **Information requirements (IR).** Communications planning also integrates the commander's intent and focuses on important information decision recommendations that include the following:
 - What type of information will be needed at the incident site?
 - How should the information be compiled?
 - What is the priority of information?
 - How will information be stored for quick recovery?
 - What agencies are needed for reach-back capability? (See Appendix G for more information on reach-back capabilities and selected federal response assets.)

4-35. The CST is equipped to assist in bridging communications between response units, but it can also provide on-scene information to other state and federal units preparing to deploy to the site. The main communications support for CST units comes from the Trojan Spirit Team, Fort Belvoir, Virginia. The Trojan Spirit Team provides multiple secure and nonsecure means, including voice and messaging services, via a satellite link from the UCS to the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA). This link provides the deployed CST access to the Defense Information Systems Network (DISN). The Trojan Spirit Team also assigns satellite communications frequencies to individual CST elements. UHF/VHF communications coordination is accomplished at the state level to ensure that frequencies are available prior to and during the response mission.

4-36. Communications planning also provides for direct linkages between the CST UCS and the C² HQ. On-site sections within the CST will have the capability to communicate within the unit, and select teams (such as

operations) have the capability to communicate on any UCS radio net. CSTs may also go to other agencies for applicable information; some information cannot be obtained ahead of time and must be obtained on site. Some of these plans require direct input of CSTs; others are done by other agencies but are useful to CSTs. While CSTs are performing mission functions, input may be provided to other agencies that facilitate their planning.

TYPES OF CIVIL SUPPORT TEAM RESPONSE OPERATIONS

4-37. The CST has a broad range of assessment, advisement, and assistance capabilities that can be applied across a spectrum of operational missions prior to or in response to an attack. The unit has the capability to conduct predictive analysis and identify vulnerabilities within its AOR. Based upon unit assessment, recommendations can be provided to appropriate officials. The CST can conduct passive monitoring or conduct sampling at various points within the area of concern to verify or deny the presence of a contaminant. The unit is able to transfer military knowledge and expertise to local and state response organizations and emergency managers on CBRNE-related issues. The unit's response to a suspected, threatened, or actual terrorist attack can include providing a nondeployment informational response, deploying in a no-notice response, or providing preplanned coverage.

NONDEPLOYMENT INFORMATIONAL RESPONSE

4-38. The CST may be able to meet an IC's RFA without deployment. The CST may furnish advice and assistance, such as POC information, technical information, or operational data that does not require deployment (such as plume projections that can be critical to emergency planners and first responders).

NO-NOTICE RESPONSE

4-39. A CST may be deployed to respond if a terrorist strike is about to occur or has occurred. For this type of operation, the commander must review the on-hand assets of the unit and deploy with the appropriate personnel and equipment to meet expected mission demands. In order to expedite the arrival of the CST to the incident site, the commander deploys an ADVON, as soon as possible. The ADVON is a small forward element of the CST that possesses limited capability and is sent to the incident site ahead of the main body of unit equipment and personnel. Generally, the ADVON performs link up operations with the IC, site quartering, verifies hot-zones, plans site entry, and provides advice (to include hazard modeling). The ADVON may be able to determine that deployment of the main body is not required.

PREPLANNED COVERAGE

4-40. Most employments during peacetime will be in a prestaged role. Units may provide on-scene assets to the IC if a terrorist attack occurs at an event that draws large attendance or if disrupting the event will achieve terrorist goals and objectives. The CST enters into deliberate planning for CST mission support; conducts an area assessment predeployment site survey; conducts initial, mid, and final planning conferences; deploys to the event;

executes mission support; redeploys to the home station; and conducts postmission activities.

OPERATIONAL PHASES

4-41. There are five operational phases: preincident, alert, deploy, response, and postincident (see Figure 4-3). (See Appendixes H through M for information on CST section actions during these five phases.)




Figure 4-3. Operational Phases

PREINCIDENT PHASE

4-42. In the preincident phase, the team completes planning, training, maintenance, and exercises to prepare for and improve response operations. Key activities include coordination, training, and maintaining an appropriate response posture or capability.

Unit Preparation

4-43. Unit preparation ensures that personnel and equipment are prepared and maintained at the highest levels of readiness. Commanders must ensure that soldiers are trained and evaluated in all procedures they may be called upon to perform in a CBRNE response environment. Equipment maintenance for vehicles and special response items must be a high priority during the preincident phase of operations. (See Appendix O for information on CST equipment.)

Mission Support

4-44. CST preincident actions (and through all phases) support the decision-making process, and are based on the mission as defined by the commander. Missions, taskings, priorities, and command or support relationships (as required) are coordinated and established by the commander. Based on the commander's guidance, CSTs prepare and update plans.

4-45. During the preincident phase, the CST commander provides opportunities through exercises and training for identification, assessment, advisement, and assistance activities. For example, training with civilian first responders provides the opportunity to conduct exercises using the CST organic identification capabilities, assist in preparing RFAs, or advise responders on the results of assessments conducted during an exercise scenario. The following provides representative actions that could be considered when providing identification, assessment, advisement, and assistance (the sample list is multiple and varied; planners war-game multiple scenarios to outline other possible variables):

- Identify areas of interest (AOI) for CBRNE reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S).
- Verify what CBRNE identification capabilities and equipment are available for a potential response scenario.
- Determine where these assets are located.
- Determine what restrictions may exist on the use of unit assets (such as areas with poor communications).
- Determine when other response assets will arrive.
- Determine potential resupply requirements.
- Prepare and/or update contingency plans.
- Provide briefings on CST capabilities.
- Support CBRNE hazard analysis and contingency planning.

ALERT PHASE

4-46. In the alert phase, the command team receives the alert/WO, validates it according to approved state procedures, executes the unit recall, assembles the unit, alerts the reach-back and ILS systems, begins identifying required information, and plans the deployment. Members are equipped with pagers to expedite this process.

Unit Preparation

4-47. The alert phase includes those specific actions needed to notify CST commanders and the primary staff to a potential deployment. This phase consists of two elements—notification of a potential incident response mission and receipt of a valid WO from higher HQ and assembly. Local procedures will be established to allow for the most expeditious call-up of unit members. When a CST is alerted for a mission, other CSTs may be notified and alerted to a standby to provide follow-on support if required. In the event that a CST is activated by TAG or a state governor, the NGB OPCEN will be notified as soon as possible.

4-48. Notification occurs when CST commanders and their primary staffs have a valid mission WO from higher HQ. Notification can begin prior to the

receipt of a WO and/or RFA through official channels. However, deployment cannot occur without a valid RFA. Notification of team members can begin when it is determined (through any means available) that a CBRNE event exists or is imminent.

4-49. During assembly, unit members arrive at the designated assembly area to complete final loading of essential equipment and execute premission checklists. At the direction of the unit commander and according to local SOP, an ADVON may be deployed to the incident site during assembly to begin an initial assessment. The ADVON deployment depends on the time available, the distance to the incident site, and the necessary mode of transportation. Distances requiring air movement of the team may prohibit dispatching an ADVON. Representative ADVON functions are shown in Table 4-3.

Table 4-3. Representative ADVON Functions

Arrive on-scene.	• Report to ICS.
	• Get SITREP.
Conduct initial assessment.	• Obtain ICS data for WMD CST.
	• Coordinate staging area.
	• Coordinate sector layout.
	• Obtain IC intentions for WMD CST employment.
	• Obtain IC strategic goals for incident.
	• Conduct site assessment and coordination with responding agencies.
Conduct hazard analysis and/or prepare the site safety plan.	• Determine whether the site is secured from hostile action.
	• Obtain the site map, including the hot, warm, and cold zone boundaries.
Conduct coordination.	• Obtain information for the CBRNE agent identified or suspected.
	• Verify decontamination setup requirements.
	• Verify survey site's hotline.
	• Monitor the designated WMD CST AO.
	• Verify and mark the hot zone.
	• Assist in CST layout.
Develop a tentative plan, priorities of work, and draft CCIR.	• Guide main body personnel and equipment into site.
	• Coordinate with the IC to determine the preferred location to stage survey/medical teams.
	• Ensure that the operations officer provides the deputy CDR and main body with CCIR based on the initial size up and the IC initial brief.

Mission Support

4-50. During the alert phase, multiple actions continue. The CST continues internal unit preparation and conducts advance coordination with applicable agencies at the incident scene to obtain and maintain SA. During the alert phase, the CST focuses on obtaining responses to commander's critical information requirements (CCIR). Obtaining required information is crucial in providing support for the CST identification assessment, advice, and assistance functions. The needed information may be obtained by the ADVON, or unit liaison personnel, or it can be provided from the incident

scene through the unit chain of command or ICS. CCIR could include the following:

- What is the incident location? (street address and longitude/latitude)
- Does the incident have an operational name?
- Is the incident a suspected terrorist/criminal act or perceived to be just an accident?
- What is the suspected agent(s)?
- What are the numbers of victims (if any)?
- What are the signs and symptoms of the victims?
- Has there been an EMS transport of the victims?
- Have there been any hospital transfers of the incident victims?
- What is the location of the victims (if any)?
- Who are the medical POCs?
- Are any medical CST POCs on site? Who are they?
- What is the status of EMS (such as paramedics on site, transport capability, triage plan, triage location)?
- Who or what authorities or response elements have been notified (such as Center for Disease Control and Prevention [CDC], United States Public Health Service [USPHS], morgues, health care facilities)?
- What response assets are present?
- What is the status of public works?
- Who is the POC for public works?
- What is the status of water?
- What is the status of electricity on site? What is the availability to support operations in the warm, cold, or hot-zone?
- What is the status of law enforcement?
- What is the evidence collection or sample collection plan?
- Who are the police chief and the POC for the police?
- Who is the incident site safety officer?
- Who is the HAZMAT team chief?
- Who is the fire chief?
- Who are other POCs at the incident site?
- Who has information on on-site organization and coordination plans, site survey plans, local emergency planning committee (LEPC) data sheets of adjacent buildings, site maps, emergency response plans, very important person (VIP) coordination, public affairs (PA) liaison, LOG POC, and current maps of the area?
- What are the weather and other environmental information (such as relative humidity; wind speed and direction; status of heating, ventilation, and air conditioning [HVAC] systems; and control of contaminated waste)?
- What are the telephone numbers and radio frequencies for the ICP and IC liaisons?

4-51. During this phase, the CST is providing assessment, assistance, and advice. The CST ADVON may be assisting the IC staff with information on the types of support that could be available or may be assisting with identification efforts. Alternatively, assistance could be furnished from off site (such as nondeployment information response) using CST secure or nonsecure communications with personnel at the incident site.

4-52. The CST may advise applicable personnel at the incident scene on other types of available support. This information may be required to help frame the RFA or provide recommendations on PPE options. The CST ADVON may also furnish assessments to incident-scene officials on the implications of CBRNE contamination (such as toxicity, hazard estimates).

4-53. CST planning continues to refine the integrated incident contingency plan, revise section plans (such as survey section CBRNE reconnaissance plan), and coordinate through the ADVON for updated information.

DEPLOY PHASE

4-54. In the deploy phase, the team receives a valid deployment order and deploys to the designated staging area in the AO.

Unit Preparation

4-55. Communications with the local IC and/or the supported emergency response organization will be initiated as soon as possible. The means of deployment will be determined by METT-TC. Each requires detailed planning, coordination, and training. The CST ADVON continues to provide responses to unit IR.

Mission Support

4-56. Timely mission support planning during this phase requires maintaining SA of events at the incident scene. The impact of relocating from home station places a premium on maintaining communications with officials at the incident site and updating response measures as required. During deployment, the CST continues to receive updates on CCIR to support the identification, assessment, advisement, and assistance functions; however, priority may be placed on receiving updates in areas such as—

- The physical environment (such as seasonal effects on the CBRNE incident scene).
- CST support requirements (such as staging area locations).
- On-site access.
- CBRNE hazard identification and data.
- CBRNE vulnerability analysis and contingency planning inputs from the CST ADVON or liaison personnel.

RESPONSE PHASE

4-57. In the response phase, the team arrives at the incident site or staging area, reports as a support asset to the IC or designated authority, and commences operations.

Unit Preparation

4-58. During the response phase, tasks may range from establishing the CST OPCEN to advising the IC. Once on scene, the CST continues to maintain liaison with external agencies and organizations; provides advice, assistance, and assessment support; executes reach-back capabilities; receives updates through the unit chain of command and the ICS on priorities and missions; and continues to receive CCIR updates.

Mission Support

4-59. During the response phase, assessments may be conducted that support—

- Conducting predictive analysis to identify vulnerabilities at the attack site and advising the IC of results.
- Collecting the necessary information and developing plans to collect samples for analysis and/or identifying unknown substances. This plan will include information on medical surveillance, site safety, decontamination, and communications.
- Using reach-back communications links to designated scientists and SME labs for advisory, confirmatory, and technical information.
- Performing surveys, as required, to complete assessments.

4-60. The CST may advise the IC on the results of assessments. After identifying the CBRNE hazard, the CST can provide initial assessments of the effects or the potential impact on public health, property, and the environment. The advisement may be based on any one of several CST capabilities (such as use of survey and medical team, reach-back, decision support tools, and SME expertise). Assessment tools include the following:

- The joint assessment and consequence evaluation (which provides the CST commander with a unique set of assessment tools to support initial and follow-on advisory information provided to the IC).
- Methods to determine the downwind hazard area of a CBRNE incident.
- Electronic reach-back computer links with DTRA and other state-of-the-art modeling centers.
- Manual modeling using organic computers and hazard modeling software tools employed by DTRA and other modeling centers.

4-61. The CST may assist the IC in the preparation of plans for the establishment of incident site restrictions, required exclusion areas/control zones (cold, warm, and hot), or various protection options. CST modeling and reach-back tools can also be used to assist the IC in the refinement of the hazard predictions. This assistance in the planning process can be supported by—

- Protecting responders and the public from the threat of exposure.
- Protecting property and the environment.
- Developing evacuation and decontamination plans. (See Appendix N for information on CST decontamination operations.)
- Determining facilities and populations at risk.

- Advising responders on protocols regarding military chemical agents, military chemical agent precursors, known military biological agents, unknown biological agents, dispersed radiological material, and TIM.
- Advising on the additional response forces that could help in the mitigation process at the incident; identifying other state and DOD assets that may be useful in mitigating the effects of the event; helping the IC develop requests for assistance for additional state or DOD response capabilities; and providing information to assets identified to respond and bridge any civil-military communications gaps or issues.

4-62. The CST contribution at the incident scene includes providing identification. The identification process is supported through accomplishing the following representative tasks:

- Performing surveys to conduct identification, as required, and updating site incident action plans (see Appendix P).
- Performing laboratory analysis of samples.
- Using technical reach-back to provide data to support operations in diverse environments and situations (see Appendix Q).

4-63. The CST may maintain engagement for further incident mitigation if state or federal authorities determine that it should be employed in a capacity, beyond its primary mission (identify, assess, advise, and assist). The redeployment decision will be made by the deploying authority.

POSTINCIDENT PHASE

4-64. In the postincident phase, the CST prepares to redeploy. It begins to provide support for its next mission.

Unit Preparation

4-65. In the postincident phase, the unit redeploys, debriefs operations, performs equipment maintenance and resupply, reconstitutes its operational readiness, and resets its response posture.

Mission Support

4-66. During this phase, the CST addresses key operations and logistics actions that will help ensure CST readiness for its next mission. Key considerations include—

- Identifying damaged equipment requiring service, replacement, or repair.
- Identifying equipment or expended supplies that require specialized decontamination or disposal.
- Assessing the need for a critical incident stress debriefing.
- Conducting follow-up medical surveillance.
- Preparing required follow-on, after-action reports (AARs).
- Determining the level of financial responsibility.
- Determining the need for conducting follow-on training or updating SOPs.

RISK MANAGEMENT

4-67. RM is the process of identifying and controlling hazards to protect the force. It is applicable to any mission and environment. The five steps of the RM process are—

- Identify hazards to the force.
- Assess hazards to determine risks.
- Develop controls and make risk decisions.
- Implement controls.
- Supervise and evaluate.

PREVENTION

4-68. Team members and individual personnel should be constantly alert for indicators of potentially hazardous situations and for signs and symptoms in themselves and others that warn of hazardous conditions or exposures. Immediate recognition of dangerous situations can avert an emergency and prevent injuries and loss of life.

COMMUNICATIONS

4-69. In a WMD response situation, critical information must be conveyed quickly and accurately. Personnel must be able to communicate such information as the location of injured personnel, orders to evacuate, and safe evacuation routes. Internal emergency signals should be developed and rehearsed regularly.

SITE MAPPING

4-70. Detailed information about the site is essential for advance planning and incident operations. At a minimum, commanders need to develop a sketch containing the locations and types of specific hazards. The sketch should contain, at a minimum, the following information:

- Hazard areas (cold-zone, warm-zone, hot-zone, and minimum safe distances [MSDs]).
- Site terrain.
- Ingress and egress routes.
- Site accessibility by vehicle and on foot.
- Off-site populations or environments at risk.
- Pertinent information (weather, wind conditions, temperature, and forecast).
- Site maps (detailed and to scale).

Chapter 5

Civil Support Team Training and Exercises

CST training comprises participation in both military and emergency responder training. Team members acquire approximately 1,000 hours of initial training above their MOS qualification or professional military education requirements. Specifically, this chapter addresses training goals, individual and collective training, training management, long-range planning; and CST exercises.

TRAINING GOALS

5-1. The CST training plan (goals) starts with individual training (IT), builds to team and full-unit collective training, and culminates in a full-scale, realistic collective training exercise that is modeled on the Army's combat training centers (CTCs).

5-2. The operational success of the CSTs is founded in the expertise and capabilities of its members to conduct domestic support operations in a CBRNE environment.

5-3. CSTs are trained to operate in support of the IC and within the framework of the civilian EFR ICS.

INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE TRAINING

5-4. Service members selected for the CST element are fully qualified in their respective MOSs. Proponent schools allocate seats at the chemical and medical officer basic courses (OBCs) and other professional military education (PME) courses as needed. Upon completion of specialty/branch qualification, the service members of the CST elements are enrolled in the CST institutional training program. All members of the CST attend intensive IT tailored to the specific responsibilities of their assigned duty positions during the first seven months of their assignment to the unit. The instruction includes both classroom and substantial hands-on, performance-oriented instruction. This joint, interagency, multifunctional CST institutional training maximizes the use of current civilian and military courses, standards, and instructors and leverages their expertise and capabilities.

TRAINING PROGRAM

5-5. The CST training program includes courses taught by the civilian EFR community (such as state fire academies and civilian first responder professional organizations), and military and nonmilitary educational schools.

LEADER TRAINING

5-6. The unique aspects of the CST mission (particularly the nonfederal civilian-military requirements) the hazardous CBRNE mission environments, and the nontraditional skills and equipment require a specialized training program for the command team and staff. Training must be provided to the CST commander and staff in all aspects of mission operations (assess, advise, and assist). The training focuses on both individual and team requirements.

TRAINING FOCUS

5-7. Training focus for CSTs includes—

- Required MOS qualification and professional development education and training.
- Execution of CST-specific individual and specialized training requirements.
- Mission-essential task list (METL) task proficiency.

INDIVIDUAL TRAINING

5-8. The institutional phase of initial training focuses on IT, with the first priority being CST-specific training and the second priority being individual military specialty and branch qualification. Each member receives, on the average, approximately 1,000 hours of initial instruction specific to the team mission. This instruction is in addition to service-required military specialty training, common skills training, and professional education.

5-9. Training is provided through a mix of formal classroom instruction, distance learning, and practical application at federal and state proponent schools, selected central locations, and the unit's home station.

5-10. The curriculum includes extensive training in all four of the HAZMAT response levels (awareness, operations, HAZMAT technician, and incident command). Training partners/providers during this phase include—

- DOJ.
- FBI.
- Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).
- FEMA.
- National Fire Academy (NFA).
- Department of Energy (DOE).
- US Army Chemical School (USACMLS).
- US Army Medical Department Center and School (USAMEDDC&S).
- US Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID).
- US Army Medical Research Institute for Chemical Defense (USAMRICD).

5-11. The term “MOS” includes Army MOS, Army additional skill identifier (ASI), Army skill qualification identifier (SQI), Air Force specialty code (AFSC), and Air Force special experience identifier (SEI) unless otherwise required for clarity. Service regulations and policies guide MOS training.

5-12. Because all CST members are engaged in principal mission training and/or operational alert status five or more days weekly in full-time active guard reserve (AGR) status with their assigned units, CST members are exempt from the requirements and procedures for mobilization training, annual training, and weekend drills (IT).

5-13. The unit commander will validate IT completion to at least the 90 percent level prior to the beginning of unit level collective training.

COLLECTIVE TRAINING

5-14. The collective training sustainment plan requires that exercises be conducted with first responders and encourages joint and interagency training. Unit training is conducted according to FMs 25-100 and 25-101, the CST mission training plan (MTP), and US Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) Regulation 350-2.

5-15. Collective training focuses on collective MTP/Army Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP) and METL tasks. CSTs participate in—

- Section and team training and command post exercises (CPXs) with first response and other state/local organizations.
- CST element field training exercises (FTXs).
- Lanes training exercises at their home station and elsewhere.

5-16. Appropriately qualified external observers, controllers, and trainers are used for selected training.

5-17. This training addresses all aspects of the CST mission (assess, advise, and assist) in a balanced manner throughout the operational phases.

SUSTAINMENT TRAINING

5-18. Sustainment training is essentially a unit and state TAG responsibility, and is designed for a CST to maintain proficiency in its METL.

5-19. Sustainment training includes—

- Initial IT for new team members hired to replace losses.
- Advanced courses in selected team member skill areas.
- Refresher and proficiency training to meet individual member certification requirements as prescribed by federal and local laws and regulations.
- Schools to meet service individual military specialties.
- Common skills and professional education requirements.

TRAINING MANAGEMENT

5-20. CST training management is an integrated system that ensures each CST is trained and ready to operate in response to a domestic terrorist attack and that training is sustained after certification. Leaders at all levels must ensure that such training is tough, realistic, and focused on mission requirements. All CST training is guided by the training management principles set forth in FMs 25-100 and 25-101, requirements of state and local emergency response plans, the concepts in the FRP for which FEMA is the proponent, and other appropriate doctrinal and training literature.

TRAINING PLANNING

5-21. Planning links the unit mission analysis and the METL to the execution and evaluation of training.

5-22. The unit commander conducts a battle-focused analysis that provides the foundation for CST training. Training requirements will be driven by operational missions, thus narrowing the focus of training to an achievable number of critical tasks.

MISSION-ESSENTIAL TASK LIST PREPARATION

5-23. The unit METL is derived from an integrated analysis of local, state, regional and federal terrorism emergency response plans and directives. Training objectives are derived by establishing conditions and standards for each mission-essential task.

5-24. A critical CST task is a mission-essential task whose accomplishment will determine the success of the next higher echelon mission-essential task. These critical CST tasks are selected by the echelon affected.

5-25. CST METLs will be approved by TAG/state commanding general (CG) and forwarded, with supporting analysis to Chief, NGB, for coordination with applicable unified commands or the numbered Armies in CONUS to help guide resourcing and support of training.

CIVIL SUPPORT TEAM CAPABILITIES

5-26. CST METL training focuses on maintaining the capability to perform the collective tasks in the MTP, consistent with state and federal plans for which the CST is aligned.

LONG-RANGE PLANNING

5-27. The Chief, NGB, schedules operational cycles for certified CSTs on a regional basis, which will be outside the state/unit training cycle. CSTs not in an operational or national response cycle use guidelines from FM 25-101 (such as using the green-amber-red training time management system). Training and operational cycles will be based on the 12-month FY as the framework for planning. Through advance planning, the commander deconflicts his operational and training requirements to ensure that all mission requirements can be accomplished.

5-28. The phases shown below are a recommended adaptation of those specified in FM 25-101. Phases are of varying length as determined by the state/unit. Sequencing should consider when the unit is scheduled to be committed to an operational cycle.

- **Green.** The green phase will be conducted by each CST at least once each FY. No support will be required by the NGB of a unit during its green phase. Green phase units focus on mission readiness through training in key METL-supporting collective, leader, and soldier tasks—all integrated through multiechelon and interagency training. Ordinary leaves and passes will not normally be scheduled during this phase, although selected individuals may be approved to attend

MOSQ courses that overlap cycles or that cannot be scheduled during amber/red phases.

- **Amber.** The amber phase should be conducted by each CST immediately prior to and after the green phase. It should feature section level METL training that is conducted in conjunction with state/local civil response agencies when possible. CSTs in this phase will be targeted for new equipment training (NET) and will be most subject to requests from NGB to participate in approved nonmission deployments, such as system tests and PA demonstrations.
- **Red.** The red phase should focus on MOSQ IT, major system equipment maintenance, and meeting individual requests for leave and discretionary schooling. Opportunities to conduct section level training and local regional conferences and planning events should be sought and exploited when feasible.

CIVIL SUPPORT TEAM EXERCISES

5-29. Each certified CST in a green or amber training phase will plan, coordinate, and participate in at least one exercise or full-unit collective training event each month. Uncertified CSTs are encouraged to follow a similar pattern.

5-30. As the operational management concept for CST focuses each team on its home state first and, within the FEMA region in which it is based, second, unit commanders must incorporate information on appropriate local and regional laws, policies, plans, and METT-TC factors into the unit training program. Unit level section training and deployed exercises will address applying this information in an operational context.

5-31. The exercises will emphasize participation with local and state authorities, as well as take occasional advantage of national and joint military exercises. The exercises will be supported by outside agencies and scenarios that are consistent with supported OPLANs/emergency response plans.

5-32. The unit formal external evaluation, when it occurs, should be considered one of the required exercises, as should any external full-unit validation exercise or actual operational deployment.

Appendix A

Metric Conversion Chart

Table A-1. Metric Conversion Chart

Distance		
1 inch	= 2.54 centimeters	= 25.4 millimeters
1 foot	= 0.305 meter	= 30.48 centimeters
1 yard	= 0.9144 meter	
1 mile	= 1.61 kilometers	= 5,280 feet
1 kilometer	= 1,000 meters	= 0.6214 mile
1 meter	= 100 centimeters	= 1,000 millimeters
1 meter	= 3.28 feet	
1 centimeter	= 0.3937 inch	= 10 millimeters
1 millimeter	= 0.039 inch	= 0.1 centimeter
1 micron	= 10 ⁻⁴ centimeter	= 10 ⁻⁶ meter
10 ⁻⁶ meter	= 1micrometer	
Volume		
1 kiloliter	= 1,000 liters	= 1 cubic meter
1 liter	= 1,000 milliliters	= 1,000 cc
1 milliliter	= 1 cc (exactly 1.000027 cc)	
1 fluid ounce	= 29.57 milliliters	
1 US gallon	= 3.785 liters	
1 Imperial gallon	= 4.546 liters	
Weight		
1 kilogram	= 1,000 grams	= 2.2 pounds
1 gram	= 1,000 milligrams	= 0.035 ounce
1 milligram	= 1,000 micrograms	= 1/1,000 gram
1 microgram	= 10 ⁻⁶ grams	= 1/1,000 milligram
1 nanogram	= 10 ⁻⁹ grams	= 1/1,000 microgram
1 pound	= 0.45 kilogram	= 16 ounces
1 ounce	= 28.35 grams	

Appendix B

Transitioning

CSTs could be employed in a variety of ways to conduct CBRNE response operations. CSTs may be employed in a number of situations that may range from use in Title 32 USC status to Title 10 USC status.

CIVIL SUPPORT TEAM UTILIZATION

B-1. CSTs could be employed in the following situations:

- Use by the respective state governors under Title 32 USC to support a state emergency.
- Use by the respective state governors under Title 32 USC to support another state through an interstate compact (such as EMAC).
- Use by the respective state governors under Title 32 USC to support another state through an MOA.
- Use through mobilization by the authority of the POTUS under Title 10 USC or transitioning from Title 10 USC status back to Title 32 USC status. According to JP 1-02, mobilization is defined as the act of assembling and organizing national resources to support national objectives in time of war or other emergencies; the process by which the armed forces or part of them are brought to a state of readiness for war or other national emergency. This includes activating all or part of the RC as well as assembling and organizing personnel, supplies, and materiel.
- Use according to DODD 3025.1 (emergency).

USE UNDER TITLE 32 UNITED STATES CODE (STATE EMERGENCY)

B-2. On a day-to-day basis, CST use is in accordance with Title 32. CSTs receive their mission taskings through their state chain of command, from the governor through the TAG of the state.

USE UNDER TITLE 32 UNITED STATES CODE (INTERSTATE COMPACT)

B-3. Selected states participate in interstate compacts to provide each other required support during times of emergency. The C² of a CST will be according to the provisions of the compact and the applicable OPLAN/OPORD. Other key issues that will be addressed in the OPLAN/OPORD will include CST sustainment requirements and reimbursement of expenses.

USE UNDER TITLE 32 UNITED STATES CODE (STATE TO STATE)

B-4. States may establish state-to-state MOAs to obtain CST support, if required. An MOA may be established through long-range planning and negotiation. Where no interstate compact exists, a simple MOA addressing support by a CST may be rapidly established. Under such an MOA, the CSTs receive their missions to mobilize and deploy from through their chain of command from the governor through their state adjutant general. Key operational issues, such as CST C² and sustainment, must be addressed in the applicable OPORD. Critical CST C² and sustainment issues that must be addressed during state-to-state MOA planning occur when C² and sustainment requirements pass from one state to another.

USE UNDER TITLE 10 UNITED STATES CODE

B-5. When a CST is mobilized and employed under Title 10 USC, the CST will be subject to employment according to applicable command or support relationships established by the governing C² HQ (such as COCOM or OPCON). The CST will provide support at the incident scene through the designated C² element or DCO.

USE UNDER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DIRECTIVE 3025.1 (EMERGENCY)

B-6. In an emergency, applicable officials (such as the governor, TAG of a state, commander or DOD/federal official) may order the CST to conduct operations to save lives, prevent suffering, or mitigate great property damage according to the guidance contained in DODD 3025.1. Any commander or official acting under this authority must advise the DOD executive agent and state through command channels, by the most expeditious means available and seek approval or additional authorization as needed.

TRANSITION IN CIVIL SUPPORT TEAM STATUS

B-7. CST employment will vary from mission to mission. The following paragraphs discuss CST transition between Title 32 USC and Title 10 USC status.

B-8. **Title 32 USC Status.** CSTs will most often be used in Title 32 USC status while engaged in sustainment, contingency planning/coordination, predeployment, or postdeployment activities. A state may decide to employ a CST in response to a suspected or threatened terrorist attack. This employment may occur prior to the involvement of an LFA (FEMA, FBI) and/or prior to mobilization under Title 10 USC by the POTUS.

B-9. **Transition from Title 32 to Title 10 USC Status.** During the change from Title 32 to Title 10 status, there are multiple factors that a CST must be cognizant of to effectively continue operations. Selected elements include—

- **Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) authority.** CST personnel are now subject to the UCMJ.
- **Logistic support.** CSTs receive logistics support from DOD resources.

- **Command and support relationships.** CSTs are a DOD asset and will receive C² guidance from a HQ identified in an applicable OPORD. CSTs will receive guidance from their C² element that will indicate whether the CST will be in a command or support relationship with the supported force.
- **Other support.** While operating in Title 10 USC status, other functional areas will also be impacted. These areas could include administrative support, priorities of work, rules for use of force, medical support, and FP.

B-10. Transition From Title 10 to Title 32 Status.

- **Release from duty.** Command will revert to the state upon release from duty under Title 10 USC.
- **Mission completion** Upon mission completion and release of control by the OSC, the CST will immediately contact its higher command for further guidance and instructions. In most cases, the CST will be ordered to redeploy and demobilize.
- **Redeploy/demobilize.** When ordered to redeploy and demobilize, the CST will return to its home station and conduct postincident activities. Individual team postincident activities can be found in the separate team appendixes.

RELIEF IN PLACE

B-11. There will come a time when a CST will be relieved of its mission by other incoming responders or another CST. When this occurs, the outgoing CST and the incoming responders must ensure that a safe and seamless transition occurs.

B-12. There are three techniques for conducting a relief: sequentially, simultaneously, or staggered. A sequential relief occurs when each team within the CST is relieved in succession. A simultaneous relief occurs when all teams are relieved at the same time. A staggered relief occurs when the commander relieves each team in a sequence as determined by the situation. Simultaneous relief takes the least time to execute. Sequential or staggered relief can take place over a significant amount of time.

B-13. A relief is either deliberate or hasty, depending on the amount of planning and preparations. The major differences are the depth and detail of planning and, potentially, the execution time. Detailed planning generally facilitates shorter execution time by determining exactly what the commander believes he needs to do and the resources needed to accomplish the mission. Deliberate planning allows him and his staff to identify, develop, and coordinate solutions to most potential problems before they occur and to ensure the availability of resources when and where they are needed.

B-14. Further discussion of relief-in-place considerations can be found in FM 3-90.

Appendix C

Use of Force

The purpose of this appendix is to provide doctrinal considerations for CST commanders and members to understand in applying the rules for the use of force. CST members need to know the applicable rules for the use of force at an incident site. In the absence of mission-specific rules for the use of force, security and guard force personnel supporting, supported by, or in support of the CST will operate under the normal rules for the use of force as stated in DODD 5210.56 and other state or service regulations. Proper training will ensure that soldiers understand the rules on the use of force in domestic operations. Peacetime operations conducted by the US military within the territorial jurisdiction of the US are governed by the use-of-force rules contained in specific state or federal directives or as determined on a case-by-case basis for specific missions.

USE OF WEAPONS

C-1. There is a general presumption that units deployed to sites of CBRNE situations will not carry arms; however, units may deploy to sites of CBRNE situations with their weapons in storage in the event that the unit is subsequently authorized to carry arms by the SECDEF or is deployed from the CBRNE site to an assignment where weapons are authorized. The military OSC is responsible to ensure that weapons and ammunition are adequately stored and physically secured at the site of the CBRNE situation.

C-2. Military members providing security for stored weapons and ammunition at military facilities during CM support operations may carry their weapons while performing their normal security duties and will adhere to the rules on the use of force set forth in CJCS Contingency Plan (CONPLAN) 0500-98.

C-3. In an emergency situation (and then only when expressly authorized by the SECDEF in consultation with the Attorney General), units providing CM support may be authorized to carry arms. When weapons are authorized, units will adhere to the rules on the use of force set forth in CJCS CONPLAN 0500-98.

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

C-4. The CJCS standing rules of engagement (SROE) do not apply to domestic disaster relief operations in which the CST may be involved. There are no preexisting, overall, stand-alone ROE/rules for the use of force for domestic disaster relief or CBRNE operations; however, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3125.01 and CJCS CONPLAN 0500-98 provide guidance for the use of force for CSTs activated under Title 10 USC.

C-5. Commanders and their supporting judge advocate generals (JAGs) must pay particular attention to any guidance on the rules for use of force is not used for domestic operations) in the execute order (EXORD) or in any subsequent orders or directives. As a baseline, however, the soldier's inherent right to self-defense, as stated in the CJCS rules on the use of force, would apply.

INHERENT RIGHT TO SELF-DEFENSE

C-6. A commander has the authority and obligation to use all necessary means available and to take all appropriate actions to defend his unit and other US forces in the vicinity from a hostile act or the demonstration of hostile intent.

C-7. Neither these rules nor the supplemental measures activated to augment these rules limit this inherent right and obligation. At all times, the requirements of necessity and proportionality, as amplified in the prescribed guidance for the use of force, will form the basis for the judgment of the OSC or individual as to what constitutes an appropriate response to a particular hostile act or the demonstration of a hostile intent.

C-8. The two elements of self-defense are necessity and proportionality.

- Exists when a hostile act occurs or when a force or terrorists exhibit hostile intent.
- The force used to counter a hostile act or a demonstrated hostile intent must be reasonable in intensity, duration, and magnitude to the perceived or demonstrated threat based on all facts known to the commander at the time. (See CJCSI 3121.01A for amplification.)

CIVIL SUPPORT TEAM GUIDANCE FOR THE USE OF FORCE

C-9. The way a CST receives rules governing the use of force depends on how they have been activated. A CST may be activated in one of two ways:

- Through its respective state under Title 32 USC.
- Through federalization under Title 10 USC.

TITLE 32 ACTIVATION

C-10. When activated under Title 32 USC, the use of force in state active-duty status will be governed by state law. As a condition on the use of federal property and equipment, NG personnel (in state active-duty status) will, at a minimum, comply with the following guidelines (unless state law is more restrictive, in which case they will comply with state law).

C-11. The use of force must be restricted to the minimum degree consistent with mission accomplishment.

C-12. The use of deadly force can be justified only by extreme necessity. It is authorized only where all three of the following circumstances are present:

- Lesser means have been exhausted or are not available.
- The risk of death or serious bodily harm to innocent persons is not significantly increased by its use.
- The purpose of its use is one or more of the following:
 - Self-defense to avoid death or serious bodily harm, including the defense of other persons.
 - Prevention of a crime that involves a substantial risk of death or serious bodily harm (for example, dispersal of a hazardous substance in an inhabited dwelling or sniping).
 - Prevention of the destruction of property vital to public health and safety.
 - Detention or prevention of the escape of a person who, during the detention or on the act of escaping, presents a clear threat of loss of life or serious bodily harm to another person.

C-13. Other state and local agencies, and perhaps nonfederalized NG, are responsible for law enforcement functions—not federal troops. The Posse Comitatus Act does not apply to the nonfederalized NG. Commanders must be mindful, however, of FP and the welfare of their soldiers.

TITLE 10 ACTIVATION

C-14. When activated under Title 10 USC, the use of force in federal active-duty status will be governed by DOD/federal directives or as determined on a case-by-case basis for specific missions by the LFA. In all cases, the use of force provided by the LFA should be reviewed by the appropriate DOD legal office/JAG for applicability and legality.

C-15. The responsibility for providing security for DOD personnel, equipment, and military sites during CM operations rests with local law enforcement authorities. DOD personnel, however, retain the right to take appropriate actions in self-defense if threatened during CM operations. If feasible, DOD personnel should request civilian law enforcement assistance before acting in self-defense.

C-16. CJCSI 3125.01 and CJCS CONPLAN 0500-98 provide further guidance for rules on the use of force for CSTs activated under Title 10 USC.

FORCE OPTIONS

C-17. When force is necessary, use it according to the priorities of force and limit it to the minimum degree necessary. The application of any or all of the priorities of force or the application of a higher numbered priority without first employing a lower numbered one, depends on (and will be consistent with) the situation encountered. Only as a last resort will deadly force be used and only as prescribed by the appropriate regulations and guidance. The priorities (in order) of force are—

- Verbal persuasion.
- Unarmed defense techniques.

- Chemical aerosol irritant projectors (subject to local restrictions).
- Use of physical force other than weapons fire (such as military dogs, MP clubs).
- Presentation of deadly force.
- Deadly force.

C-18. Commanders must stress the importance of disseminating the rules for use of force early (although this may be difficult given the time constraints of deployment) and provide realistic training to CST members during normal training. This will ensure no “surprises” occur when actually having to execute the rules for use of force.

C-19. DODD 5210.56 provides guidance pertaining to the authorized use of deadly force that could be applicable. This directive primarily focuses on the use of force that would pertain to situations involving soldiers performing guard duty. For example, a CBRNE incident scene may require the security of sensitive COMSEC material. To prevent compromise of COMSEC material, CST soldiers may be confronted with a use of force situation. CJCSI 3125.01 addresses use of force by CSTs.

Appendix D

Checklists

The sample CST checklists (Tables D-1 to D-7, pages D-1 to D-5) follow a five-phase operational concept: preincident, alert, deploy, response, and post-incident. Each checklist applies to the entire CST. The sample checklists are designed as starting points for the commander and section leaders.

Table D-1. Preincident Phase Checklist

- Ensure that all required equipment is on hand and serviceable.
- Ensure that all required equipment is packed for deployment.
- Complete and test load plans (ground, air, and water).
- Complete and test the alert roster and procedures.
- Monitor the health status of all assigned personnel.
- Complete preventive maintenance checks and services (PMCS) on all vehicles.
- Ensure that all vehicle fuel tanks are filled according to unit load plans.

Table D-2. Alert Checklist

- Execute the alert roster.
- Verify the release authority with TAG/POMSO.
- Establish initial liaison/coordination with the supported agency.
- Request necessary deployment support.
- Perform first-in procedures for the team (dispatch vehicles, sign out weapons/ammunition, load equipment, complete precombat and functional checks, and update WO).
- Make the advance-party deployment decision (commander/deputy).
- Plan routes and times (primary and alternate).
- Issue a WO to the team or orders group.
- Execute load plans.
- Update CST personnel with any new information.
- Complete final vehicle/equipment preparations.
- Ensure that passenger manifests are complete.
- Complete the ground movement checklist (if ground movement).
- Send the final personnel accountability to the operations team.
- Conduct a briefing prior to movement.

Table D-3. Deployment Checklist

- Deploy an ADVON, if required.
- Maintain intrateam communications.
- Request support for movement.
- Maintain communications with the IC during movement.
- Update and disseminate any new information prior to movement.
- Identify and plot the staging area, if operational.
- Receive and submit all required reports.
- Account for all personnel and equipment during the move.
- Complete all final vehicle/equipment preparations.
- Establish linkup with the IC and staging officer.

Table D-4. Air Movement Checklist

- Prepare and clean the cargo.
- Ensure that there are no fluid leaks.
- Ensure that vehicles are in good mechanical condition (engine runs, brakes and steering are operational).
- Fill fuel tanks to the appropriate level for deployment.
- Secure fuel cans (secure, fuel levels, seals).
- Compute and mark the center of balance.
- Compute and mark the scale weight.
- Compute and mark the axle weight.
- Secure vehicle equipment.
- Prepare the passenger manifest. Prepare/certify hazardous cargo.
- Prepare and certify load plans.
- Provide load teams.
- Load and secure the cargo.
- Provide MHE and vehicle operators.
- Supervise load teams.
- Perform joint inspections.

Table D-5. Road Movement Checklist

- Obtain convoy clearance, if required.
- Forward the request for movement support to POMSO/EOC.
- Update the movement roster.
- Brief communications procedures.
- Disseminate strip maps, to include primary and alternate routes.
- Ensure that the selected route has the needed support facilities.
- Ensure that appropriate accident documents are on hand.
- Conduct road movement.
- Perform PMCS on vehicles (to include trailers).
- Fill all fuel cans.
- Ensure that all required BII are available and serviceable.
- Ensure that all required safety equipment is available and serviceable.
- Ensure that all equipment is loaded and configured properly.
- Mark vehicles properly.
- Dispatch vehicles properly.
- Ensure that all drivers have highway maps for all states through which the unit will travel.
- Issue the movement brief.
- Report accidents to local LEAs.

Table D-6. Response Checklist

- Identify and link up with the IC.
- Receive the initial intelligence situation brief (command section).
- Receive the IC intent, and develop the CST commander's objectives.
- Issue the WO and establish priorities of work.
- Ensure that the LNO reports to the ICP.
- Establish communications with the ICP, POMSO, TAG, and EOC.
- Backbrief the IC on the incident action and site safety plans.
- Issue the final OPORD and mission brief.
- Establish and identify the following sites: cold, warm, and hot zones; OPCEN; entry and exit points; exclusion areas; safe refuge areas; decontamination area; staging area; rest and recovery area; and dress-out and gear storage area.
- Ensure that the area sketch and control measures are briefed in the site safety plan and that they are understood by all members.
- Establish and maintain FP measures, and ensure that protective postures are adhered to at all times.
- Ensure that all personnel adhere to CST communication procedures.
- Ensure that the CST safety officer has confirmed that the CST decontamination line is operational and has been certified by the site safety officer.
- Ensure that the CST operations officer has coordinated movement of hot-zone entry teams to the edge of the warm and hot zones.
- Ensure that the CST operations officer has informed the CST commander that teams are ready to enter the hot zone.
- Establish proper tagging and storage procedures for all contaminated clothing and equipment.
- Monitor work and rest cycles.

Table D-7. Postincident Checklist

- Account for all personnel.
- Conduct an outbrief and AAR with the IC.
- Account for all equipment.
- Perform all required PMCS.
- Submit the final personnel and equipment status to the operations officer.
- Load vehicles for departure.
- Issue the movement brief.
- Line up vehicles for movement.
- Conduct movement according to the deployment checklist.
- Reinspect, reinventory, and repair all assigned equipment.
- Store and pack all equipment for deployment.
- Conduct section AARs.
- Conduct a team AAR with the commander or deputy, and include any changes to the following: SOP, load plans, alert procedures, CONPLANs, operations, code words, communication procedures, control measures, sequence of events, and changes to the list of PIR.
- Submit a formal AAR, closing report, and cost report to TAG and POMSO.

Appendix E

Reporting

Reporting during an incident or CBRNE emergency is as important as the response. The CST must receive timely and accurate information to effectively support the response. The CST also provides timely and accurate information that reinforces the decision-making process at all tiers of the response. This appendix provides sample guidance on report formats and procedures in order to minimize communications and properly frame the actual events at the incident site. Sample reporting formats in this appendix provide the detailed information generally required by the chain of command.

REPORTING TIMELINES

E-1. Due to the potential catastrophic effects of a CBRNE situation, a timely DOD response at the state and federal levels will be critical. Personnel at all levels of the approval process will expedite their actions and communications to support these missions.

E-2. During operations, the reporting sequence will be from the CST to the state command EOC for internal distribution and external transmission to the NGB EOC. The NGB will assemble the provided information and transmit the needed information to the director of military support (DOMS).

E-3. Unit organic secure communications assets are the primary means to communicate classified information.

E-4. Copies of all warning, planning, alert, and execution orders published by the state NG command authority will be furnished to the NGB EOC for distribution.

NOTE. See Table E-1, page E-2, for reporting timelines.

Table E-1. Reporting Timelines

Report	To	Timeline
Deployment report	State EOC	Not later than 30 minutes after departure and arrival
SITREP	State EOC	1200Z/2400Z while deployed; as of 1000Z/2200Z
SITREP (Quick)	State EOC	As required
RFS	CMSUPCEN or state EOC	As required by procedures
Request for information	State EOC/appropriate agencies	As required
Redeployment report	State EOC	NLT 30 minutes after departure and return to home station
OPREP3	State EOC	Initial voice within 15 minutes; written with 1 hour
Postmission report	State EOC/STARC/NGB	As soon as possible upon completion of the mission or according to higher-level guidance

RESPONSIBILITIES

E-5. The CST is responsible for transmitting reports in accordance with the timelines specified in applicable OPLANs/OPORDs. Both state area coordinators (STARCs) and NGB EOC are responsible for 24-hour, 7-day per week coverage, prior to, during, and after operations.

REPORTS

E-6. The CST provides reports for CBRNE response to the state EOC. These reports are used to immediately notify appropriate authorities for any significant event or incident of national-level interest. The reports must be timely, concise, and include enough information to allow action addresses to fully understand the situation and provide information to other levels as required. For example, operational reports (OPREPs), deployment reports, SITREPs, RFS, and reports used during redeployments will be submitted according to OPLAN/OPORD/SOP requirements. (See Tables E-2 to E-8, pages E-3 to E-10.)

OPERATIONS REPORT

E-7. An OPREP3 should be sent in the following situations (the list is illustrative and should not be considered all-inclusive):

- Interstate movement of a CST.
- Movement of a CST by rotary or fixed-wing aircraft.
- A positive finding of CBRNE.

- Injury of a member (such as type of injury and disposition), vehicle accident resulting in a loss of the vehicle, or injury to a civilian because of a CST action.
- Significant loss or contamination of equipment. (such as contaminated, improved chemical agent monitor [ICAM], vehicle).
- Additional CBRNE hazards discovered or identified at the incident site.
- Receipt of significant intelligence of an anticipated WME-related terrorist act.

When to Submit OPREP3 Reports

E-8. All OPREP3 reports will be submitted as soon as possible after an incident has occurred and sent at Flash precedence. The goal is to make initial voice reports within 15 minutes of an incident, with message reports submitted within 1 hour of an incident. Initial OPREP3s must not be delayed to gain additional information. Follow-up reports can be submitted as additional information becomes available.

Method of Transmission

E-9. OPREP3s will be reported by the fastest means available, consistent with security constraints. Reporting methodology is as soon as possible using voice reporting and appropriate secure/nonsecure means followed by amplifying record copy communications. Secure communications will be used for all classified reporting.

E-10. Sample OPREPs are shown in Tables E-2, below, and E-3, page E-4.

Table E-2. OPREP3 (Voice Format) (Example)

Voice Format:

"This is Pinnacle/Commander's Assessment from Commander, CST to STARC." Describe the current situation and actions being taken as a result.

Table E-3. OPREP3 (Message Format) (Example)

(PRECEDENCE: PINNACLE) FROM: COMMANDER, XX CST TO: TAG (STATE) INFO: NGB-CS CLASSIFICATION OPER/XXXXXX// MSGID/OPREP-3PCA/CST COMMANDER// RF/A/XXXX/DTG// AMPN/VOICE REPORT TO STARC// FLAG WORD/PINNACLE/COMMANDER'S ASSESSMENT// GENTEXT/COMMANDER'S ASSESSMENT// 1. () STATE THE EVENT. INCLUDE THE VOICE REPORT DATE-TIME GROUP. 2. () STATE THE REPORTED EVENT AND THE RESULT. 3. () STATE THE CASUALTIES RESULTING FROM THE EVENT. 4. () STATE KNOWLEDGE ON INTENTIONS OR INTELLIGENCE. 5. () STATE STATUS AND POSITION OF US FORCES. 6. () STATE IMMEDIATE SUPPORT. 7. () ANTICIPATE FURTHER OPREP3 ON THIS INCIDENT//

OTHER REPORTS

E-11. The CST is required to provide reports for response to operations utilizing the appropriate message formats. Reports will be submitted at periodic intervals (such as 1300Z and 0100Z) or, as scheduled by the state EOC/STARC/NGB-CS or as significant events occur throughout the phases of the operations. The following sample reports are included in this appendix:

- Deployment Report, page E-5.
- Situation Report, page E-6.
- Request for Support, page E-7.
- Request for Information, page E-9.
- Redeployment Report, page E-10.

Table E-4. Deployment Report Format (Example)

FROM: XX CST

TO: STARC

INFO: NGB-CS

PRECEDENCE (AS APPROPRIATE)

CLASSIFICATION

SUBJ/DEPLOYMENT REPORT/

GENTEXT/GENERAL SITUATION//DISCUSS CIRCUMSTANCES LEADING TO DEPLOYMENT. AUTHORITY THAT DEPLOYED THE UNIT(S), ANTICIPATED EXPANSE OF THE WMD SITUATION TO INCLUDE PRELIMINARY CASUALTY ESTIMATES OR PROPERTY DAMAGE//

GENTEXT/DEPLOYMENT//DTG OF CST AND THE LOCATION/DEPLOYMENT DTD OF ADVON AND LOCATION/DEPLOYMENT DTG OF MAIN BODY OF THE CST AND LOCATION AT FORWARD STAGING BASE//

GENTEXT/MEDICAL//MILITARY PERSONNEL HOSPITALIZED OR INJURED, REASON FOR HOSPITALIZATION //INJURY//

GENTEXT/LOCATION OF ICP, JOC, EXCLUSION AND SUPPORT ZONES, PERMISSIBLE LINES OF COMM INTO THE JOINT OPERATIONS AREA//

GENTEXT/SUMMARY OF OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY FOR NEXT 24 HOURS, TO INCLUDE RESPONSE AND ASSESSMENT OPERATIONS, INTERAGENCY COORDINATION, AND ANTICIPATED CM ACTIVITIES//

GENTEXT/ANTICIPATED SUSTAINMENT DURATION FROM ON-HAND AND LOCAL LOGISTICS SUPPORT PRIOR TO RESUPPLY//

GENTEXT/COMMUNICATIONS-CONNECTIVITY/POC//

Table E-5. Situation Report—SITREP (FLASH) (Example)

FROM: XX CST
TO: STARC
INFO: NGB-CS
PRECEDENCE: FLASH
CLASSIFICATION
SUBJ/SITUATION REPORT/
GENTEXT/SITUATION//
GENTEXT/INTELLIGENCE//
GENTEXT//OPERATIONS//
GENTEXT//LOGISTICS//
GENTEXT//COMMUNICATIONS-CONNECTIVITY/POCS//
GENTEXT/PERSONNEL//(DETAIL SERVICE, LOCATION, MISSION, AND NUMBERS)//
GENTEXT MEDICAL///MILITARY PERSONNEL HOSPITALIZED OR INJURED, REASON FOR HOSPITALIZATION/INJURY)//
GENTEXT/INTERAGENCY COORDINATION//
GENTEXT/DOMESTIC SUPPORT ACTIVITIES//
GENTEXT/COMMANDER'S COMMENTS TO INCLUDE, AS A MINIMUM—
A. EVENTS OF LAST 12 HOURS.
B. EVENT OF NEXT 12 HOURS

Table E-6. Request for Support (Example)

FROM: XX CST

TO: DIRECTORATE OF LOGISTICS (DOL)/USPFO (NAME OF STATE)

FOR: CMSUPCEN

INFO: CNGB/NGB-CS

PRECEDENCE: ROUTINE/PRIORITY/URGENT

CLASSIFICATION

SUBJ/REQUEST FOR NONSTANDARD MISSION-UNIQUE EQUIPMENT AND LOGISTICS SUPPORT/

1. () GENERAL.
 - A. UNIT TO BE SUPPORTED.
 - B. WHEN SUPPORT IS REQUIRED.
 - C. LOCATION OF SUPPORTED UNIT WHEN SUPPORT IS REQUIRED.
 - D. UNIT POCS.
 - E. NUMBER OF PERSONNEL TO BE SUPPORTED.
2. () CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS//GENERAL SUMMARY OF THE UNIT'S OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY OVER THE PAST 24 HOURS, AND NEXT 24 HOURS TO INCLUDE RESPONSE AND ASSESSMENT OPERATIONS, INTERAGENCY COORDINATION, AND ANTICIPATED CM ACTIVITIES BASED ON VALIDATED REQUESTS FOR ASSISTANCE//
3. () LOCATION OF CST, CP, FORWARD STAGING BASE, ICP, JOC.
4. () EMERGENCY RESUPPLY PUSH MISSION PACKAGES CONSISTING OF CUSTOM-BUILT NONSTANDARD MISSION-UNIQUE EQUIPMENT STORED AS CONTINGENCY SUPPLIES AT THE CMSUPCEN.
 - A. NONSTANDARD OPERATIONAL EQUIPMENT.
 - B. NONSTANDARD CDE.
 - C. CLASS IX (REPAIR PARTS) TO SUPPORT WME-UNIQUE EQUIPMENT.
5. () EMERGENCY PROCUREMENTS CONSISTING OF CUSTOMIZED NONSTANDARD CST-UNIQUE EQUIPMENT THAT MUST BE PURCHASED FROM OUTSIDE SOURCES AND DELIVERY EXPEDITED TO MEET URGENT OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS.
 - A. SPECIAL EQUIPMENT. LIST ANY SPECIAL CLASS II EQUIPMENT REQUIRED OVER AND ABOVE THAT ALREADY AUTHORIZED AND ON HAND. LIST BY NOMENCLATURE, NSN, AND QUANTITY TO MEET MISSION-SPECIFIC TECHNICAL CAPABILITIES.
 - B. SPECIAL CLOTHING REQUIREMENTS. DETERMINE REQUIREMENTS FOR CLOTHING ABOVE NORMAL ISSUE TO MEET ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS DUE TO TEMPERATURE.
 - C. ADDITIONAL EQUIPMENT. DETERMINE REQUIREMENTS FOR ADDITIONAL ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT TO SATISFY OPERATIONAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS, SUCH AS TRUCKS, TENTAGE, AND GENERATORS. LIST BY NOMENCLATURE, NSN, AND QUANTITY.

Table E-6. Request for Support (Example) (continued)

6. () MAINTENANCE AND CALIBRATION.
- A. SPECIAL-PURPOSE VEHICLE SUPPORT FOR EITHER THE UCS OR THE MALS.
 - B. RESPONSE VEHICLE SUPPORT ABOVE REGIONAL FLEET MANAGEMENT CAPABILITIES.
 - C. MAINTENANCE AUGMENTATION. DETERMINE THE REQUIREMENTS FOR MAINTENANCE AUGMENTATION TO SUPPORT TDA EQUIPMENT.
 - D. MISSION-UNIQUE EQUIPMENT. OTHER NONSTANDARD OR COMMERCIAL EQUIPMENT. LIST BY TYPE, MODEL NUMBER, MANUFACTURER, DENSITY, AND DELINEATE REPAIR PARTS SUPPORT FOR THE COMMERCIAL/NONSTANDARD EQUIPMENT.
7. () SERVICES.
- A. FIELD SERVICES.
 - B. ENGINEERING SERVICES.
 - C. LOCAL SUBSISTENCE.
 - D. HOUSING AND LAUNDRY.
8. () TRANSPORTATION.
- A. () AIR TRANSPORTATION.
 - 1) UNIT LOAD PLANS FOR EQUIPMENT (PALLETIZED OR NONPALLETIZED), PERSONNEL, AND VEHICLES. IDENTIFY ADDITIONAL MHE AND PERSONNEL AT THE ARRIVAL AIRFIELD.
 - 2) 463L PALLETS. DETERMINE REQUIREMENTS FOR 463L PALLETS AT LOCATION. SPECIFY HOW MANY.
 - 3) AIRFIELD CAPABILITIES. PROVIDE PRIMARY, ALTERNATE, CONTINGENCY, AND EMERGENCY AIRFIELD LOCATIONS DESCRIBING SERVICES, HOURS OF OPERATION, AND CAPABILITY TO HANDLE C-130S, C-141S, C-5S, AND OTHERS (SPECIFY).
 - 4) AIR LANDING AND DROP ZONES.
 - B. () GROUND TRANSPORTATION.
 - 1) COMMERCIAL CARGO AND PERSONNEL.
 - 2) MILITARY TRANSPORT VEHICLES.
9. () COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS/ REMARKS. DELINEATE WHERE TO LINK UP FOR RECEIPT OF SUPPLIES, SERVICES, MAINTENANCE, REPAIRS, AND EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION TO VALIDATE SHIPPER AND RECEIVER. LIST PRIMARY, ALTERNATE, CONTINGENCY, AND EMERGENCY COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS.

Table E-7. Request for Information (Example)

FROM: XX CST

TO: STARC

PRECEDENCE: ROUTINE/PRIORITY/URGENT

CLASSIFICATION

SUBJ/REQUEST FOR INFORMATION

1. () SITUATION//GENERAL SUMMARY OF THE UNIT'S OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY OVER THE PAST 24 HOURS AND THE NEXT 24 HOURS TO INCLUDE RESPONSE AND ASSESSMENT OPERATIONS, INTERAGENCY COORDINATION, AND ANTICIPATED CM ACTIVITIES BASED ON VALIDATED REQUESTS FOR ASSISTANCE//

2. () INFORMATION REQUIRED//LIST OF QUESTIONS THAT NEED TO BE ADDRESSED, WITH POSSIBLE SOURCES, AND WHEN INFORMATION IS REQUIRED.

3. () POC.

DECLASSIFY/ORIGINATING AGENCY'S DETERMINATION REQUIRED

Table E-8. Redeployment Report Format (Example)

FROM: XX CST

TO: STARC

INFO: NGB-CS

PRECEDENCE: ROUTINE/PRIORITY/URGENT

CLASSIFICATION

SUBJ/DEPLOYMENT REPORT/

GENTEXT/GENERAL SITUATION//DISCUSSING CIRCUMSTANCES LEADING TO REDEPLOYMENT, AUTHORITY THAT DEPLOYS THE UNIT(S), END RECAPITULATION OF EXPANSE OF THE WMD EMERGENCY, TO INCLUDE CASUALTY ESTIMATES OR PROPERTY DAMAGE//

GENTEXT/REDEPLOYMENT//DTG OF CST AND LOCATION/REDEPLOYMENT DTG OF ADVON OF THE CST AND LOCATION/REDEPLOYMENT DTG OF MAIN BODY OF THE CST AND LOCATION/REDEPLOYMENT OF STAY-BEHIND ELEMENTS AND LOCATION//

GENTEXT/MEDICAL//(MILITARY PERSONNEL HOSPITALIZED OR INJURED, REASON FOR HOSPITALIZATION/INJURY)//

GENTEXT/LOCATION OF ICP, JOC, EXCLUSION AND SUPPORT ZONE, PERMISSIBLE LOC INTO THE JOA//

GENTEXT/SUMMARY OF OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY FOR NEXT 24 HOURS TO RECOVERY OPERATIONS/MOVEMENT TIMES OF REDEPLOYING UNITS, AND EXPECTED RELEASE OF PERSONNEL//

GENTEXT/COMMUNICATIONS-CONNECTIVITY/POC AND ANTICIPATED AAR COMPLETION//

DECLASSIFY/ORIGINATING AGENCY'S DETERMINATION REQUIRED//

QUICK REFERENCE MESSAGE FORMATS

E-12. CST quick reference message formats include the postmission report and the SITREP (quick).

Postmission Report

E-13. The postmission report will be submitted to the state EOC/STARC (see Table E-9).

Table E-9. Postmission Report (Example)

PROWORD

PARAGRAPH.

USE OF NAMES, CODE NAMES, OR NUMBERS ARE AUTHORIZED.

(1) LOCATION (NEAREST 100 METERS).

(2) CST FORCES KILLED.

(3) CST FORCES MISSING.

(4) CST FORCES WOUNDED.

(5) NON-CST RESCUED.

(6) NON-CST WOUNDED.

(7) NON-CST DEAD.

(8) ADDITIONAL INFORMATION.

(9) SENSITIVE-ITEM ACCOUNTABILITY.

(10) DTG OF AAR.

(11) OPEN ACTIONS.

SITREP (Quick)

E-14. The SITREP (quick) report will be submitted to the state EOC/STARC (see Table E-10).

Table E-10. Situation Report (QUICK)

PROWORD – QUICK

PARAGRAPH

1. LOCATION.

2. ASSETS ON SITE.

3. MAJOR ACTIVITIES SINCE LAST REPORT.

4. PROJECTED MAJOR ACTIVITIES (WHAT, WHERE, AND WHEN).

5. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION.

6. AS-OF TIME.

Appendix F

Sample Operations Plan and Warning Order

This appendix provides a sample deliberate CST OPLAN and a sample WO with a brief description. While no-notice responses generally utilize WOs, preplanned events that allow for deliberate planning can utilize an OPLAN.

F-1. A sample OPLAN is shown in Figure F-1.

(Classification)	
Copy ____ of ____ copies	
Issuing HQ	
Place of Issue	
DTG of signature	
Message reference number	
OPORD _____ (code name) State EMA Mission Number.	
References.	
Time zone used throughout order.	
Task organization.	
1. SITUATION.	
a. Incident.	
(1) Incident location.	
(2) Incident name.	
(3) Incident description (brief).	
(4) Victim information.	
(a) Signs/symptoms/history.	
(b) Number of victims (killed/casualties/potentially affected).	
(c) Location at point of injury.	

Figure F-1. CST OPLAN (Sample)

(d) Decontamination (when, where, method of decontamination, method of confirmation of decontamination).

b. Environment.

(1) Weather.

(a) Present (next 12 hours).

- Temperature (ambient/wet-dry bulb).
- Humidity/precipitation.
- Barometric pressure.
- Wind speed.
- Wind direction (from).
- Cloud cover.
- Pertinent light data (time of day, estimated time of sunrise/sunset/moonrise/moonset, moon phase, percent nighttime illumination).

(b) Effects of present weather on personnel.

(c) 12-24 hours.

- General forecast.
- High/low temperature.
- Barometric pressure trends.
- Pertinent light data (time of day, estimated time of sunrise/sunset/moonrise/moonset, moon phase, percent nighttime illumination).

(d) 24-48 Hours.

- General forecast.
- High/low temperature.
- Barometric pressure trends.
- Pertinent light data (time of day, estimated time of sunrise/sunset/moonrise/moonset, moon phase, percent nighttime illumination).

(e) Effects of next 12-48 hours of weather on personnel, equipment, incident area and site.

(2) Incident area and site.

(a) Area.

- Terrain.
- Population.
- Avenues of approach.
- Congested areas/obstacles.

Figure F-1. CST OPLAN (Sample) (Continued)

- (b) Detailed description of incident site.
- (c) IC defined exclusion area.
- (d) Key surrounding areas potentially affected by hazard.
- c. Threat. The CST considerations for the threat assessment should consider what actions have occurred at an incident site and the likelihood of possible future adversary COAs. Address the possibility of multiple terrorist events being conducted simultaneously or the use of secondary improvised explosive or chemical devices aimed toward debilitating the capabilities of responders. If a separate intelligence annex is not being produced, current intelligence should be discussed in this paragraph.
 - (1) Perpetrator identification, ideology/goals (if known).
 - (2) Tentative CBRNE identification.
 - (a) Known agent(s).
 - (b) Probable agent(s).
 - (c) Dispersion method.
 - (d) Plume (hazard modeling).
 - (3) Secondary devices/additional hazards.
- d. Higher/supporting agencies (POC name, contact number). The plan should include the mission, the commander's intent, and the concept of operations for HQ one and two levels up (if available) and identify status of the CST (such as Title 32, Title 10). Subparagraphs identify additional military response elements being deployed to a site. FRAGOs can be used to update this information as the situation matures. Any units whose actions would have a significant bearing on the CST should also be included. If known, information concerning the ICS for the AO may be included.
 - (1) Higher commander's mission.
 - (2) Higher commander's intent.
 - (3) Requesting state EOC.
 - (4) Requesting state NG EOC.
 - (5) C² state NG EOC.
 - (6) DTRA.
 - (7) DOD SMEs.
 - (a) Chemical.
 - (b) Biological.
 - (c) Radiological.
 - (d) Nuclear.
 - (e) High-yield explosives.
 - (f) Hazard modeling.
- e. Incident command (POC name, agency, contact number or frequency).
 - (1) Single or unified command.
 - (2) IC.
 - (3) Safety officer.

Figure F-1. CST OPLAN (Sample) (Continued)

- (4) Information officer.
- (5) LNO.
- (6) Planning section.
- (7) Operations section.
- (8) Logistics section.
- (9) Finance/Administrative section.

f. Crisis or CM assets available (attachments and detachments). Do not repeat information already listed under task organization or in Annex A (Task Organization). Try to put all information in the task organization or in Annex A and state, "See Task Organization" or "See Annex A." However, when not in the task organization, list the assets that are attached or detached to the HQ that issues the order. State when attachment or detachment is to be effective if different from when OPORD or OPLAN is effective.

- (1) HAZMAT.
- (2) Decontamination.
- (3) EMS.
- (4) Fire services.
- (5) Local law enforcement/security.
- (6) Local bomb squad.
- (7) Federal or military EOD.
- (8) Hospitals.
- (9) State agencies.
- (10) Federal agencies.
- (11) Volunteer organizations.
- (12) Other.

2. MISSION.

State the mission derived during the planning process. There are no subparagraphs in a mission statement which will also cover on-order missions. The mission statement should be short, concise, and focus on the efforts of the CST (such as, By order of the governor _____ WMD CST deploys NLT (time) _____ to (location) _____ to assess a potential hazard, advise the IC on CBRNE-related aspects of CM, and facilitate the mobilization of additional military and federal assets to assist in CM in order to prevent loss of life, human suffering, and property damage).

3. CONCEPT OF OPERATION.

a. Commander's intent. States the commander's intent derived during the planning process, describes the commander's vision of the operations, describes the purpose, visualizes the end state, and illustrates how the operation will facilitate future operations.

- (1) Key tasks (IC objectives).
- (2) Desired end state.

Figure F-1. CST OPLAN (Sample) (Continued)

b. Concept of the operation (general). The concept of the operation may be a single paragraph, may be divided into two or more subparagraphs or, if unusually lengthy, may be prepared as a separate annex. The concept of the operation should be based on the COA statement from the decision-making process and, at a minimum, will provide sufficient detail to ensure understanding of the commander's intent and purpose. It should specify the priority of support and the tasks allocated to the CST. The concept describes—

- The employment of the CST.
- The identification of any FP issues and their implementation.
- The integration of other major organizations within the incident response system. These include military (other NG), reserve, and active forces that may be involved in incident mitigation.
- Any other aspects of the operation the commander considers appropriate to clarify the concept and to ensure unity of effort. If the integration and coordination are too lengthy for this paragraph, they are addressed in the appropriate annexes.

When an operation involves two or more clearly distinct and separate phases, the concept of operations may be prepared in subparagraphs describing each phase. Designate phases as "Phase" followed by the appropriate Roman numeral, for example, Phase I.

NOTE: Depending on what the commander considers appropriate, the level of command, and the complexity of any given operation, the following subparagraphs are examples of what may be required within the concept of operations.

R&S. This paragraph should specify the R&S plan and how it ties in with the basic concept of operations.

OPSEC. The plan identifies on-scene security requirements.

Environmental considerations. The plan should identify whether the incident site falls into a geographic area with unique environmental considerations (such as local population, industrial base, soil composition).

Coordinating instructions. List only instructions applicable to two or more units and not routinely covered in unit SOPs. This is always the last subparagraph in paragraph 3. Complex instructions should be referred to in an annex. The following information should be included:

- Time or condition when a plan or an order becomes effective.
- CCIR. List PIR, EEFI, FFIR, and risk reduction control measures.

Figure F-1. CST OPLAN (Sample) (Continued)

- (1) Phase I, Predeployment—continuous unit operations end upon alert notification.
 - (a) Mobilization records.
 - (b) Daily PERSTAT/LOGSTAT reports.
- (2) Phase II, Deployment—begins at receipt of the mission and ends upon arrival at the incident site assembly area.
 - (a) Alert notification/assembly procedures.
 - (b) Deployment the CST unit.
 - (c) WO/OPORD.
 - (d) Convoy operations.
- (3) Phase III, Response Operations—begins in the assembly area and ends at the completion of IC assigned tasks.
 - (a) Perform liaison operations/quartering.
 - (b) Conduct unit decontamination operations.
 - (c) Establish and maintain OPCEN.
 - (d) Establish and maintain communications operations.
 - (e) Provide logistical support operations.
 - (f) Conduct administrative support operations.
 - (g) Conduct medical support operations.
 - (h) Conduct CB survey operations.
 - (i) Conduct radiological survey operations.
 - (j) Conduct assessments.
- (4) Phase IV, Redeployment—begins at the completion of IC assigned tasks and ends upon return to unit area.
- (5) Phase V, Recovery—begins upon return to the unit area and ends when all sensitive items and equipment are inventoried and secure.
 - c. Subunit missions (composition, location).
 - (1) ADVON.
 - (2) First sortie.
 - (3) Second sortie.
 - (4) Command.
 - (5) Liaison.
 - (6) Modeler.
 - (7) OPCEN.
 - (8) A&L.
 - (9) Communications.

Figure F-1. CST OPLAN (Sample) (Continued)

- (10) MALS.
- (11) Medical treatment.
- (12) First hot-zone entry.
 - (a) Survey.
 - (b) Backup.
 - (c) Decontamination line.
- (13) Second hot-zone entry.
 - (a) Survey.
 - (b) Backup.
 - (c) Decontamination line.
- d. Key personnel (name, location).
 - (1) Commander.
 - (2) Liaison.
 - (3) Operations.
 - (4) Survey.
 - (5) Decontamination.
- e. Medical disqualified (personnel identified as a risk for dress out).
- f. Detailed instructions (such as security, ROE).
- g. Routes to incident site.
 - (1) Primary.
 - (a) Route.
 - (b) Checkpoints.
 - (c) Rally points.
 - (d) Forward staging area.
 - (2) Alternate.
 - (a) Criteria for use.
 - (b) Route.
 - (c) Checkpoints.
 - (d) Rally points.
 - (e) Forward staging area.
 - (3) Actions if break in contact during movement.
 - (4) Actions if breakdown during movement.
 - (5) Actions if loss of communications during movement.

Figure F-1. CST OPLAN (Sample) (Continued)

- h. Forward staging area.
 - (1) Estimated time of arrival at the forward staging area.
 - (a) ADVON.
 - (b) First sortie.
 - (c) Second sortie
 - (2) Actions of main body in the staging area.
- i. Actions at the incident site.
 - (1) ETA at the incident site.
 - (a) ADVON.
 - (b) First sortie.
 - (c) Second sortie.
 - (2) Site contamination check.
 - (3) Plan if site contaminated (alternate site).
 - (4) IC liaison/site occupation.
 - (5) Priorities of work.
 - (6) Tentative timeline.
 - (7) Sampling plan.
 - (8) Priority of decontamination.
 - (9) Hasty withdrawal plan.
- j. Coordinating instructions.
 - (1) Uniform.
 - (a) Common items worn by all.
 - (b) Cold-zone uniform—survey/decontamination.
 - (c) Cold-zone uniform—all others.
 - (d) Decontamination line PPE.
 - (e) Survey team PPE.
 - (f) Backup team PPE.
 - (2) Tentative timeline—time(s) of departure.
 - (3) Rehearsals.
 - (4) Inspections.
 - (5) PIR

Figure F-1. CST OPLAN (Sample) (Continued)

4. SERVICE SUPPORT.

Address service support in the areas shown below as needed to clarify the service support concept. Refer to annexes, if required. Subparagraphs can include:

- Support concept. State the concept of logistics support to provide personnel a visualization of how the operation will be logistically supported.
- Material and services.
- Medical evacuation and hospitalization.
- Personnel support.

a. General.

- (1) Logistics SOP is in effect for sustainment operations.
- (2) A&L section will be collocated with the TOC.
- (3) Damaged equipment will be reported to the A&L immediately.
- (4) Medical treatment will be located in the survey dress out/medical rehabilitation and surveillance area.

b. Materials and services.

(1) Supply.

(a) Class I: Unit will deploy with a 72-hour supply of MREs.

(b) Class III: Class III items will be locally purchased using the vehicle-assigned GSA fuel card.

(c) Classes II and VII: Sections are to deploy with 72-hour basic load. CMSUPCEN will forward the prescribed push packages at H+8, H+24, H+48, and H+72.

(d) Class VIII: Medical section will deploy with 72-hour basic load. Emergency items will be locally purchased or requested through USPFO or CMSUPCEN.

(e) Class IX: Items will be requested through USPFO or CMSUPCEN.

(f) Distribution methods:

- Ration plan: Unit logistics NCO will issue three MREs daily. Unit contract meals can be provided.
- Medical: Unit logistics NCO will issue supplies to medical section; unit's medical section will resupply combat lifesaver or EMT, as needed.
- Repair parts: Issued by unit logistic NCO.

(2) Transportation. See unit movement plan.

Figure F-1. CST OPLAN (Sample) (Continued)

- (3) Services.
- (4) Maintenance. Operators will continue to perform before, during, and after PMCS. Findings will be reported to the unit logistic NCO for coordination with CMSUPCEN or appropriate maintenance support.
- c. Medical evacuation (method/priorities).
- d. Personnel (method of cordoning off the unit AOs and managing the entrance/exit point, designation of medical area).
- e. Miscellaneous.
- (1) Special equipment.
- (2) Contaminated equipment. Describe how this will be handled.
5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL.
- Command. State the map coordinates for the CST OPCEN and the ICS CP. Identify the chain of command if not addressed in unit SOPs.
 - Signal. List signal instructions not specified in unit SOPs. Identify the specific signal operating instructions in effect, required reports and formats, and times the reports are submitted. Identify any unique frequency management issues in the AO.
 - a. Command.
 - (1) Provide the EOC location.
 - (2) Provide phone numbers for the EOC.
 - (3) Identify where the commander will be located.
 - (a) Phase I, unit HQ.
 - (b) Phase II, briefing area/CMD vehicle.
 - (c) Phase III, ICP/unit TOC.
 - (d) Phase IV, Command vehicle/unit HQ.
 - (e) Phase V, unit HQ/MSCA.
 - (4) Succession of Command: commander, deputy commander, operations officer, followed by date of rank.
 - b. Signal.
 - (1) Communications plan.
 - (2) Methods of communications (by priority).
 - (a) UCS.
 - Voice. Unsecure/secure telephone; unsecure/secure HF; or unsecure/secure UHF SATCOM.
 - Data.
 - (b) International maritime satellite. Unsecure/secure voice; non-secure Internet protocol router network.

Figure F-1. CST Plan (Sample) (Continued)

- (3) Signals (hand and arm).
 - (4) Signals (audible).
 - (5) Code words.
 - (6) Challenge/password. The challenge/password system will be briefed at the initial team briefing and updated as necessary.
 - (7) Recognition signals. Primary recognition signals for both day and night will be via FM radio. Primary recognition signal for night will be the military issue flashlight with red lens (blinking the light on and off three times). The primary recognition signal for day will be personal recognition and/or ID card.
 - (8) Special instructions. Use of code words will be implemented by the commander or his designated representative. Use of challenge/password will be implemented by the commander or his designated representative. Any change in frequencies or radio configuration will be directed and implemented by the communications team through the commander or his designated representative.
 - (9) Provide time check.
6. SAFETY.
- a. Safety briefing.
 - (1) Weather.
 - (a) Current temperature.
 - (b) Cold-/hot-weather hazards. Hydration (rate of consumption).
 - (2) Lifting.
 - (a) Use multiple-person lifts when lifting heavy/uneven objects.
 - (b) Use proper lifting techniques; use your legs, not your back.
 - (c) Use a guide when moving large/heavy objects to clear any hazards.
 - (3) Communications.
 - (a) Avoid antenna fields that are marked; these areas will have both tripping and radio frequency radiation hazards.
 - (b) Avoid electrical cables, wires, and grounding rods.
 - (c) Follow the proper procedures, and wear required personal protection (gloves, goggles, hard hat and safety boots) for erecting and stowing antennas.
 - (4) Vehicles.
 - (a) Use seatbelt (mandatory).
 - (b) Use lights when operating a vehicle.
 - (c) Use ground guides when parking, backing, and moving in heavily populated areas (assistant driver's responsibility).
 - (d) Observe posted speed limits and roadway signs.
 - (5) Unit operations.
 - (a) Be situational aware of all hazards (identify, mitigate, notify, and supervise).
 - (b) Be aware of shock hazards; avoid them if possible.
 - (c) Follow the proper procedures for safe operation of equipment.

Figure F-1. CST OPLAN (Sample) (Continued)

- (d) Use buddy teams at all times.
- (e) Wear the appropriate PPE.
- (f) Eat, drink, and rest in designated areas.
- (6) Conclusion.
 - (a) Safety is everyone's responsibility.
 - (b) Stop unsafe acts.
 - (c) Halt potentially unsafe activities/conditions and notify a supervisor.
 - (d) Follow policies, procedures, directives, and standards.
 - (e) Use common sense at all times.

(Classification)

Figure F-1. CST OPLAN (Sample) (Continued)

F-2. A sample WO is shown in Figure F-2.

(Classification) (Change from oral orders, if any) (Optional)
WOs DO NOT AUTHORIZE EXECUTION UNLESS SPECIFICALLY STATED
Copy ____ of ____ copies Issuing HQ Place of issue DTG of signature Message reference number
WARNING ORDER _____ References. Refer to higher HQ OPLAN/OPORD, and identify map sheet for operation (optional). Time zone used throughout the order (optional). Task organization (optional) (see paragraph 1c). 1. SITUATION. a. Enemy forces. Include significant changes in enemy composition, dispositions and COAs. Information not available for inclusion in the initial WO can be included in subsequent WOs. b. Friendly forces (optional). Only address if essential to the WO. (1) Higher commander's mission. (2) Higher commander's intent. c. Attachments and detachments. Include initial task organization. Only address major unit changes. 2. MISSION. This lists issuing HQ mission at the time of the WO. This is nothing more than the higher HQ restated the mission or the commander's decisions during the MDMP. 3. EXECUTION. a. Intent. b. Concept of operations. Provide as much information as available. This may be no information during the initial WO. c. Tasks to maneuver units. This is any information on tasks to units for execution, movement, reconnaissance, or security.

Figure F-2. WO (Sample)

d. Tasks to combat support units. See paragraph 3c. e. Coordinating instructions. Include any information available at the time of the issuance of the WO. It may include the following: • CCIR. • Risk guidance. • Deception guidance. • Specific priorities, in order of completion. • Time line. • Guidance on orders and rehearsals. • Orders group meeting (attendees, location, and time). • Earliest movement time and degree of notice. 4. SERVICE SUPPORT (optional). Include any known logistics preparation for the operation. a. Special equipment. Identify requirements, and coordinate transfer to using units. b. Transportation. Identify requirements, and coordinate for pre-position of assets. 5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL (optional). a. Command. State the chain of command if it is different from the unit SOP. b. Signal. Identify the current SOI edition, and pre-position signal assets to support operation. ACKNOWLEDGE (mandatory). OFFICIAL: (Optional) NAME (commander's last name) RANK (commander's rank) (Classification)
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Figure F-2. WO (Sample) (Continued)

Appendix G

Reach-Back Capability and Federal Response Assets

Reach-back is a process that employs communications assets to identify and bring to bear resources not present at the site that support and integrate the advise, assess, and assistance mission of the CST. The FRP establishes a process and structure for the systematic, coordinated, and effective delivery of federal assistance to address the consequences of any major disaster or emergency declared under the Stafford Act and the Emergency Assistance Act. The FRP employs a functional approach that groups the 12 ESFs under the types of direct federal assistance that a state is most likely to need (such as mass care, health and medical services), and the kinds of federal operations support necessary to sustain federal response actions (such as transportation, communications). Each ESF is headed by a designated agency. ESFs are expected to support one another in carrying out their respective missions. CSTs can facilitate reach-back to the designated ESF authority (if required) in support of an incident response. The ESFs and their designated authorities are listed in Table G-1.

Table G-1. Emergency Support Function Designation Matrix

Emergency Support Function	Designated ESF Authority
Transportation	Department of Transportation
Communications	National Communications System
Public Works and Engineering	DOD
Firefighting	US Department of Agriculture
Information and Planning	FEMA
Mass Care	American Red Cross
Resource Support	GSA
Health and Medical Services	Department of Health and Human Services
Urban Search and Rescue	FEMA
Hazardous Materials	EPA
Food	USDA
Energy	DOE

GENERAL

G-1. Technical reach-back is the ability to contact technical SMEs when a technical issue exceeds the on-scene SME's capability. Reach back should be conducted using established unit protocols. Many of the listed reach-back resources have other primary missions and are not specifically resourced for reach-back. Issues may include the following:

- **Nonstandard agent identification of CBRNE and TIM.** CSTs are trained to detect and identify certain military warfare agents. If a TIM is used or is suspect, then CST personnel must obtain technical information. This information could include persistency, medical effects, and decontamination or protection requirements.
- **Modeling.** During CST operations, the spread of contamination must be limited. Technical reach-back should provide the ability for detailed analysis of the area to assist in determining downwind hazard areas and locating staging areas, OPCENs, decontamination sites, etc. Tools that can be used include decision support tools (such as hazard prediction and assessment capability), consequence assessment tool set, joint assessment of catastrophic events, etc.
- **Sample evacuation.** Sample evacuation can be an important part of CST operations. Sample evacuation of samples can provide critical information for patient treatment and/or be used as evidence for prosecution.
- **Hazard prediction.** Technical experts can use modeling to provide a better indication of where vapor, liquid, or aerosolized hazards may occur.

G-2. Reach back can be accomplished through various means, from the telephone to broadband satellites.

G-3. Reach back could also result in an RFA and in response to a validated RFA that could originate from an LFA (such as FEMA).

G-4. This appendix briefly addresses reach-back capability and various response agencies that could potentially respond to an incident.

TECHNICAL REACH-BACK CAPABILITIES

G-5. The following technical reach-back capability is available if technical issues exceed on-site, local SME capabilities (see Table G-2). Reach back should be conducted using established local protocols and SOPs.

Table G-2. Technical Reach-Back Points of Contact

National Response Center, Chemical Terrorism/Chemical Biological Hot Line	1-800-424-8802
Technical Chemical and Biological Assistance Hot Line	1-877-269-4496
DTRA	1-877-244-1187
AFRRI	1-301-295-0316/0530
USAMRIID	1-888-872-7443
USAMRICD	1-800-424-8802

NATIONAL RESPONSE CENTER, CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL HOT LINE

G-6. The National Response Center (NRC) mans the hot line service and serves as an emergency resource for first responders to request technical assistance during an incident. The intended users include trained emergency personnel, such as emergency operators and first responders (such as firefighters, police, and EMTs who arrive at the scene of a CB terrorist incident). Other potential users may include the state EOCs and hospitals that may treat victims of agent exposure.

G-7. The USCG operates the NRC, and trained operators staff the hot line 7-days a week, 24-hours a day. Operators use extensive databases and reference material in addition to having immediate access to the nation's top SMEs in the field of NBC agents. NRC duty officers take reports of actual or potential domestic terrorism and link emergency calls with applicable SMEs (such as US Army SBCCOM, USAMRICD) for technical assistance and with the FBI for federal response actions. The NRC also provides reports and notifications to other federal agencies, as necessary. Specialty areas include the following:

- Detection equipment.
- PPE.
- Decontamination systems and methods.
- Physical properties of CB agents.
- Toxicology information.
- Medical symptoms from exposure to CB agents.
- Treatment of exposure to CB agents.
- Hazard prediction models.
- Federal response assets.
- Applicable laws and regulations.

G-8. The CB hot line is a joint effort of the USCG, FBI, FEMA, EPA, DHHS, and DOD. The NRC is the entry point for the CB hot line. The NRC receives basic incident information and links the caller to the DOD and FBI CB and terrorism experts. These and other federal agencies can be accessed within a few minutes to provide technical assistance during a potential CB incident. If the situation warrants, a federal response action may be initiated.

G-9. Use the local established policies and procedures for requesting federal assistance before contacting the CB hot line. State and local officials can access the hot line in emergency circumstances by calling 1-800-424-8802.

TECHNICAL CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL ASSISTANCE HOT LINE

G-10. The US Army SBCCOM hotline provides technical assistance to emergency responders. The hotline is manned and operated 7-days a week, 24 hours a day. Technical CB assistance from SBCCOM can be obtained by calling 1-877-269-4496.

DEFENSE THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY

G-11. DTRA can provide technical reach-back information and services for on-scene personnel. The focal/coordination point for support is through the DTRA EOC.

ARMED FORCES RADIOBIOLOGY RESEARCH INSTITUTE

G-12. The Armed Forces Radiobiological Research Institute (AFRRI) can provide DOD technical support capability for nuclear/radiological incidents or accidents.

US ARMY MEDICAL RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF INFECTIOUS DISEASES

G-13. The USAMRIID provides medical and scientific SMEs and technical guidance to commanders and senior leaders on the prevention and treatment of hazardous diseases and prevention and the medical management of biological casualties. The USAMRIID serves as the DOD reference center for the identification of biological agents from clinical specimens and other sources. The USAMRIID can provide technical guidance for assessing and evaluating a biological terrorist incident from initial communication of the threat through incident resolution.

US ARMY MEDICAL RESEARCH INSTITUTE FOR CHEMICAL DEFENSE

G-14. The USAMRICD provides medical and scientific SMEs and technical guidance to commanders and senior leaders on the prevention and treatment of chemical casualties. The USAMRICD can provide technical guidance for assessing and evaluating a chemical terrorist incident from initial communications of the threat through incident resolution.

RESPONSE AGENCIES

G-15. This section describes military and government agencies that could be tasked to respond to a request for CM support. The discussion does not include all response agencies.

DEFENSE THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER

G-16. The DTRA OPCEN enables first responders and warfighters to deal with CBRNE threats through on-line assistance and provides a wide-band infrastructure for user support.

G-17. As part of the Combat Support Directorate in DTRA, the OPCEN is manned 7-days a week, 24-hours a day, and has the requisite communications links to act as the single POC for on-line assistance and the dispatch of other agency resources, as required.

CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT ADVISORY TEAM, DEFENSE THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY

G-18. The CM advisory team (CMAT) deploys to provide joint technical support to the supported commander with expertise in CBRNE response procedures, requirements, resources, C², health physics, PA, legal affairs,

and specialized technical information. The CMAT coordinates technical information flow by controlling and resourcing requirements passed to the supported TOC.

G-19. The CMAT is able to task-organize and deploy to support commanders in the technical aspects of CBRNE accidents or incidents. The incident-tailored force brings with it secure communications, trained technical experts, hazard prediction modeling, and rapid reach-back capability.

WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION ASSESSMENT AND ANALYSIS CENTER, DEFENSE THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY

G-20. The WMD Assessment and Analysis Center (WMDAAC) provides on-line support and crisis action planning through scenario development and war game and exercise participation.

G-21. The WMDAAC, through network-centric support, enables warfighters and domestic first responders to—

- Access computer modules for CBRNE analysis and consequence prediction.
- Access high-resolution weather data.
- Access data files on CBRNE materials.
- Access teleconferencing capabilities and national experts.
- Perform on-line collaborative computing.

JOINT NUCLEAR-ACCIDENT COORDINATION CENTER, DEFENSE THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY

G-22. The Joint Nuclear Accident Coordination Center (JNACC) is operated in coordination with the DOE. The JNACC provides a centralized center for maintaining and exchanging information with those agencies that are capable of providing radiological assistance and for coordinating that assistance in response to an accident or incident involving radioactive materials.

G-23. The JNACC maintains current information on the location and capabilities of specialized DOD and DOE teams, organizations, and individuals capable of responding to accidents or incidents involving radioactive materials.

EDGEWOOD CHEMICAL-BIOLOGICAL CENTER

G-24. The Chemical Support Division (CSD) serves as the Edgewood Chemical-Biological Center (ECBC) POC for operations associated with chemical surety materiel (CSM)-related remediation and restoration at the Edgewood Area of Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, and formerly used defense sites. The CSD also manages and maintains support services and capabilities associated with material, facilities, and equipment vital to the ECBC mission. The CSD provides technical and program management support to the DOD and other governmental agencies associated with processing chemical facilities, equipment, and ammunition.

G-25. The CSD can provide a full range of CSM-related air, water, and soil analyses in support of the ECBC, DOD, and other governmental agency operations and remediation efforts. The CSD also provides and maintains a repository of chemical agent standard analytical reference materials in support of the DOD chemical defense mission. The CSD maintains specialized equipment to accomplish its assigned mission and a detailed unit equipment listing.

G-26. The CSD can provide low-level monitoring using the real-time analytical platform (RTAP), which is a vehicle containing a fully functional chemical analysis system. In its current configuration, the RTAP can automatically sample ambient air to detect the presence of specific CW agents (nerve and mustard agents). The RTAP uses a gas chromatograph (GC) miniature chemical agent monitor system equipped with an automatic, continuous air-sampling system. The GC is equipped with a flame photometric detector (FPD) and uses ultrapure laboratory air, hydrogen, and nitrogen supplied via a built-in generator. The analysis process allows for the detection of the toxic chemical agents sarin (GB), soman (GD), mustard gas (HD), and o-ethyl s-diisopropylaminomethyl methylphosphonothiolate (VX), in the same sample. The CSD also has the mobile environmental analytical platform (MEAP) that provides accurate and legally defensible determinations of CW material (especially CSM), agent degradation products, World War I CW agents, and other compounds of military significance in environmental samples. The MEAP is a fully functional, trailer-mounted laboratory that is able to perform critical on-site chemical analysis and monitoring.

CHEMICAL BIOLOGICAL—RAPID-RESPONSE TEAM

G-27. The mission of the CB rapid-response team (CB-RRT) is to, on order, deploy and establish a robust and integrated capability to coordinate and synchronize DOD technical assistance (medical and nonmedical) to support the LFA in both crisis management and CM of a CBRNE incident or a designated national security special event. The focus of the CB-RRT is on domestic events, but it can also respond worldwide.

G-28. The role of CB-RRT is to provide a technical support package specifically tailored for a CBRNE incident response. The CB-RRT offers a highly deployable, independent OPCEN that synchronizes DOD CBRNE technical expertise. The CB-RRT is composed of members of the armed forces and employees of DOD with specialized CB, medical, and EOD expertise who are capable of providing technical assistance to aid federal, state, and local officials in the response to and mitigation of incidents involving CBRNE containing BW materials (or related HAZMAT). The CB-RRT can be under the OPCON of a geographic COCOM, joint special operations task force (JSOTF), or another designated joint task force (JTF) or in direct support of an LFA. The unit is collocated with the SBCCOM 24-hour OPCEN.

G-29. The CB-RRT is designed to provide forward elements to assist the LFAs (FBI, FEMA, EPA, US Secret Service [USSS], USPHS, and others)

with technical expertise and contingency development options during times of crisis. In addition, through the state-of-the-art SBCCOM OPCEN, the CB-RRT brings together leading CB technical experts without the need for the experts to be deployed to an incident site.

G-30. Technical elements that are managed and coordinated by the CB-RRT include, but are not limited to, the US Army Technical Escort Unit (TEU), US Army ECBC, US Army ECBC Forensic Analytical Center (FAC), US Army Medical Command (MEDCOM) Special Medical Augmentation Response Teams (SMARTs) and Regional Medical Commands (RMC), USAMRICD, USAMRIID, US Army Center for Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine (CHPPM), US Navy Medical Research Center (NMRC), US Navy Environmental Health Center (NEHC), US Navy Environmental and Preventive Medicine Units (NEPMU), and US Naval Research Laboratory (NRL).

G-31. Planning and consideration tools are essential to successfully minimize the impact of actual or potential terrorist attacks. The heart of the CB-RRT's concept of operations is an integrated, self-contained, and deployable command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C⁴I) infrastructure that allows for integrated, structured, and controlled planning and incident response. The CB-RRT deploys with two primary communications systems—the Deployable Communications System (DCS) and the Deployable Response and Graphics Operations Network (DRAGON) system—that are the heart of this C⁴I infrastructure.

- The DCS is a wireless-to-wire communications gateway system offering increased simplicity, mobility, operational flexibility, and rapid deployment. The DCS is a self-sustaining mobile satellite communications system that supports the forward-deployed elements with telephone (secure and nonsecure) interface, video teleconference interface, secret Internet protocol router network (SIPRNET) (dial up), and digital cellular telephone service that is separate from local networks. The CB-RRT communications system uses the T1 satellite reach-back capability to link C² nodes with the SBCCOM OPCEN and other operations and technical centers.
- The DRAGON system is a communications suite of computers and ancillary hardware that seamlessly integrates all aspects of communications and emergency planning/response software. The DRAGON is a local area network/wide-area network (LAN/WAN) designed for multiple computer users who gain access by hard wire, satellite, or Internet. The system is used to provide SA to users, and it serves as the main information management tool for the CB-RRT staff.

G-32. Additional assets that may support, or be supported by the CB-RRT include, but are not limited to, the DTRA, USMC chemical-biological incident response force (CBIRF), NG WMD CSTs, US Army 52nd Ordnance Group, and National Capitol Render Safe Organization (NCRSO).

G-33. The CB-RRT can deploy using US Army SBCCOM organic air assets, US Army Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) assets, or commercial air transportation. The CB-RRT is self-sustaining for 72 hours.

ARMY TECHNICAL ESCORT UNIT

G-34. The unit provides worldwide, no-notice capability to conduct field sampling, identification, and verification of chemical agents and to monitor, recover, decontaminate, escort, and mitigate hazards associated with CB materials in compliance with international, federal, state, and local laws.

G-35. The capabilities of the TEU are multifaceted, to include the following:

- Providing technical escort of CB munitions and material.
- Rendering safe and/or disposing of weaponized CB munitions and material.
- Conducting technical intelligence exploitation of foreign CB munitions and material.
- Providing CB response teams to government agencies as required to support national and/or international counterproliferation policies.
- Operating in hazardous environments.

G-36. The TEU basic operational element is the Chemical-Biological Response Team (CBRT). The unit can deploy CBRTs from Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland; Dugway Proving Ground, Utah; and Pine Bluff Arsenal, Arkansas. In general, each CBRT is comprised of CB and EOD specialists, but the team composition can be tailored to the mission. The CBRT can be deployed to suspect or actual incidents involving CB agents, munitions, and other HAZMAT to transport the suspected samples to the appropriate labs. The TEU CBRTs maintain a rapid-response capability in detection, decontamination (neutralization), containment (packaging), dismantlement (render safe), and disposal (transport and escort only) of WMD containing CB agents or related materials. The CBRT also maintains an information reach-back capability to TEU EOC for communications with CB agent, explosive ordnance, and disaster response SMEs.

ARMY EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL GROUP

G-37. The unit provides EOD bomb squad units to defeat or mitigate the hazards from conventional, nuclear, or chemical military munitions and WMD throughout CONUS as requested by local, state, and federal law enforcement or military authorities.

G-38. The capabilities of the US Army EOD group are multifaceted, to include the following:

- Identifying and rendering safe foreign and US military munitions (chemical, conventional, and nuclear).

- Disposing of munitions encountered and rendering safe terrorist IEDs (such as pipe bombs, booby traps).
- Responding to CBRNE incidents.
- Conducting training in military munitions and IEDs to law enforcement agencies (LEAs).
- Providing support to the USSS and the Department of State (DOS).

G-39. There are EOD companies that are configured to respond to a WMD incident. These designated companies receive specific training on WMD. They possess unique equipment to counter booby traps and are trained to operate specialized equipment (provided by the DOE) used for diagnostics and for rendering safe/mitigating a WMD nuclear initiation.

ARMY BIOLOGICAL DETECTION COMPANY (CORPS)

G-40. This unit conducts biological detection to provide rapid detection and presumptive identification of large-area biological aerosol attacks.

G-41. The Biological Integrated Detection System (BIDS) was developed in response to the BW agent vulnerability of US forces during Operation Desert Storm. The BIDS is a multicomponent system that provides monitoring, sampling, detection, and presumptive identification of BW agents.

ARMY MADIGAN MEDICAL CENTER DISASTER ASSISTANCE RESPONSE TEAM

G-42. The disaster assistance response team (DART) provides a rapid-deployment unit with triage, ambulatory/litter, and advanced medical/trauma stabilization capabilities for US Army needs related to NBC incidents in the western US.

G-43. The DART capabilities include triage, decontamination, and stabilization of contaminated and multiple injured casualties. The team has 24-hour access to board-certified toxicologists. Team members have received substantial training in basic and advanced life support, trauma life support, HAZMAT, confined-space medicine, crush injury medicine, and emergency medical response to terrorism.

ARMY RESPONSE TASK FORCE—EAST/RESPONSE TASK FORCE—WEST

G-44. When directed, a response task force-east/response task force-west (RTG-E/RTG-W) supports the LFA during an incident. The RTF commander may assume OPCON of committed DOD elements (less US Special Operations Command [USSOCOM] and US Army Corps of Engineers [USACE]), coordinate military support of CM operations, and redeploy units when DOD disengagement criteria are met.

G-45. The RTF commander establishes a fully functional CP near the incident within 24 hours of notification. He exercises OPCON of all federal DOD resources committed to providing MSCA, provides liaison officers to appropriate civil agencies, and receives LNOs from appropriate military commands and agencies.

G-46. The RTFs are composed of members of the US First and Fifth Army HQ staff. The initial response team establishes initial liaison with the supported civil agencies and coordinates support for the follow-on personnel. The predesignated DCO and DCE serve as special staff augmenting the RTFs.

ARMED FORCES RADIOBIOLOGY RESEARCH INSTITUTE MEDICAL RADIOBIOLOGY ADVISORY TEAM

G-47. The medical radiobiology advisory team (MRAT) responds as part of the DTRA CMAT and is available at all times. The MRAT can provide on-site training to health professionals on the management of nuclear or radiological casualties. The team provides state-of-the-art expertise and advice to commanders and primary care providers following a nuclear or radiological accident (nuclear weapons, reactor, or radiological material). The MRAT provides access to biodosimetry and bioassay support to incident responders and local health authorities.

G-48. The MRAT is a primary source of medical and radiological health information dealing with the management of casualties from nuclear warfare weapons and radiological dispersal-device accidents. Senior medical experts provide on-site advice to physicians on—

- Resuscitative techniques for radiation injury and radionuclide contamination therapy.
- The use of investigative chelation therapy for internal contamination by radioactive material.
- Therapeutic drug combinations for acute radiation injury, infection, and protection against late-occurring diseases (such as cancer).
- Radiation injury interventional therapy and dose estimate bioassay.

G-49. The MRAT is in contact with other SMEs at the AFRRRI for additional information. The MRAT is led by a physician and is normally comprised of three individuals for initial deployment; additional team members may deploy if the situation dictates. Team members are on call 24 hours a day by either telephone or pager. The team is equipped with PPE to perform its intended mission, related general-purpose equipment, and supplies.

MEDICAL CHEMICAL-BIOLOGICAL ADVISORY TEAM

G-50. The medical, chemical-biological advisory team (MCBAT) provides input in the development of operating procedures and training in the management of chemical agent casualties. The MCBAT also provides clinical advice and consultation in matters related to the initial and long-term management of chemical agent casualties at the incident site. The experts on this team are from the USAMRICD and the USAMRIID. They provide essential medical information during the recovery phase of the operation for the safe return to normal activities. The MCBAT also provides on-site training to medical professionals on the management of CB casualties.

G-51. The MCBAT is the primary source of medical information dealing with the management of CW agent casualties for the federal government. Through the FBI or agencies within the DHHS, the MCBAT provides consultation to state, city, or local agencies. As necessary, the MCBAT supervises the collection of biological samples (bodily fluids) for subsequent verification of chemical agent exposure that can be used to facilitate the confirmation, diagnosis, and treatment.

MEDICAL RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF INFECTIOUS DISEASES

G-52. The institute conducts research to develop strategies, products, information, procedures, and training programs for medical defense against BW threats and infectious diseases. It develops products—such as vaccines, drugs, and diagnostic tests—and medical management procedures to protect military personnel against biological attack or against endemic infectious diseases. It supplies medical and scientific SMEs who provide technical expertise and guidance to commanders and senior leaders on the prevention and treatment of hazardous diseases and the management of biological casualties. It serves as the DOD reference center for identification of biological agents from clinical specimens and other sources.

G-53. The USAMRIID has many capabilities that can be employed for assessing and evaluating a biological terrorist incident, from initial communications of the threat through incident resolution. The primary capabilities that the USAMRIID provides are intellectual capability (consulting), extensive fixed confirmatory and reference laboratory facilities, and the aeromedical isolation team (AIT).

MARINE CORPS CHEMICAL BIOLOGICAL INCIDENT RESPONSE FORCE

G-54. When directed, the CBIRF forward deploys to a domestic or foreign area in order to provide FP and/or mitigation in the event of a WMD incident. The CBIRF is prepared to respond to no-notice WMD incidents with a rapidly deployable initial response force (IRF) and a follow-on force if required. The CBIRF also conducts FP training for fleet units.

G-55. The CBIRF is composed of 350 to 375 US Marine Corps (USMC) and US Navy (USN) personnel. In garrison, the CBIRF is under the OPCON and administrative control (ADCON) of the II Marine Expeditionary Force (II MEF) and Marine Corps Forces, Atlantic (MARFORLANT). The CBIRF is an incident-response force that executes CM operations in support of a COCOM or LFA. The CBIRF has limited organic equipment decontamination capability but does not conduct detailed equipment decontamination (DED) or area decontamination operations. Furthermore, the majority of CBIRF personnel are trained in Level A and B operations. TIC and TIM are potential threats to US forces, even outside the continental US (OCONUS), since littoral areas include port and industrial complexes where storage and manufacture of these materials are common. The CBIRF also has state-of-the-art monitoring and detection equipment used to identify, sample, and analyze NBC hazards, including TIC and TIM as well as oxygen (O₂) and lower explosive levels (LELs).

G-56. The CBIRF provides C² liaison teams to other agencies or commands, interfaces with local and military commanders, coordinates all on-site CBIRF operations; establishes data/voice reach-back to scientific and medical advisors, and prepares CBR plume models. Other examples of CBIRF capabilities include—

- Conducting agent detection and identification.
- Performing sampling and collection.
- Monitoring concentration and exposure levels.
- Providing decontamination support for unit personnel and first responders.
- Conducting casualty decontamination on the scene.
- Conducting victim searches.
- Performing technical rescue and casualty extraction.
- Conducting emergency medical care in the contaminated area.
- Performing casualty triage and stabilization.
- Providing mobile lab services.

NAVAL MEDICAL RESEARCH CENTER

G-57. The mission of the NMRC is to defend members of the armed forces against a biological threat in a theater of operations (TO); therefore, rapid biological-detection methods are essential for prompt medical intervention and successful mission accomplishment. To provide for such needs, the NMRC (Biological Defense Research Program [BDRP]) has formed a scientific research program for the development of rapid detection and identification methods for BW agents.

G-58. The BDRP has a transportable, biological field laboratory. The field lab is comprised primarily of commercially available scientific lab equipment, except for the HHA (tickets). The field lab can process approximately 50 samples (4 to 5 samples a day for a period of approximately 2 weeks) before replenishment of supplies is required.

NAVY EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL UNITS

G-59. The mission of the unit is to eliminate hazards from ordnance that jeopardize operations conducted in support of the national military strategy by providing specially trained, combat-ready, highly mobile forces. Navy EOD units are employed in a variety of operations, and across a wide spectrum of warfare areas in the execution of this mission.

G-60. Navy EOD units are structured for a relatively small footprint and rapid response. EOD units can split into smaller units to respond to multiple EOD incidents/tasks, which are within the capabilities of a smaller force. Each unit is trained in a variety of mobility and survivability skills enabling it to operate in a variety of environments both afloat and ashore. EOD units are capable of responding to underwater and surface ordnance and NBC threats. They can also provide support for diving and demolition, intelligence collection, aircraft and ordnance recovery, range and underwater clearance, riverine

operations, Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) projects, special warfare (SPECWAR) operations, and other special operations.

AIR FORCE RADIOANALYTICAL ASSESSMENT TEAM

G-61. The radioanalytical assessment team (RAT) is a globally responsive specialty asset team that responds to radiation incidents/accidents, providing health physics and radiological support.

G-62. The RAT provides field radioanalytical support to the assigned theater medical authority. It measures, analyzes, and interprets environmental and occupational samples for their content of radioactivity, providing expert guidance on the type and degree of radiological hazards that face deployed forces. The RAT can deploy on short notice to assess radiological hazards following a nuclear or radiological incident/accident. The RAT will perform radioanalytical analysis on environmental samples (such as swipes, soil, water, air, and foodstuffs) and occupational samples (such as the whole body, breath, urine, and feces). Analysis results are interpreted for the impact on deployed forces and noncombatants. The information is compiled for use by the medical authority for dose avoidance, dose reduction, dose assessment, risk communications, and additional requirements for effective CM. The team has expertise in areas of health physics, environmental monitoring, radiation measurement, and medical laboratory operations.

SPECIAL MEDICAL AUGMENTATION RESPONSE TEAM

G-63. These teams are organized and equipped to respond to disasters to include CBRNE incidents. Three SMARTs are so designed that their response to CBRNE events can provide critical medical support activities. The US Army CHPPM has three preventive medicine (PVNTMED) threat assessment SMARTs (identified as SMART-PM). Each US Army RMC has a CB SMART (identified as SMART-CB). The US Army Veterinary Command has four SMARTs: food safety, veterinary PVNTMED, and animal health care (identified as SMART-V). Additional types of SMARTs are also organized and equipped for a rapid response. (For additional information on SMARTs, see FM 8-42.)

Special Medical Augmentation Response Team—Preventive Medicine

G-64. The mission of this team is to provide initial disease and environmental health threat assessments. This is accomplished before or in the initial stages of a contingency operation or during the early or continuing assistance stages of a disaster.

G-65. Although the basic team organization is standardized, it may be tailored to the requirements of the specific mission if the Commander, US Army Medical Command (USAMEDCOM) determines additional specialties are needed. It can—

- Perform on-site initial medical threat assessments, limited and rapid hazard sampling, monitoring and analysis, health risk characterization, and needs assessment for follow-on PVNTMED

specialties or other medical treatment support in the incident site or AO.

- Prepare PVNTMED estimates.
- Perform analysis of, but not limited to, endemic and epidemic disease indicators within the incident site or AO; environmental toxins related to laboratories; production and manufacturing facilities, nuclear reactors, or other industrial operations; and potential CBRNE hazards.
- Provide medical threat information and characterize the health risk to deployed forces or civilian populations.
- Provide guidance to local health authorities on surveying, monitoring, evaluating, and controlling health hazards relative to naturally occurring and man-made disasters.
- Assist local health authorities in surveying, monitoring, evaluating, and controlling health hazards relative to naturally occurring and man-made disasters.

Special Medical Augmentation Response Team—Chemical-Biological

G-66. This team consists of trained medical teams that can deploy in response to a CBR incident. Examples of incidents that may require a rapid response include—

- An accident involving the transport or storage of weapons.
- The release of CW or BW agents or radiological material.
- A leak of an industrial chemical, infectious material, or radioactive material.

G-67. This team can provide medical advice and consultation to commanders or local medical and political authorities for preparation of a response to a threat or actual incident. It can also provide medical advice to commanders or local authorities on the protection of first responders and other health care personnel, casualty decontamination procedures, first aid (for nonmedical personnel), initial medical treatment, and casualty handling. The initial advice includes signs, symptoms, first aid (self-aid, buddy aid, and combat lifesaver aid for military personnel), and initial treatment when an incident has occurred. It also assists in facilitating the procurement of needed resources. During an incident response, all response personnel must first protect themselves from the agent/material and then provide response assistance to victims. The SMART-CB will conduct the initial response. Upon arriving at the incident site or AO, it will determine the types and number of other responders required. The SMART-CB may, after initial assessment of the situation, elect to use telemedicine reach-back or call in domestic or foreign response assets organized at the national level.

Special Medical Augmentation Response Team—Veterinary

G-68. The mission of this team is to assess the degree of existing destruction and/or impending risk and to determine recommended follow-on actions relative to animal health and food safety. The SMART-V also advises local first responders on food safety/veterinary PVNTMED issues and triage and treatment of injured animals. It provides limited triage and emergency treatment of injured animals, including lifesaving emergency procedures or, when appropriate, euthanasia to prevent undue suffering of those cases encountered during the assessment process. It provides veterinary care for military search-and-rescue dogs. When authorized, it also provides care to other governmental and nongovernmental agency animals participating in the operation.

G-69. This team can assess food contamination and the potential for food-borne illness outbreaks, determine the magnitude of animal involvement in public health and zoonotic disease threats, make initial assessments, recommend corrective actions, provide liaison with follow-up relief organizations/agencies, assist in establishing control for the incident site or AO, and coordinate with all known animal medicine/food safety agencies and organizations in the incident site or AO.

AIR FORCE THEATER EPIDEMIOLOGY TEAM

G-70. The theater epidemiology team (TET) provides threat assessments of environmental and occupational factors, evaluates infectious disease risks and disease and nonbattle injury (DNBI) rates from all sources, and recommends interventions to minimize degradation of mission staff. These tasks are accomplished as part of the initial site/theater assessment and during ongoing operations and disease and environmental health threat assessments.

G-71. The TET is a light, mobile, multidisciplinary team with limited environmental/occupational sampling equipment. It uses a portable high-end computing capability. It uses a communications infrastructure that allows for theater-wide data collection; coordination with JTF, Air Force forces (AFFOR), and COCOM surgeon general staffs; linkage with other PVNTMED teams (such as an AF preventive aerospace medicine team, a US Army SMART-PM); and an immediate reach-back to SMEs at the Air Force Institute for Environment, Safety, and Health Risk Analysis (AFIERA).

G-72. The TET has a standardized, five-person team that consists of a PVNTMED physician, a public health officer and supporting technician, and a bioenvironmental engineer and supporting technician. The composition can be tailored to include other specialties (such as tropical medicine, laboratory officer, entomologist). The basic allowance standard includes basic bioenvironmental sampling equipment and supplies. The ruggedized advanced pathogen identification device (RAPID) with selected probes and primers is available to assist with biological-agent identification during outbreak investigations.

ARMY RESERVE COMPONENT DECONTAMINATION-CAPABLE COMPANIES

G-73. The domestic response mission of these units is to provide casualty decontamination in support of CM operations.

G-74. These units, while designed for overseas deployment, have also been tasked by the SECDEF to provide domestic-response casualty decontamination (DRCD) in support of CM. These units are neither designed nor intended to replace functions carried out under the ICS nor to replace those functions normally performed by the emergency first-responder community. Instead, these units provide additional capability, as needed, to support the nation. These assets are formally requested for support by using the formal military assistance to civil authorities system. The best use of these units is for them to be pre-positioned in preparation for a high-threat, high-visibility event, such as the Olympic Games. These units are not designed for a rapid response but can be mobilized and deployed within days.

G-75. These units are equipped with a platoon set of domestic-response equipment to decontaminate both ambulatory and nonambulatory casualties. The set includes a quickly erectable tent with runoff containment included for the actual decontamination, two other tents for sun protection for the workers and victims, showers for washing and rinsing, and rollers for decontaminating nonambulatory victims.

ARMY RESERVE COMPONENT CHEMICAL RECONNAISSANCE-CAPABLE COMPANIES

G-76. The domestic-response mission of these units is to provide dismounted NBC reconnaissance.

G-77. The standard chemical reconnaissance companies or elements smaller than companies, while designed for overseas deployment, have also been tasked by the SECDEF to provide dismounted NBC reconnaissance. These units are neither designed nor intended to replace functions carried out under the ICS nor to replace those functions normally performed by the emergency first-responder community. Instead, these units provide additional capabilities, as needed, to support the nation. These assets are formally requested for support by using the formal military assistance to civil authorities system. The best use of these units is for them to be pre-positioned in preparation for a high-threat, high-visibility event, such as the Olympic Games. These units are not designed for a rapid response but can be mobilized and deployed within days.

G-78. These units are equipped with enhanced chemical and radiological detection equipment (multigas detectors, commercial chemical detection equipment, and AN/PDR-77 radiac meters) and commercial OSHA Level A equipment (such as, suits, SCBA) to allow them to operate with local first responders throughout the nation. These units are capable of working soldiers in all OSHA protection levels.

OTHER FEDERAL RESPONSE ASSETS

G-79. Other federal response assets could include Department of Transportation (DOT), FEMA, DHHS, FBI, EPA, and DOE activities.

- Department of Transportation.
 - **USCG Federal On-Scene Coordinators (FOSCs).** Under the authority of the National Contingency Plan (NCP), USCG FOSCs coordinate all federal containment, removal, and disposal efforts and resources during an incident in the coastal zone.
 - **National Strike Force (NSF).** The USCG NSF provides 24-hour access to special decontamination equipment for chemical releases and provides advice to the OSC in hazard evaluation, risk assessment, multimedia sampling and analysis, on-site safety, clean up techniques, and more. The NSF portable, chemical agent instrumentation is capable of detection and identification, and entry level capabilities using Levels A through C PPE. Other NSF capabilities include pumping, cost documentation support, and monitoring/oversight of contractors.
- Federal Emergency Management Agency.
 - **Urban Search and Rescue Team (USRT).** The USRTs save lives and protect property from both natural and man-made catastrophic urban disasters. The USRTs have a limited HAZMAT capability.
 - **Rapid-Response Information System (RRIS).** The RRIS is a database containing information on federal NBC response capabilities, NBC agent and munition characteristics, and safety precautions.
- Department of Health and Human Services.
 - **Metropolitan Medical Strike Team (MMST).** The MMST operates as a specially organized team. Its capabilities include agent detection and identification, patient decontamination, triage and medical treatment, patient transportation to hospitals, and coordination with local law enforcement activities. Twenty-seven teams have been initiated. The goal of the federal government is to develop MMSTs for the 100 most populous cities in the US.
 - **National Medical Response Team (NMRT).** The NMRTs are comprised of medical personnel. These teams are capable of agent identification, patient decontamination, triage, and medical treatment in support of local health systems. There are three NMRTs.
 - **Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.** The CDC capabilities are epidemiological surveillance, biological-agent identification, and public-health consultation and response.
 - **Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR).** The ATSDR provides consultation and advice on

issues relating to the release or threatened release of hazardous substances.

- **Federal Drug Administration (FDA).** The FDA provides regional laboratory support and surveillance assistance in support of public health.
- **Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA).** The SAMHSA provides mental-health support and crisis counseling during emergencies.
- **Federal Bureau of Investigation.**
 - **Hazardous Materials Response Unit (HMRU).** The HMRU is capable of specialized sampling, detection, and identification of NBC agents. It is also equipped with a variety of personal-protective (OSHA Levels A through C) and rescue equipment.
 - **Evidence Response Teams.** The evidence response teams main functions are crime scene documentation and evidence collection in support of criminal investigations. Some evidence response teams are HAZMAT-trained.
 - **Critical-Incident Response Group (CIRG).** These teams are specially assembled to conduct tactical and crisis management efforts.
 - **Intelligence Collection and Analysis.** The FBI has experts that contribute to and coordinate detailed interagency threat assessment activities.
- **Environmental Protection Agency.**
 - **OSCs.** Under the authority of the NCP, EPA OSCs coordinate all federal containment, removal, and disposal efforts and resources during an incident.
 - **Environmental Response Team.** The EPA environmental response team provides 24-hour access to special decontamination equipment for chemical releases and advice to the OSC in hazard evaluation, risk assessment, multimedia sampling and analysis, on-site safety, clean up techniques, and more. The environmental response team has portable chemical-agent instrumentation that is capable of detection and identification in the low and sub parts per million (ppm), as well as entry level capabilities using Levels A through C PPE.
 - **Radiological Emergency Response Team (RERT).** The EPA RERT provides on-site monitoring and mobile laboratories for field analysis of samples, along with expertise in radiation health physics and risk assessment. The RERT is accessible 24 hours per day.
 - **Environmental Radiation Ambient Monitoring System (ERAMS).** The EPA operates the ERAMS for monitoring radioactivity in samples of precipitation, air, surface water, drinking water, and milk. In the event of a radiological

emergency, sampling at the approximately 260 monitoring sites can be increased to provide information on the spread of contamination.

- **Radiation Environmental Laboratories.** The EPA has state-of-the-art radiological laboratories in Montgomery, Alabama, and Las Vegas, Nevada. By quickly characterizing radiation sources, these two laboratories can offer advice on how best to protect public health in emergencies.
- **EPA Research Laboratories.** The EPA has 12 research laboratories that offer programs in field monitoring, analytical support, and other technical support to quality assurance programs related to air, water, wastewater, and solid waste. Five of these laboratories are capable of deploying mobile units to a contaminated site for CB analysis.
- **National Enforcement Investigations Center (NEIC).** The EPA NEIC offers expertise in environmental forensic evidence collection, sampling, and analysis; computer forensic and information management; and enforcement-related analysis.
- Department of Energy.
 - **Radiological Assistance Program (RAP).** The RAP provides the initial DOE radiological emergency response. Under the RAP, there are several RATs to assist in identifying the presence of radioactive contamination on personnel, equipment, and property at the incident or accident scene. These teams also provide advice on personnel monitoring and decontamination and material recovery.
 - **Radiation Emergency Assistance Center/Training Site (REAC/TS).** The REAC/TS provides 24-hour medical consultation on health problems associated with radiation accidents. It also provides training programs for emergency response teams comprised of health professionals.
 - **Nuclear Emergency Search Team (NEST).** The NEST provides technical responses to the resolution of incidents involving improvised nuclear and radiological dispersal devices. The team is able to search, locate, and identify devices or material.
 - **Joint Technical Operations Team (JTOT).** The JTOT is a combined DOD and DOE team that provides technical advice and assistance to the DOD.
 - **Aerial Measuring System (AMS).** The AMS can be mounted on helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft to respond to radiological emergencies. Its capabilities include aerial radiation surveys and search (gamma spectroscopy), real-time radiological aerial sampling, aerial photography survey, and aerial multispectra scanning surveys.
 - **Atmospheric Release Advisory Capability (ARAC).** The ARAC provides real-time computer predictions of the

atmospheric transport of radioactivity from a nuclear incident or accident.

TOXIC INDUSTRIAL MATERIAL REFERENCE DATA WEBSITES

G-80. Multiple data sources are available for data and information to support the military decision-making process. These sources include several federal agency data sources. Selected data sources are provided in this appendix.

AGENCY FOR TOXIC SUBSTANCES AND DISEASE REGISTRY

G-81. ATSDR produces “toxicological profiles” for hazardous substances found at national priorities list (NPL) sites. These hazardous substances are ranked based on their frequency of occurrence at NPL sites, toxicity, and potential for human exposure. Toxicological profiles are developed from a priority list of 275 substances.

(<http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/hazdat.html>)

NORTH AMERICAN EMERGENCY RESPONSE GUIDEBOOK 2000

G-82. The US DOT, Transport Canada, and the Secretariat of Communications and Transportation of Mexico (SCT) developed the North American Emergency Response Guidebook (NAERG) 2000 jointly for use by firefighters, police, and other emergency services personnel who may be the first to arrive at the scene of a transportation incident involving a HAZMAT. It is primarily a guide to aid first responders in quickly identifying the specific or generic classification of the material(s) involved in the incident. It provides information on how to protect themselves and the public during the initial response phase of the incident. The ERG is updated every 3 years to accommodate new products and technology. ERG 2000 incorporates dangerous goods lists from the most recent United Nations (UN) recommendations as well as from other international and national regulations.

(<http://hazmat.dot.gov/guidebook.htm>)

G-83. The DOT goal is to place one ERG 2000 in each emergency service vehicle, nationwide, through distribution to state and local public safety authorities. To date, more than seven million copies have been distributed without charge to the emergency responder community. Copies are made available free of charge to public emergency responders through the state coordinators (US only). In Canada, contact CANUTEC at 613-992-4624 or via the internet at canutec@tc.gc.ca for information. In Mexico, call SCT at 52-5-684-1275.

NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH POCKET GUIDE TO CHEMICAL HAZARDS

G-84. The National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) pocket guide (NPG) is intended as a source of general industrial hygiene information for workers, employers, and occupational health professionals. The NPG presents key information and data in abbreviated tabular form for 677 chemicals or substance groupings (such as

manganese compounds, tellurium compounds, inorganic tin compounds) that are found in the work environment. The industrial hygiene information found in the NPG should help users recognize and control occupational chemical hazards. The chemicals or substances contained in this revision include all substances for which the NIOSH has recommended exposure limits (RELs) and those with permissible exposure limits (PELs) as found in the OSHA General Industry Air Contaminants Standard (29 CFR 1910.1000).

(<http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/npg/npg.html>)

G-85. The information in the NPG includes chemical structures and formulas, identification codes, synonyms, exposure limits, chemical and physical properties, incompatibilities, reactivities, measurement methods, respirator selections, signs and symptoms of exposure, and procedures for emergency treatment.

REGISTRY OF TOXIC EFFECTS OF CHEMICAL SUBSTANCES

G-86. The Registry of Toxic Effects of Chemical Substances (RTECS) provides toxicological information with citations on over 140,000 chemical substances. These detailed profiles include toxicological data and reviews, international workplace exposure limits, references to US standards and regulations, analytical methods, and exposure and hazard survey data. The data is compiled into substance records for ease of use, and updated data is fully integrated. (<http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/rtecs.html>)

INTERNATIONAL CHEMICAL SAFETY CARDS

G-87. The International Programme on Chemical Safety (IPCS) is a joint activity of three cooperating international organizations: the UN Environment Program (UNEP), the International Labor Organization (ILO), and the World Health Organization (WHO). The main objective of the IPCS is to carry out and disseminate evaluations of the hazards posed by chemicals to human health and the environment.

(<http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/ipcs/icstart.html>)

G-88. International Chemical Safety Cards (ICSCs) summarize essential health and safety information on chemicals for their use at the “shop floor” level by workers and employers in factories, agriculture, construction, and other workplaces. ICSCs are not legally binding documents, but consist of a series of standard phrases, mainly summarizing health and safety information collected, verified, and peer-reviewed by internationally recognized experts, taking into account advice from manufacturers and poison control centers.

G-89. The IPCS intends to generate approximately 2,000 ICSCs in the next 6 years. Efficient support from IPCS principal investigators (PIs) specialized in chemical safety and through international cooperation with the European Union could lead to a production rate of about 350 cards per annum (approximately 25 cards per PI and for a group of 15 PIs).

CHEMICAL HAZARDS RESPONSE INFORMATION SYSTEM

G-90. The Chemical Hazards Response Information System (CHRIS) database is a comprehensive source of emergency response information for those involved in the transport of hazardous materials. The database is based upon the text of the USCG-printed CHRIS manual. It is useful for many different types of emergencies, including spills.

G-91. Records for more than 1,300 HAZMATs are provided in English. Each record for a HAZMAT contains key identification data such as synonyms, chemical abstract service (CAS) numbers, hazard labels, and observable characteristics. In addition, information useful for emergency response situations (such as health, fire, and reactivity hazards; first aid; water pollution; shipping and hazard classifications; and physical and chemical properties) is included in each record.

(<http://www.uscg.mil/hq/g%2dm/mor/articles/chris.htm#electron>)

HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES DATA BANK

G-92. The hazardous substances data bank (HSDB) is a factual, nonbibliographic data bank created and maintained by the National Library of Medicine in the USA. It provides extensive information on identification, manufacturing, use, chemical and physical properties, safety, handling, human and nonhuman toxicity, pharmacology, environmental fate and exposure, regulations, and analytical determinations of chemical substances. HSDB information is organized into records for over 4,500 chemical substances.

(<http://www.nlm.nih.gov/pubs/factsheets/hsdbfs.html>)

INTEGRATED RISK INFORMATION SYSTEM

G-93. The Integrated Risk Information System (IRIS) is prepared and maintained by the US EPA. The IRIS electronic database contains health risk and US EPA regulatory information on almost 700 specific substances. It contains over 5,500 pages of printed information in a fully indexed, searchable database. The chemical files contain descriptive and numerical information regarding—

- Oral reference doses and inhalation reference concentrations for chronic noncarcinogenic health effects.
- Hazard identification, oral slope factors, and oral and inhalation unit risks for carcinogenic effects.
- Background documents and references that describe the rationale and methods used to develop the values and associated information in the chemical files.
- A glossary of scientific terms used in the chemical files and background documents and a definition of acronyms and abbreviations used.
- Supplementary data on acute health hazards and physical/chemical properties.
- Bibliographic citation.

(<http://www.epa.gov/iris/>)

RISK MANAGEMENT PROGRAM

G-94. When Congress passed the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, it required EPA to publish regulations and guidance for chemical accident prevention at facilities using extremely hazardous substances. The RMP regulation builds upon existing industry codes and standards and requires companies of all sizes that use certain flammable and toxic substances to develop an RMP that includes a hazard assessment detailing the potential effects of an accidental release, an accident history for the last 5 years, and an evaluation of worst-case and alternative accidental releases. (<http://www.epa.gov/swercepp/acc-pre.html>)

G-95. The goal of the RMP is to reduce chemical risks at the local level. RMPs contain a summary of information about each facility RMP. This information helps local fire, police, and emergency response personnel (who must prepare for and respond to chemical accidents) and is useful to citizens in understanding the chemical hazards in communities. Making the RMPs available to the public is intended to stimulate communications between industry and the public to improve accident prevention and emergency response practices at the local level.

CHEMICAL RIGHT-TO-KNOW HIGH-PRODUCTION VOLUME CHALLENGE PROGRAM CHEMICAL LIST

G-96. The US high-production volume (HPV) chemicals are those that are manufactured or imported into the US in amounts equal to or greater than one million pounds per year. The US HPV chemicals were identified through information collected under the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) inventory update rule (IUR). Organic chemicals that are manufactured in or imported into the US in amounts equal to or exceeding 10,000 pounds per year are subject to reporting under the TSCA IUR. Reporting is required every four years. The HPV challenge program chemical list contains about 2,800 chemicals. (<http://www.epa.gov/opptintr/chemrtk/index.htm>)

EXTREMELY HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES CHEMICAL PROFILES AND EMERGENCY FIRST AID GUIDES

G-97. The Extremely Hazardous Substances (EHS) Chemical Profiles and Emergency First Aid Guide contains information on over 300 EHS currently listed as part of Section 302 of the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act. Each chemical profile includes physical/chemical properties, health hazards, fire and explosion hazards, reactivity data, precautions for safe handling and use, and protective equipment for emergencies. The first aid guide provides signs and symptoms of poisoning and emergency treatment for first responders. The chemical profiles and first aid guides may be accessed from either the CAS number or the alphabetical list of EHS. (http://yosemite.epa.gov/oswer/ceppoweb.nsf/content/ehs_2003.htm?openDocument)

IMMEDIATELY DANGEROUS TO LIFE OR HEALTH CONCENTRATIONS

G-98. The current list of 387 chemicals that are IDLH was developed in the mid-1970s when only limited toxicological data was available for many of the substances. NIOSH has recently requested information on the current use of IDLHs in the workplace and on the scientific adequacy of the criteria and procedures originally used for establishing them.

(<http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/idlh/idlhintr.html>)

G-99. The latest version includes IDLHs for an additional 85 substances (such as benzene and methylene chloride) determined by NIOSH to meet the OSHA definition of “potential occupational carcinogen” as given in 29 CFR 1910.103. For all of these substances, except ethylene oxide and crystalline silica, NIOSH recommends that workers exposed at concentrations above the NIOSH REL or at any detectable concentration when there is no REL wear the “most protective” respirators. For ethylene oxide and crystalline silica, NIOSH recommends that the “most protective” respirators be worn in concentrations exceeding 5 ppm and 25 milligrams (mg)/m³, respectively (NIOSH 1989, 1994).

GENERAL DENNIS J. REIMER TRAINING AND DOCTRINE DIGITAL LIBRARY

G-100. The General Dennis J. Reimer Training and Doctrine Digital Library is the single repository of approved Army training and doctrine information. As such, it contains several applicable TIM references to be used by CSTs. (<http://155.217.58.58>)

NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION

G-101. The NOAA conducts research and gathers data about the global oceans, atmosphere, space, and sun and applies this knowledge to science and service that touch the lives of all Americans. (<http://www.noaa.gov/>)

G-102. NOAA warns of dangerous weather, charts our seas and skies, guides our use and protection of ocean and coastal resources, and conducts research to improve our understanding and stewardship of the environment that sustains us all.

G-103. A Commerce Department agency, NOAA provides these services through five major means: the National Weather Service (NWS); the National Ocean Service (NOS); the National Marine Fisheries Service; the National Environmental Satellite, Data, and Information Service (NESDIS); and NOAA research and numerous special program units. In addition, NOAA research and operational activities are supported by the seventh US uniformed service, the NOAA Corps, a commissioned officer corps of men and women who operate NOAA ships and aircraft and serve in scientific and administrative posts.

Appendix H

Command Section

This brief description of the command team outlines selected command team functions during the different phases of CST operations.

PREINCIDENT PHASE

H-1. The command team provides C² of the CST. The command team interfaces with external agencies and organizations central to the accomplishment of the CST mission.

H-2. The command team anticipates and plans for unique challenges of operating in a CBRNE environment and uses RA as a tool for ensuring the safety of the personnel operating in a hazardous or threatening environment.

ALERT AND DEPLOY PHASES

H-3. In the alert and deploy phases, the command team receives the alert/WO, validates it according to approved state procedures, executes the unit recall, assembles the unit, alerts the reach-back and ILS systems, begins identifying required information, and plans for the deployment.

H-4. In order to expedite the arrival of the CST to the incident site, the commander can deploy an ADVON as soon as possible. The ADVON is a small forward element of the CST that is sent to the incident site ahead of the unit main body.

H-5. Generally, the ADVON (with either the commander or deputy present) performs link up operations with the IC, coordinates site quartering, receives information on the hot zone, conducts site entry planning, and keeps the main body informed of the situation.

H-6. If the ADVON is able to determine that the threatened or suspected incident is a hoax, then the ADVON can advise the commander not to deploy the main body.

H-7. The command section conducts initial mission analysis and develops a measured and appropriate response. The commander coordinates appropriate notifications.

RESPONSE PHASE

H-8. Upon arrival at the incident site, the CST commander receives the IC's objectives and obtains updated situation information. The command team advises the IC on the CST assets, capabilities, and limitations. Based on this exchange, the commander determines if the CST will accept the mission.

H-9. After accepting the mission, the CST commander employs the unit to execute CST operations. The command section establishes and maintains liaison with the ICP.

H-10. The command team identifies the location for the setup of the team assets.

H-11. The command team issues the commander's guidance, assigns tasks, monitors performance of the CST, and monitors effectiveness of the support plans (such as, Are CST personnel receiving the necessary support from outside agencies?).

H-12. The command team supervises the OPCEN and supervises and approves the updated IAP and site safety plan (SSP). Additionally, the command team coordinates the assigned missions and verifies site setup and operations of support functions (decontamination line, medical screening, etc.).

H-13. The command team exchanges information to support the development of the mission plan. The team identifies and obtains the incident data and information from the IC.

H-14. The command team assists in integrating the CST into the incident response. It also coordinates its effort as part of the overall state and/or DOD response.

H-15. The command team disseminates information, provides mission guidance to the OPCEN, and provides an initial assessment and recommendation. It provides SITREPs to the IC and provides recommendations to the IC on appropriate responses to a CBRNE incident.

H-16. The command team provides information and advice to the IC based on assessment and analysis results and other facts known to them from skills, experience, and knowledge. Recommendations are based on—

- The identification, classification, and location of CBR and other hazards.
- Updated downwind hazard predictions and hazard areas based on modeling.

H-17. The command team advises the IC on additional local, state, and federal assets available to assist in mitigating the incident and in developing a framework under which these assets can be integrated at the incident scene.

H-18. When appropriate, the CST plans for reinforcement, replacement, or relief by another CST. Also, when appropriate, it plans for transition from Title 32 to Title 10 status (and back to Title 32 status).

H-19. Redeployment decisions are made in concert with the IC, and the criteria for redeployment should be established by the commander and approved by command channels upon arrival and assessment of the situation. The exit strategy should be measurable, coordinated with the IC, and flexible, as the situation dictates. Redeployment should be conducted systematically, making allowances for cleaning or disposing of contaminated materials and

supporting any stay-behind elements that are required to continue CST support to the IC.

POSTINCIDENT PHASE

H-20. In the postincident phase, the unit redeploys, debriefs operations, performs equipment maintenance and resupply, reconstitutes its operational readiness, and reestablishes its response posture. Commanders must ensure that appropriate AAR, cost reimbursement claims, and closeout reports are submitted.

H-21. The command team oversees and verifies that each team is prepared for follow-on missions.

Appendix I

Operations Section

The operations section forms the CST OPCEN. The operations section plans, monitors the employment of the unit, and manages the unit mission on behalf of the CO. In order to do this, the operations section—

- Coordinates the actions of other CST sections and ensures that the CST commander's intent and concept of operations are executed by all elements of the CST.
- Develops and maintains a common operating picture of both civil and military forces conducting crisis and CM operations.
- Supports the CST commander in formulating requirements for follow-on support.

PREINCIDENT PHASE

I-1. In the preincident phase, the operations team identifies responder agencies within the AO and coordinates for preincident training and exercise opportunities for CST teams. The operations team also coordinates with supporting and supported military organizations, other NG and reserve forces within its area of concern, joint/response task force (RTF) personnel, and other active emergency response elements (such as EOD, Army TEU, CBIRF).

I-2. The team maintains awareness of the many DOD agencies with which they may have contact in a CBRNE response role and maintains close contact with local, state, and federal law enforcement officials. A detailed listing of contacts should be maintained by the operations team to ensure the continuity of operations.

I-3. The CST requests, collects, and assesses all available local, state, and federal plans and directives that involve CBRNE preparedness and response. This information will be used to help ensure that CST needs are met and that interagency unity of effort is achieved.

I-4. The operations section compiles information pertinent in the development of adequate CST response plans for contingency missions (such as operational area information, climate, infrastructure, target vulnerability).

I-5. The operations section tracks the operational readiness of the unit on a day-to-day basis, to include personnel, training, and equipment status.

I-6. During the preincident phase, the operations section also does the following:

- Ensures that all operations equipment is ready to deploy.
- Maintains the reach-back database.
- Maintains the first responder/EOC/EMA database.
- Maintains the duty rosters and call-up procedures.
- Updates and loads all modeling information.

ALERT AND DEPLOY PHASES

I-7. In the alert and deploy phases (following the alert and recall), the operations team maintains accountability for all personnel and initiates an incident log. Closure reports are forwarded to the appropriate HQ.

I-8. The operations team coordinates preparation of the deployment plan, selects the method of deployment, coordinates transportation, selects the route and checkpoints, and establishes the communications frequencies and signals.

I-9. The operations team also monitors the movement of the equipment from the home station to the designated staging area. It ensures that the equipment is packed and loaded according to the load plans, that logistical equipment is properly marked, and that shipping documents are complete.

I-10. The operations section gathers information from the incident scene and prepares assessments. They begin to develop the initial plan for incident support. This may include recommendations to the commander for the appropriate response, which may include the construction and design of ADVON for this incident, or attempting to satisfy the mission requirements without deploying. The operations section identifies and establishes contact with and provides initial information to potential reach-back assets that may be required to mitigate the incident.

I-11. During the alert and deployment phases, the operations section—

- Prepares operations estimate for the WO.
- Conducts route planning and prepares route maps.
- Establishes communications with established IC or his representative.
- Prepares initial hazard model assessment based on current weather conditions, and updates modeling data as required.
- Coordinates any required aviation support.
- Obtains weather updates on the move.
- Updates hazards and modeling on the move.
- Passes recommended route changes and the prestaging area to the CST commander/deputy.

RESPONSE PHASE

I-12. In the response phase, the team arrives at the attack/incident site or staging area, reports as a support asset to the IC or his designated authority, and commences operations.

I-13. Once the location for the CST has been established, the operations team develops and/or updates a site occupation plan. The initial development of a site safety plan and incident action plan occurs in this phase and is updated as necessary throughout the operation.

I-14. The operations team will man the CST OPCEN according to its SOP and begin the process of maintaining SA (such as by initiating and maintaining a situation map sketch, tactical command board). Based on the commander's guidance, the OPCEN may adjust the CCIR.

I-15. The operations team conducts a predictive analysis to estimate vulnerabilities at the incident site and to advise the IC of the results. The operations team collects the necessary information and develops the plan to collect samples for analysis and/or identify unknown substances. This plan will include information on medical surveillance, site safety, decontamination, and communications.

I-16. The operations team ensures that the sample chain of custody is maintained and that its appropriate disposition is coordinated.

I-17. The operations team will maintain reach-back communications links to designated SMEs for advisory, confirmatory, and technical information.

I-18. The OPCEN will collect and analyze information from internal and external sources and is responsible for tracking the location and actions of all CST personnel operating at the incident site. Automation tools are provided to the operations team that can provide initial assessments of the effects or potential impact of agents on public health, property, and the environment.

I-19. The operations team collects information from all sections and develops recommended COAs for the CST commander.

I-20. The operations team updates the unit plans based on feedback from the incident site and from ongoing operations.

I-21. The operations team plans for transition or hand-off operations and procedures. All pertinent information and recommended COAs will be consolidated and presented to the CST commander for review and submission to the IC prior to the termination of the operation. Termination packets may include the following products: incident logs, site safety plan, IAP, models, reach-back POCs, site sketches or photographs, and analysis results. All reports will be submitted before departure from the incident site, and a debriefing is provided to the IC before the mission is terminated.

I-22. The OPCEN conducts redeployment coordination. A redeployment plan will be prepared to redeploy the unit according to the unit SOP. The team also coordinates with the IC for the disposition of hazardous items, including equipment and waste.

I-23. During the response phase, the operations section may do the following:

- Coordinate with higher HQ.
- Update maps.
- Update the task organization.
- Update frequencies/call signs.
- Update the hazard model.
- Maintain LNO contact and the rotation plan.
- Establish and maintain an incident log.
- Track the status of all personnel and equipment.
- Plan future operations.
- Submit and receive all reports.
- Request entry of CST personnel into the hot-zone.
- Confirm that the CST decontamination site is operational prior to survey teams entering into any contaminated zone.
- Ensure that personnel execute sample chain-of-custody procedures.
- Update the commander/deputy, as required.
- Maintain SA at all times.
- Develop and refine the information for the list of PIR.
- Brief the IC on CST operations and plans.
- Maintain reach-back SME capability with the communications team.
- Accomplish all required internal communications checks.
- Request any additional resources, as required.
- Conduct RA and update the site safety plan.
- Monitor downrange operations (such as time on air, number of personnel downrange).
- Submit required closing reports/AARs.

POSTINCIDENT PHASE

I-24. In the postincident phase, the unit redeploys, debriefs operations, performs equipment maintenance and resupply, reconstitutes its operational readiness, updates the unit readiness status, and resets its response posture.

I-25. The operations section should prepare, conduct, and disseminate, as appropriate, an AAR. The section submits a closure report/AAR to the appropriate HQ.

I-26. The operations section revises current plans in order to improve future operations.

I-27. During the postincident phase, the operations section will also do the following:

- Ensure that all team and equipment status is briefed to the commander.
- Ensure that all borrowed equipment is returned to the CST.
- Complete any required air coordination.
- Prepare final FRAGOs.
- Assist the commander/deputy in establishing priorities of work.

- Maintain communications with appropriate higher HQ and agencies.
- Liaise/coordinate with the departure airfield and/or the unit providing airlift support.
- Conduct the final CST safety/movement brief.
- Submit required closing reports.

Appendix J

Medical Section

The medical section is responsible for the medical support of the unit. It receives and analyzes incident-related samples. The medical section provides medical advice and consultation to the CST commander, the IC and, as directed, to public health agencies and local hospitals on the management of contaminated casualties, providing an initial medical assessment of the effects of the terrorist incident.

PREINCIDENT PHASE

J-1. In the preincident phase, the CST medical section should make frequent on-site coordination with EMS, hospital care providers, public health authorities, and representatives of organizations/agencies included in the National Disaster Response System. Planning for patient evacuation and decontamination and treatment protocols are key to successfully mitigating a CBRNE incident.

J-2. The medical section—

- Administers the unit medical surveillance program in accordance with DOD 6055.5-M.
- Coordinates with state and federal agencies to integrate and standardize laboratory analysis and sample packaging procedures (such as training with supporting state and/or federal agencies).
- Supervises the management of pharmaceuticals and medical logistics in accordance with applicable Army regulations (ARs), FMs, and supply bulletins (SBs).
- Coordinates supplements of the Army Surgeon General-approved base formulary with the state surgeon.
- Develops, requests, and maintains push packages for follow-on resupply of Class VIII supplies in support of ongoing operations.
- Prepares and maintains medical records and required medicants for deployment and ensures that all personnel have required immunizations.
- Ensures that all annual baseline physicals are up to date and documented.
- Ensures that all medical supplies and equipment are on hand and serviceable.
- Updates the medical resource database (hospitals/strike teams/resources).
- Ensures that all CST personnel have received required inoculations.

ALERT AND DEPLOY PHASES

J-3. In the alert and deploy phases, the medical section will package deployment medical records and required medical equipment and supplies for deployment. They will administer any required immunizations. They will prepare and provide a medical threat briefing to the CST staff for each mission. The medical section will prepare and coordinate a medical safety brief to include a hydration plan. The medical section will ensure that its vehicle is loaded and equipped according to the load plan and will brief the CST on any initial suspected agents (based on available intelligence).

J-4. The medical section provides information on suspected agents for modeling plumes, map overlays, and medical and laboratory facilities in the area of the incident site.

J-5. The medical section provides available information from the IC on available local supporting medical resources (such as supporting medical facility and laboratory) and conveying information to the IC on CST medical capabilities.

J-6. The medical section will establish initial reach-back with applicable medical resources per unit SOP. (See Appendix G for information on reach-back capability.)

J-7. The medical section will begin to conduct preentry medical monitoring.

J-8. The medical section will initialize appropriate medical and analytical equipment prior to deployment according to METT-TC and issue appropriate medical surveillance devices (such as dosimeters) in accordance with the unit SOP.

J-9. Additional medical section actions include—

- Prepare the initial medical hazard estimate for WO.
- Update the medical estimate with any new information.
- Load and check the equipment.
- Coordinate for medical support from local treatment facilities.
- Collect pertinent medical updates en route.
- Initiate reach-back to CBRNE SMEs.

RESPONSE PHASE

J-10. During the response phase, the medical section upon arriving at the incident site updates the medical support plan with the CST OPCEN to meet the commander's intent. The team receives the situation briefing from the IC and OPCEN and identifies medical support requirements based on the initial intelligence. The medical section establishes liaison with emergency medical resources to identify what the intent should be for the coordinated CST response (such as casualty extraction, evacuation, and on-scene treatment capabilities), especially during remote-site operations. The medical section keeps the commander, OPCEN, and the team members informed of the symptoms, health risks, and treatment protocol of the suspected threat agent(s).

J-11. The medical section will assist in the development of the CST safety plan.

J-12. The medical section establishes medical operation areas and communication with the OPCEN. The team advises the CST commander on CBRNE readiness of medical communities surrounding the incident site. The medical section establishes liaison and maintains contact with other health care entities to ensure adequate medical care for CST members and to assess the medical impact of the incidents. Medical operations documentation will be maintained at all times during the mission.

J-13. The medical section conducts medical monitoring of preentry personnel operating in PPE. This must be completed in a timely manner prior to entry. The medical section places the DAP/MALS into an operational status. The team establishes communications with the UCS for medical technical reach-back. It initiates a laboratory journal for analytical operations and uses chain-of-custody procedures. All equipment and calibrated instruments are validated prior to accepting a sample for analysis.

J-14. The medical section monitors CST personnel in PPE during section operations. Personnel operating in PPE may be operating beyond the visual range of CST medical personnel. Medical personnel can monitor communication channels to determine changes in behavior that require a recommendation to the CST OPCEN that entry personnel should be extracted. The medical section provides emergency medical care to CST members, as required.

J-15. The medical section works with the survey section to develop the sampling plan based on initial reconnaissance and available intelligence. The medical section assumes the appropriate level of PPE to receive samples for analysis. The team verifies the container integrity by a visual check, maintains the chain of custody, and initiates documentation upon receipt. The medical section prepares one or more sample aliquots for on-site testing. The remaining sample aliquots are forwarded to local, state, or national laboratories for confirmatory or definitive analysis. The medical section coordinates sample disposition with the operations team. An analytical log will be maintained on all samples processed and tested.

J-16. The medical section conducts a presumptive sample analysis. It conducts a collaborative assessment of analysis results (reach-back, health care community, modeling NCO, and available on-scene SMEs). It provides the OPCEN with the analytical results for inclusion in reports and in the periodic and final assessment packages. The incident medical assessment identifies the medical implications of on-site hazards and suggests medical mitigation actions.

J-17. The medical section conducts postentry medical screening of personnel in PPE. Medical personnel provide postentry monitoring and supportive medical care. The medical section provides final screening results to the OPCEN and updates medical documentation, as necessary.

J-18. The medical section controls residual sample material and coordinates to relocate waste materials from the analytical area to the HAZMAT collection point. The disposition of the analytical area must be determined

prior to leaving the site (such as decontaminated, disposed of). The medical section processes through the decontamination line, as required by METT-TC.

J-19. During the response phase, the medical section will—

- Link up with IC medical personnel for a situation update.
- Prepare the initial medical assessment for the OPORD brief.
- Assist, as necessary, in coordinating with local hospital facilities for two-way exchange of information and patient tracking.
- Supervise and monitor exit procedures for CST personnel in the hot-zone to ensure that decontamination is being conducted properly.
- Help facilitate medical resources for the CST commander.
- Identify medical facilities prepared to decontaminate casualties who arrive contaminated.
- Determine if a radiological OEG status has been reported.
- Ensure that medical treatment personnel have PPE appropriate for the hazard.
- Ensure that measures are being taken to preclude further casualties.
- Ensure that procedures are in place to prevent contamination of food, medical supplies, and water.
- Ensure that exposed CST personnel are treated immediately.
- Monitor decontamination team operations.
- Ensure that medical supplies are immediately available to treat CST personnel.
- Ensure that expended medical supplies are being tracked for resupply.
- Ensure proper disposal for expended/used medical supplies.
- Help ensure that first responders are being monitored/evaluated for agent exposure.
- Monitor work/rest cycles for the CST commander.
- Plan for managing contaminated CST casualties.
- Submit all required reports.
- Keep the OPCEN updated on all hazards and assessments.
- Ensure that all appropriate actions have been taken to reduce/eliminate risk to CST members.
- Track all required medical records, action logs, and journals.

POSTINCIDENT PHASE

J-20. In the postincident phase, the medical section updates the list of expendable medical supplies and submits shortages per the unit SOP. The medical section also updates CST medical personnel. The team conducts operator maintenance of all on-hand equipment and coordinates necessary outside maintenance to ensure preparedness for the next mission.

J-21. The medical section maintains all appropriate communications links with medical resources that participated during the incident.

J-22. The medical section coordinates the medical and mental health care of unit members that participated in the incident response. The section also coordinates for reconstitution of expended medical supplies and for medical maintenance support.

Appendix K

Communications Section

The communications section mission is to provide tactical emergency and garrison communications to the CST commander and as requested by a site IC. This is accomplished through the UCS by providing voice and data communications through a variety of networks designed to support CST operations and civil and military agencies. The UCS acts as a common support node for an incident site and maintains intrateam communications and communications with higher authorities, other responding agencies, and SMEs. The section establishes secure communications links, as required. It maintains COMSEC, classified cryptological information (CCI) equipment, and all classified documentation. The UCS is capable of stand-alone support to an IC, if required. The UCS performs much of its duties using high-powered radio and satellite transmissions supported by generator power. As such, the UCS must be included into the site safety plan to ensure safe and effective operations.

PREINCIDENT PHASE

K-1. During the preincident phase, the communications section ensures that all communications equipment, COMSEC, and CCI are serviceable and ready to deploy. The commander and the communications section chief will be responsible for the site and physical security of the UCS, COMSEC, and other classified materials. It will maintain all CST software for backup purposes. It will coordinate all remote communications and distance learning activities. The communications team chief will ensure that section training, UCS proficiency training and new technology training are conducted. The communications section will conduct communications surveys of possible infrastructure targets of opportunity as directed by CST commanders. It will conduct communications logistics to support unit and section requirements and maintain all updated information for reach-back purposes.

K-2. The communications team coordinates, integrates, and incorporates the UCS into any incident. The communications section will account for and maintain all essential communications equipment.

K-3. The communications section will maintain all databases and information support systems and fulfill all required duties for the UCS accreditation.

ALERT AND DEPLOY PHASES

K-4. During the alert and deploy phases, the communications section establishes a communications plan and maintains communications en route with supporting agencies such as the—

- Trojan Network Control Center (TNCC), Fort Belvoir, Virginia.
- POMSO/TAG or the next higher military HQ.
- ICP or state EOC/EMA.
- CST home station.

K-5. The communications section will configure its section equipment for any means or mode of travel and conduct 100 percent inventory and PMCS. The section ensures that alternate power supplies and power systems are available.

K-6. The ADVON may deploy with the UCS, and the UCS will provide the CST commander a modular, air-transportable, self-contained communications system with the capability to support civil and military authorities. When deployed, the UCS would give the commander the ability to exercise TACON while coordinating operations with on-scene CM agencies.

K-7. Communications nets will be opened and maintained as needed. Radio checks will be conducted with all vehicles in convoy prior to departing to the incident.

RESPONSE PHASE

K-8. The communications section will implement the site communications plan that supports the commander's intent. The team also plans the CST OPOD (signal portion) and SOI.

K-9. Additionally, the communications section establishes internal and external communications using a site communications plan if that specific portion is applicable. The communications section functions include—

- Placing the UCS in operation.
- Establishing initial communications with the IC.
- Establishing communications with the appropriate EOCs.
- Establishing voice reach-back communications.
- Establishing data reach-back communications.
- Establishing LAN communications between the OPCEN, the analytical equipment (as required), and the UCS.

K-10. The communications section provides communications support during the mission. The team determines incident-specific communications requirements and assesses existing capabilities. The communications section also manages other communications-related matters, such as assigned frequencies, and develops the call signs and radio nets from the SOI.

K-11. Another key task for the CST communications section is to maintain unit internal communications. To support intradetachment voice communications, the communications section provides push-to-talk communications equipment or handheld radios to assigned team personnel.

K-12. The communications section will conduct a 100 percent COMSEC and CCI inventory. The communications team chief will be prepared for the emergency destruction of COMSEC and CCI. The communications section chief will implement a section work/rest cycle, as needed.

POSTINCIDENT PHASE

K-13. The communications section will clean and inventory all communications equipment, to include all COMSEC/CCI. The communications section will dispose of lithium batteries per the unit SOP. Any required closing reports will be submitted prior to departure. The communications section will notify the COMSEC custodian of any changes in the COMSEC status.

K-14. The communications section also completes required inspections and addresses any equipment readiness issues. Equipment and vehicles are repacked and are made ready for movement and future missions. Upon returning to the home station, communications nets will be closed on commander's orders.

Appendix L

Survey Section

The role of the CST survey team is to enter an area that may be contaminated by a CBRNE hazard and provide an initial assessment of the hazard. CST survey teams can also collect samples and maintain a chain of custody for laboratory analysis. CST survey teams are equipped with a variety of specialized military and civilian CBRNE agent detectors to support the detection and identification. The survey team should be proficient in operating in two teams of two or more survey members. Additionally, the survey team provides, as a minimum, a two-person backup team to assist the entry team in the case of emergency operations.

PREINCIDENT PHASE

L-1. Service members selected for the CST survey team element must be fully qualified in their respective MOS and must complete appropriate professional development education.

L-2. This training program employs the USACMLS as its foundation and includes courses taught by the civilian EFR community (such as state fire academies and civilian first responder professional organizations). It also includes courses from the US Army Medical Department, US Army FORSCOM, the Director of Military Support, the EPA, the NFA, the Defense Nuclear Weapons School (DNWS), and the FEMA Emergency Management Institute (EMI). Individual training may include toxic agent training at the USACMLS chemical decontamination training facility (CDTF) and suit training for Levels A and B PPE.

L-3. The individual training builds individual competencies in NBC defense procedures, operation of specialized detection equipment, and knowledge of hazardous waste operations practiced by the civilian EFR.

L-4. Each member of the CST survey team maintains individual certifications and qualifications for HAZMAT technician training (29 CFR 1910.120).

L-5. The survey team maintains the capability to conduct CBR surveys.

L-6. Survey team members ensure serviceability and maintenance—

- Authorized PPE.
- Detection and identification equipment.

L-7. Hydration plans and air refill plans for the SCBA tanks will also be developed and initiated.

L-8. The survey team conducts training on (but are not limited to)—

- Joint entry operations.
- Sampling.
- Confined space entry.
- Emergency action drills.

ALERT AND DEPLOY PHASES

L-9. In the alert and deploy phases, equipment preparation and load-out are prioritized based on the WO/OPORD and pre-positioned in load plans.

L-10. Each section conducts inspection of team members' individual equipment. Team members also begin pre-mission inspections.

L-11. During these phases, the CST begins planning entry operations.

RESPONSE PHASE

L-12. In the response phase, the team leader (TL) prepares and issues the initial team WO/OPORD.

L-13. A CST survey mission is a directed effort to obtain information that identifies the type of contamination in a specific area or location. There are many factors to consider before, during, and after a CBRNE incident. The following factors are considered:

- Knowing the hazard prior to entering the site can reduce the amount of detection equipment and time needed to respond, and it also ensures that personnel have the appropriate PPE prior to entering the site. Medical treatment, decontamination solutions, and procedures can be determined if the agent hazard is known.
- Wind direction and speed may affect the agent downwind hazard. Temperature, humidity, rain, fog, and snow may also impact the agent field behavior.
- Variables such as locations of urban environments, heavy or low populated areas, terrain features, accessibility, available resources, and building locations and use are assessed. Structural damage and visibility considerations can also be factors in determining how to respond.
- Other HAZMAT teams, fire departments, hospitals, police, NG, or other federal agencies may also be available and possess capabilities to support operations at an incident site.

L-14. Planning will focus on the assigned missions and consider what other agencies have accomplished.

SURVEY TEAM RESPONSE ACTIONS

L-15. Team members will receive an updated WO/OPORD once on site. They will conduct perimeter monitoring operations to clear CST work areas and verify the hot-zone exclusion area. The team will review building blueprints or diagrams, if needed, and obtain updates to downwind hazard models. Weather briefings, containing primary wind direction and speed, will also be given as needed. Before the survey team enters the hot-zone, the survey TL

recommends the minimum PPE necessary for the entry based on the mission and established guidelines. Teams should conduct rehearsals prior to entering the hot-zone (such as review mission objectives and actions, movement, detection and sample collection procedures, emergency responses, and back brief). See Table L-1, page L-4, for a sample survey team response checklist.

L-16. The survey team debriefs the appropriate personnel at the site, if possible. Ensure that pertinent information is included in the AAR.

L-17. The survey team checks PPE and detection devices for proper functioning. The TL verifies and reinforces the importance of the buddy system and the importance of maintaining contact with one another while operating in the hot-zone. The survey team will conduct communication checks with the operations team and with each other. CST brevity codes can also be communicated as the primary means of alerting the OPCEN and survey TL to an emergency in the hot-zone or the immediate AO. Established warning signals (air horns, sirens, whistles, etc) can provide an alternate means of alert. Mission-abort criteria will be established and reviewed. The survey team also delivers the downrange equipment manifest to the OPCEN prior to site entry. All personnel receive the site safety briefing prior to the initiation of entry operations.

L-18. Once preoperational procedures and checks are completed, the initial entry team and backup team will don the appropriate level of protection, deploy from the cold/warm-zone, and position themselves on the edge of the warm/hot-zone adjacent to the CST decontamination site. The CST decontamination station must be established upon arrival at the CBRNE incident site prior to the entry of any CST personnel into the hot-zone. The decontamination site also functions as the CST element administrative checkpoint to account for personnel entering and exiting the incident site. The backup team should be positioned where it can concentrate on its primary function of monitoring the activity within the hot-zone and/or waiting to provide assistance. The teams will exercise a rotation schedule based on ambient conditions and protective posture according to the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA). The operations team relays IC approval for entry into the hot-zone. The survey team advises the operations team when it begins using SCBA air and deploys into the hot-zone.

INITIAL-ENTRY SAFETY GUIDELINES

L-19. CSTs must conduct air monitoring before and throughout operations in the hot-zone to identify any atmospheres that are corrosive, combustible, or oxygen-deficient or that contain radioactive or toxic substances that exceed IDLH and exposure over PELs.

Table L-1. Survey Team Response Checklist (Example)

1. Prepare survey plan.
2. Prepare survey team rotation schedule and priorities of work.
3. Update hazard assessment.
4. Assist with identification of dress-out, briefing, decontamination, and recovery areas.
5. Be prepared to conduct survey operations within 90 minutes of mission assumption from the IC.
6. Conduct final hazard analysis and determine modified entry points and stay times.
7. Coordinate with the medical section, and receive required preentry screening of personnel within 1 hour of entry into the hot-zone.
8. Establish the mission-abort/turn-back criteria.
9. Identify any mission-abort indicators to the operations team.
10. Review any structural diagrams or blueprints available.
11. Issue equipment, and conduct equipment checks.
12. Ensure that the survey team continuously monitors the hazard.
13. Conduct communications checks with the CST OPCEN.
14. Inform the OPCEN when the lead survey team is ready to enter the hot-zone; request permission to make entry into the hot-zone.
15. Receive authorization from the operations team for entry teams to enter the hot-zone.
16. During reconnaissance activities the survey team will—
 - Report entry into the hot-zone.
 - Report status/position to the OPCEN at predetermined intervals/checkpoints.
 - Pass on any agent detection and identification information as it becomes available.
 - Identify when samples have been collected and ready for hand-off.
 - Call for clearance out of the hot-zone into the decontamination area.
 - Inform the OPCEN regularly of the personnel status and future operations posture.
 - Complete postentry medical screening.

Monitoring Requirements

L-20. The monitoring requirements are—

- Corrosive vapor/liquid.
- Combustibility (flammability).
- Oxygen levels (deficient and rich).
- Radioactivity.
- Other hazardous products (such as volatile organic chemicals).

Survey Team Operations—CB or Unknown Hazard

L-21. Factors that influence the survey plan include—

- IC's intent.
- Immediate and continuing safety hazards.
- Indicators of secondary device(s), as required.
- Types of containers or other storage systems.
- Tags, labels, markings, or other identifying indicators.
- The condition of waste containers and storage systems.
- The physical condition of the materials.
- Potential pathways of dispersion.
- Indicators of potential exposure to hazardous substances.
- Reactive, incompatible, flammable, or highly corrosive wastes.
- The presence of any potential naturally occurring skin irritants or dermatitis-inducing agent.
- Weather conditions.

L-22. The team develops survey and sampling plans using information from IC intelligence and initial reconnaissance. They use the reconnaissance techniques of search, survey, and/or sampling. Initially, search techniques are used to find the contamination. Once the contamination is detected and identified, a survey of the area can be performed to determine the size and extent of the contamination. Sampling is conducted after the search or survey is completed and samples of the contamination are required. Sampling is required when the agent identity cannot be determined or confirmed, biological agents are suspected, or proof of use is needed.

L-23. Three search techniques can be employed upon entering a contaminated site. Each technique can be performed mounted or dismounted. These techniques are—

- Zigzag.
- Lane.
- Cloverleaf.

NOTE: Refer to FM 3-11.19 for the proper execution of these techniques.

L-24. Three survey techniques can be employed to determine the spread of contamination to CST staging, mission-planning, and decontamination areas. These techniques are—

- Near side/far side.
- Box.
- Star.

NOTE: Refer to FM 3-11.19 for the proper execution of these techniques.

L-25. The entry team detects and identifies CBRNE hazards that were present within mission capabilities, provides SITREPs to the operations team, maintains SA, adjusts the survey plan (as required), maintains the buddy system, and checks and collects the following information:

- Locations and types of hazards.
- Physical layouts and descriptions.
- Casualty status or information.
- Additional requirements.
- Video and/or still-camera pictures.

L-26. The survey team and operations team track the length of time soldiers have been "on SCBA air" and the amount of "air time" for the entry, decontamination, DAP, and backup teams. It also identifies any critical tests that need to be performed before hot-zone extraction.

SURVEY TEAM OPERATIONS—MONITORING AND SAMPLING

L-27. The collection of air, vapor, liquid, soil, and other solid samples is an integral part of initial and presumptive identification of known and/or unknown agents. During CST survey and sample collection operations, the survey TL establishes the required protective equipment to fit the situation. CST survey teams will collect samples under varying circumstances. WMD samples should be turned in to the laboratory for use in the identification process (while maintaining a chain of custody).

L-28. Detection equipment may include items such as expended M256A1 kits, draeger tubes, assay tickets, and M8 and M9 detector paper. These items should be recovered, packaged, and delivered to the IC for future disposition.

L-29. The techniques for conducting surveys of CBRNE hazards can be found in FMs 3-11.3 and 3-11.19. During survey team operations, the survey team will—

- Report entry into the hot-zone.
- Provide status/position reports to the OPCEN at predetermined intervals/checkpoints.
- Pass on any agent detection and identification information as it becomes available.
- Identify when samples have been collected and are ready for hand-off.
- Call for clearance out of the hot-zone to the decontamination area.
- Keep the OPCEN informed of the personnel status and future operations posture.

- Complete postentry medical screening.

L-30. When conducting a survey, CST members may face a number of potentially dangerous situations that require specific, immediate action. The following paragraphs describe some of the situations that may be encountered, along with suggested response actions.

L-31. The following actions should be taken if a low-air alarm activates inside a protective suit:

- Notify survey TL to initiate decontamination.
- Notify your TL of the problem.
- Proceed to the decontamination line as directed.
- Draw individual protective equipment (IPE) after decontamination termination.
- Report to the medical-monitoring area.

L-32. The following actions should be taken if a team member goes down:

- Alert CST of the situation (man down).
- Implement the emergency plan.

L-33. The following actions should be taken if team members become separated (TL will advise the CST OPCEN of the situation.):

- Proceed to the rally point.
- Request a backup team if required.
- Advise the OPCEN of the current situation and proceed as directed.

L-34. The following actions should be taken if chemicals are detected that are within flammability ranges:

- Abort the entry and proceed to the clean area.
- Notify the CST OPCEN, and request guidance.
- Plan for mitigation, and execute on order.

L-35. The following actions should be taken if a suit is torn:

- Conduct emergency decontamination.
- Apply tape, if possible.
- Request a backup team if required.
- Proceed immediately to the decontamination line with a team member.
- Notify the survey TL.

NOTE: Unaffected team members await further orders before entering the decontamination area.

L-36. The following actions should be taken if a survey team member becomes overheated:

- Report to the survey TL and CST commander.
- Leave as soon as permission is received.
- Request a backup team if required.

L-37. The following action should be taken if a terrorist is encountered:

- Take cover if available.
- Inform the survey TL.
- Move out of the area as soon as possible.

L-38. The following actions should be taken if a team member becomes grossly contaminated:

- Inform the CST OPCEN.
- Conduct emergency decontamination.
- Evacuate from the hot-zone immediately.
- Proceed to the decontamination line immediately with a team member.
- Seek medical aid if necessary.

Collecting Environmental Samples

L-39. Control or background samples should be collected from clean areas upwind and/or near the incident site as baseline data. The control samples must be identical to the samples collected from the contaminated areas (such as liquid, soil, vegetation). The contaminated samples are compared to the baseline data (control samples). This is especially true if unknown or nonstandard chemical and/or suspected biological agents were employed. Control samples generically are the same as those collected in an alleged attack area. The size of an environmental control sample should be about the same as the suspected contaminated sample collected from the attack area. The CST medical section uses the control samples to compare with a similar contaminated item during the analysis process.

Collecting Air and Vapor Samples

L-40. The CST collects samples of air by using devices that draw air through a filter material that selectively removes certain compounds from the air or by taking a volumetric air sample.

L-41. The amount of contaminants in the air is influenced by several factors, such as—

- Atmospheric or meteorological conditions.
- Contaminant flow rate into the environment.
- Physical state of the contaminant.
- Contour of the terrain.

Collecting Water Samples

L-42. Water sampling is a matter of collecting enough water to get acceptable information about its contaminants.

Collecting Soil Samples

L-43. Soil surrounding a CBRNE incident site is an appropriate place to collect samples for toxic/organic compounds analysis. Samples should be collected adjacent to suspected contamination or where indicators of CBRNE agents exist (such as powders, oily substances, dead animals).

Collecting Contaminated Vegetation

L-44. Before collecting samples of vegetation from an incident site, the survey team makes a visual examination of the area, looking for CBRNE agent indicators or suspected contamination. The team collects samples of vegetation that appear to be different from normal.

Recording Information to Support Sampling

L-45. After the CST survey team has undergone decontamination and redress operations, the operations team can then develop a complete record for each sample. The completed record can be made available to the requesting agencies receiving and analyzing the sample(s). Critical information includes—

- **Circumstances of acquisition.** Describe how the sample was obtained. Note where it was found, what time it was obtained, and who collected the sample.
- **Physical description.** List the physical state (solid, liquid, powder, apparent viscosity), color, approximate size, and identity (such as military nomenclature) of the specimen, dirt, leaves, and so forth.
- **Circumstances of agent deposition.** If known, note the type of delivery system; describe how the weapon functioned; how the agent acted on release; sounds heard during dissemination; any craters or shrapnel found associated with a burst; and colors of smoke, flames, or mist that may be associated with the attack.
- **Agent effects on vegetation.** Describe the general area (urban, jungle, mountain, grassland) and changes in the vegetation after agent deposition (color change, wilting, drying, dead) in the main attack and fringe areas.
- **Agent effects on humans.** Describe how the agent affected personnel in the main attack area versus fringe areas. Note the duration of agent effects, peculiar odors that may have been noticed in the area prior to, during, and/or after an attack; measures taken that alleviated or deteriorated the effects; and the approximate number of victims and survivors, to include their ages and genders.
- **Agent effects on animals.** Note the types of animals that were or were not affected by an attack and a description of how they were affected.

Packaging and Marking Samples for Transfer

L-46. Materials used for packaging samples primarily consist of tamper-resistant tape, collection bags, specimen jars and tubes, pigs, ice chests, tape, sealing materials, and wrapping and cushioning supplies. The utilization of these materials is described below:

- **Collection container.** Survey team personnel use the EPA-approved sampling container as the initial container for such samples as protective masks and filter canisters, individual antidote and decontamination kits, munition fragments, and other items too large to place in a specimen jar. The container acts as an initial or

secondary vapor barrier to prevent air from leaking inward and toxic material leaking outward.

- **Glass specimen jars.** Use glass containers to hold small environmental samples because toxic agents may react with chemicals from plastics and introduce contamination, confusing the analysis efforts and/or dissolving the container and allowing HAZMATs to leak.
- **Sealing and marking material.** If the container has a screw-on lid and no O-ring, place plumbers tape (NSN 8030-00-889-3535, tape, antiseize) on the threads of the container before putting on the lid. This helps to limit the leakage of liquids and vapor from the container and ensures that the lid will not fall off while in transit. If the lid has a cardboard liner, remove the liner and replace it with one or two layers of film (a laboratory sealant film). Once the lid is on, stretch the film around the outside of the container at the junction of the lid and the glass. Two wraps of the film are enough to provide a leakage barrier and ensure that the lid cannot fall off. At this point, ensure that the sample number is on the outside of the container. If it is not, use an adhesive label to record the sample number on the outside of the container.
- **Ice chest.** Standard polyethylene or metal ice chests are the most easily procured items used for shipping CB samples. The most easily used size is about 24 inches long by 18 inches high by 15 inches deep. Use self-contained cooling tubes (cooling vest type) to keep the sample cool. Standard ice should only be used as a last resort because of its rapid melting rate and the possibility that the melted ice may contaminate samples.

DOCUMENTATION

L-47. In order to maintain the chain of custody, the survey team members complete a written record for each sample using DD Form 1911 or other approved documentation. Whoever later assumes responsibility for the care of the sample should add his name and the date and time he received the sample. The minimum information required on the exterior of all sample containers is—

- Date, time, and location of the sample.
- Identification of the person who took the sample.
- Physical description of the sample.
- Sample number (samples are numbered consecutively).

EXITING AND EXTRACTION FROM THE HOT-ZONE

L-48. The survey team advises the operations team that they are departing the incident site, or the operations team advises the survey team to immediately depart the incident site. After concluding all testing/sampling operations, the survey team will collect equipment and samples for removal from the hot-zone and will report items that were not removed. They will generally depart the incident site via the same route used to enter the site. Entry and backup teams will link up (informing the operations team and decontamination team, if necessary) and depart the incident site. The priority

for decontamination goes to downed/injured team members, members lowest on air, samples, video records, evidence, and equipment.

MARKING CONTAMINATED AREAS

L-49. Marking a contaminated area indicates the presence of a hazard. The extent of a hazard is determined by a detailed survey. Signs will be placed, where possible, according to the NAERG for the particular hazard.

PRESERVING THE CRIME SCENE

L-50. Appropriate law enforcement personnel should collect evidence. At incident scenes, appropriate agencies, such as the FBI, are responsible for collecting and documenting evidence. During CM operations, CST survey teams enter a crime scene to conduct detection and identification.

L-51. To ensure consistent documentation, control, and security, it may be useful to designate CST personnel to coordinate with law enforcement authorities. Potential physical evidence related to an incident scene often includes, but is not limited to—

- Equipment.
- Tools.
- Wires.
- Hardware.
- Computer disks.
- Pre- and postincident positions of incident-related elements.
- Scattered debris.
- Patterns, parts, and properties of physical items associated with the incident.

L-52. Less obvious (but potentially important) physical evidence includes fluids (liquids and gases). Significant physical evidence is often found in obscure and seemingly insignificant places, such as hinges and supports.

L-53. When preparing to remove samples from an incident site, the following guidelines are recommended:

- Document (photograph) the crime scene, in particular those areas where samples are collected.
- Do not start extraction and removal or movement of items until position records (measurements for maps and photographs) have been made.
- Be aware that the incident site may be unsafe due to dangerous materials or a weakened structure.
- Mark locations of removed items according to IC guidance and/or the unit SOP.
- Exercise care during extraction and preliminary examination to avoid defacing or distorting impact marks and fracture surfaces.

POSTINCIDENT PHASE

L-54. The postincident phase consists of two elements: redeploy and unit reconstitution operations. This phase begins when the IC has determined that the CST is no longer required for incident support. The CST may maintain engagement with incident mitigation if state or federal authorities determine that continued assistance is required and the deploying authority concurs.

L-55. The survey team ensures that all equipment is on hand and that all vehicles are reconfigured according to load plans. The survey TL updates the list of all expendable items and coordinates with the logistics team for support.

Appendix M

Administration and Logistics Section

The A&L section provides logistics, administration, and CSS (supply and services) and coordinates technical maintenance for the CST. The section works directly with the Defense CMSUPCEN for forward-area support, resupply, and reconstitution after deployment. The Defense CMSUPCEN is a DOD activity established to supply, sustain, and assist with initial equipment fielding for designated CBRNE response forces. The Defense CMSUPCEN conducts stock management and warehousing, warranty management, and ILS. It coordinates and monitors forward-area resupply and sustainment.

PREINCIDENT PHASE

M-1. Prior to mission employment, the section advises the commander on personnel and equipment issues, such as the status of personnel, equipment calibration, and basic load status. The section conducts periodic visits to the Defense CMSUPCEN to reconcile logistics actions with their assigned logistics support coordinator. They also coordinate with the state Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics (DCSLOG)/DOL or United States Property and Fiscal Office (USPFO) representatives on logistics issues.

M-2. During the preincident phase, the A&L section is responsible for several actions. It conducts the following administration functions:

- Monitors administrative CST personnel status, and advises the commander on personnel readiness issues.
- Ensures that all personnel records are up to date.
- Reports all personnel and equipment shortages to the operations team.
- Maintains all deployable files, forms, and publications.
- Ensures that appropriate personnel orders are on hand.

M-3. During the preincident phase, the A&L section conducts the following logistics functions:

- Supports property accountability and maintenance.
- Monitors the arms and ammunition status, and ensures that they are available for issue based on the threat and rules for the use of force.
- Coordinates the repair of standard equipment through the state NG supply and maintenance system.
- Coordinates the repair of nonstandard or mission-unique equipment according to procedures detailed in the CST logistics support SOP.
- Ensures that equipment is calibrated and ready for deployment and that routine logistics support operations occur during this time.

- Coordinates unit load planning, whether movement is conducted by ground or air. Units move by organic means or transportation, provided at the state or national levels, through existing military traffic management systems.
- Updates all supply and requisition actions.
- Plans on-site logistical support.
- Reports all equipment shortages to the operations team.
- Ensures that the logistics NCO is authorized to use the unit international merchant purchase authority card (IMPAC) card on deployment.
- Maintains and manages all ILS transactions.
- Maintains and reports the status of major end items/systems readiness, consumables and spare parts stockage, and supply shortages impacting the planned concept of operations to the command section.
- Assists with coordination of transportation assets and loading.
- Initiates all transactions to maintain mission-essential equipment readiness.
- Establishes and updates timelines for the delivery of mission-essential equipment.

ALERT AND DEPLOY PHASES

M-4. During the alert and deploy phases, the A&L section is responsible for several actions. In its administration function, it conducts the following administration functions:

- Ensures the team members' personal deployment packages are complete.
- Activates the family support network.

M-5. During the alert and deploy phase, the A&L section conducts the following logistics functions:

- Ensures that the basic section load is serviceable and ready to deploy. Only the state TAG can authorize the release of Class V supplies when the CST is deployed under Title 32. When the CST is deployed under Title 10 authorization for the release of Class V supplies will be through its established chain-of-command.
- Conducts the resupply of common items.
- Supports the loading of unit equipment and transport planning as required.
- Identifies the CST primary and alternate fuel sources at the incident site.
- Ensures that the appropriate documents are on hand for property accountability, maintenance, service, and requisitions.
- Coordinates for logistics support.

RESPONSE PHASE

M-6. During the response phase, the A&L section is responsible for several actions. It conducts the following administration functions:

- Maintains accountability of all attachments.
- Requisitions additional personnel, when needed.
- Maintains contact with the family support group.

M-7. During the response phase, the A&L section conducts the following logistics functions:

- Ensures that equipment is serviceable and functional.
- Informs the commander and the CMSUPCEN of priority logistics actions, and the status of pacing items and equipment readiness condition items.
- Ensures that the unit is resupplied with expendables and consumables.
- Coordinates for the use of a locally available fuel source or relies on fuel sources provided during the operation by supporting organizations.
- Continues to focus on the repair of standard equipment through the state NG's supply and maintenance system (less Class VIII supplies).
- Supports the resupply of common items.
- Disposes of water/equipment from the CST decontamination site.
- Rents vehicles, if required.
- Coordinates sleeping quarters, if required.
- Coordinates the feeding plan.
- Ensures that additional PPE for personnel attached to the CST is available.
- Assists with the decontamination line, as required.
- Assists the medical section with the storage and safeguarding of critical CST medical supplies.

POSTINCIDENT PHASE

M-8. During the postincident phase, the A&L section is responsible for several actions. It conducts the following administration functions:

- Manages the troop strength and retention according to existing procedures. Replacements for personnel losses will be filled with MOS-qualified soldiers or airmen.
- Updates historical records, action logs, and completed journals.
- Coordinates the final personnel status with operations section.

M-9. During the postincident phase, the A&L section conducts the following logistics functions:

- Ensures that equipment readiness and the basic load are to preemployment levels, as soon as feasible.
- Coordinates with the state HQ and the CMSUPCEN to reconcile logistics actions.

- Initiates (on order from the CST commander) property reconciliation actions. State DCSLOG/DOLs, USPFOs, and logistics NCOs reconcile property losses prior to receiving replacements.
- Ensures that all arms and ammunition are secured after an operation. Expended ammunition is accounted for according to applicable ARs.
- Ensures that vehicles are refueled prior to parking at the home station.
- Ensures that the repair of standard equipment (less Class VIII equipment) is through the state NG supply and maintenance system.
- Monitors the status of equipment and its disposition, to include the location.
- Coordinates the final equipment status with the operations team.
- Coordinates the transfer of equipment into maintenance or repair cycles.
- Updates all hand receipts.
- Updates all DA Form 2404s, as required.
- Ensures that all contracting agreements are met.
- Ensures that all expenditures have been properly accounted for and documented.

Appendix N

Civil Support Team Decontamination Operations

Decontamination is the reduction or removal of CBR contamination from persons and equipment by physical and/or chemical processes. Emergency response and CST personnel independently or collectively can implement thorough and/or emergency decontamination and verification procedures to ensure contamination is not spread to cold-zone operations. The CST commander will appoint an officer in charge/ noncommissioned officer in charge (OIC/NCOIC) for the decontamination line, which should be manned by two to four individuals, as the situation warrants. All contaminated equipment will be decontaminated before leaving the site, or will be properly packaged for disposal. The degree of decontamination and appropriateness of the packaging will be agreed to by the CST commander and the IC. The CST decontamination site is established to remove and localize CBR contamination from team members, exteriors of the CBRNE sample containers, detection and identification equipment, and decontamination-site equipment. The primary objective for personnel manning the decontamination station is to avoid becoming contaminated or contaminating other personnel or equipment outside the hot-zone. If contamination is suspected, decontamination of personnel, equipment, and apparatus should be performed. The decision to implement all or part of a decontamination plan should be based upon a field analysis of the hazards and risks involved. This analysis generally consists of referring to technical reference sources to determine the general hazards (such as reactivity, flammability, and toxicity), and then evaluating the relative risks.

DECONTAMINATION PLANNING

N-1. During every incident involving a CBRNE release, there is a possibility that targeted personnel, members of the public, clothing, and equipment will become contaminated. The contaminant poses a threat not only to the persons contaminated, but also to other personnel who may subsequently encounter contaminated personnel and equipment. The entire process of decontamination should be directed toward confinement of the contaminant within the hot-zone and the decontamination corridor to maintain the safety and health of response personnel, the public, and the surrounding environment.

N-2. Although decontamination is typically performed following site entry, the determination of proper decontamination methods and procedures must be considered before and during the incident as part of the overall incident planning and hazard and risk evaluation process. Entry into the hot-zone

should not be attempted until appropriate decontamination methods are determined and established based on the hazards present.

N-3. Before initiating decontamination, the following questions should be considered:

- Can decontamination be conducted safely (visibility, access, waste management)?
- Are existing resources adequate and immediately available to perform decontamination of personnel and equipment? If not, where can they be obtained and how long will it take to get them?
- What are the agents to be decontaminated?
- What are the existing and forecast meteorological conditions (wind direction and speed, temperature, etc.)?
- What is the terrain?

N-4. Physical methods generally involve the physical removal of the contaminant from the contaminated person or object and containment of the contaminant for appropriate disposal. Physical removal is the most important principal in decontamination. While these methods can reduce the concentration of the contaminant, generally the chemical properties are unchanged. Examples of physical decontamination methods include the following:

- Absorption.
- Brushing and scraping.
- Isolation and disposal.
- Washing.

N-5. Chemical methods are used on equipment and generally involve decontamination by changing the contaminant through some type of chemical reaction to render the contaminant less harmful. Chemical methods destroy or inactivate the agent. Examples of chemical methods include the following:

- Adsorption.
- Chemical degradation.
- Disinfecting or sterilization.
- Neutralization.
- Solidification.

N-6. If contact with a contaminant can be controlled, the risk of exposure is reduced and the need for decontamination can be minimized. The following actions should be considered to prevent contamination:

- Stress work practices that minimize contact with hazardous substances.
- Wear limited-use or disposable protective clothing and equipment where appropriate military traffic management systems exist.

DECONTAMINATING PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT

N-7. During the doffing of PPE, clothing and equipment should be removed in a manner so that the outer surfaces do not touch or make contact with the wearer's skin. The CST survey team leader should require team members to maintain a log of PPE used during all hazard identification and sample collection operations. Military and/or first responder personnel wearing disposable PPE should proceed through the decontamination process after removing equipment harnesses and externally mounted cameras and placing weapons in authorized storage containers. Disposable protective equipment is containerized and identified for HAZMAT disposal in accordance with established procedures. Personnel undergoing decontamination are monitored for contamination prior to crossing the liquid control line. The physical and chemical compatibility of decontamination solutions needs to be determined before they are used. Any decontamination method that permeates, degrades, damages, or otherwise impairs the safe function of PPE and endangers the wearer should not be used.

N-8. Water or other solutions for washing or rinsing have to be confined, collected, and containerized for proper disposal. CST command and operations sections will need to establish liaison with on-scene environmental and public health agencies to coordinate hazardous wastes containerization and disposal methods.

N-9. Decontamination methods vary in their effectiveness for removing different substances. If decontamination does not appear to be effective, a different method should be selected and implemented. Determining the effectiveness of decontamination during field operations includes the following:

- Contamination levels are reduced as personnel move through the decontamination corridor.
- Contamination is confined to the hot-zone prior to the vapor control line of the decontamination corridor.
- Contamination is reduced to a level that is as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA).

N-10. Methods that may be useful in assessing the effectiveness of decontamination include—

- Visual observation (stains, discolorations, corrosive effects).
- Monitoring devices (such as PIDs, chemical agent monitor [CAM], radiac meter detector tubes, and pH paper strips) can show that contamination levels are at least below the detection limit.
- Wipe sampling provides after-the-fact information on the effectiveness of decontamination. Once a wipe swab is taken, it is analyzed by chemical means, usually in a laboratory. Protective clothing, equipment, and skin may be tested using wipe samples.

N-11. Personnel assigned to the decontamination team wear an appropriate level of PPE. PPE can be upgraded or downgraded as additional information is obtained concerning the type of HAZMATs involved, the degree of hazard, and the probability of exposure of CST personnel.

N-12. If personnel display any symptoms of heat exhaustion/hypothermia or CBRNE exposure, implement immediate measures to doff PPE while protecting the individual from contaminants and preventing the spread of any contaminants. These individuals will be treated immediately by the CST medical personnel.

N-13. Exposed persons should be provided with as much information as possible about the delayed health effects of the HAZMATs involved in the incident. If necessary, follow-up examinations should be scheduled with medical personnel. Medical and exposure records will be updated as soon as the mission allows.

DECONTAMINATION PROCESS

N-14. The decontamination process is carried out in three fundamental stages:

- **Primary.** Gross contamination removal.
- **Secondary.** Residual contamination removal.
- **Tertiary.** PPE removal and personal shower.

N-15. A liquid control line and a vapor control line separate these stages from the hot-zone to the cold-zone. The decontamination site sequential actions should be—

- Equipment drop.
- Outer suit scrub and rinse.
- Initial monitoring.
- Outer garment removal.
- Air supply removal.
- Mask (faceplate) removal.
- Personal shower.
- Medical monitoring.

N-16. The decontamination procedures for all levels of protection generally consist of 19 steps (see Table N-1). Each step emphasizes an important aspect of decontamination.

N-17. Decontamination lines are site-specific and vary depending on the types of contamination and the work activities conducted on-site.

N-18. The objective of decontamination procedures is to minimize the risk of exposure to hazardous substances in the field. Personnel must wear protective equipment when response activities involve known or suspected hazardous substances.

Table N-1. Decontamination Steps (Example Template)

Step	Description	Procedure
1	Segregated Equipment Drop	Deposit equipment used on site (tools, sampling devices and containers, monitoring instruments, radios, clipboards, etc.) on plastic drop cloths or in different containers with plastic liners. During hot-weather operations, a cool-down station may be set up within this area.
2	Boot Cover and Glove Wash	Scrub outer boot covers and gloves with decontamination solution or detergent and water.
3	Boot Cover and Glove Rinse	Rinse decontamination solution from step 2 using copious amounts of water.
4	Tape Removal	Remove the tape around boots and gloves and deposit it in a container with a plastic liner.
5	Boot Cover Removal	Remove boot covers, and deposit them in a container with a plastic liner.
6	Outer Glove Removal	Remove outer gloves, and deposit them in a container with plastic liner.
7	Suit and Boot Wash	Wash encapsulating suit and boots with a scrub brush and decontamination solution or detergent and water. Repeat as many times as necessary.
8	Suit and Boot Rinse	Rinse off decontamination solution with water. Repeat as many times as necessary.
9	Tank Change	Change the air tank if needed (the last step in the decontamination procedure). Exchange air tank, don new outer gloves and boot covers, and tape joints. The worker returns to duty.
10	Safety Boot Removal	Remove safety boots, and deposit them in a container with a plastic liner.
11	Fully Encapsulating Suit and Hard Hat Removal	Remove the fully encapsulated suit with the assistance of a helper, and lay it on a drop cloth or hang it up. Remove the helmet. Hot-weather rest station may be set up within this area for personnel returning to the site.
12	SCBA Backpack Removal	Remove the backpack, and place it on the table while wearing the face-piece. Disconnect the hose from the regulator valve, and proceed to the next station.
13	Inner Glove Wash	Wash with decontamination solution that will not harm the skin. Repeat as often as necessary.
14	Inner Glove Rinse	Rinse with water, and repeat as many times as necessary.
15	Face Piece Removal	Remove the facepiece. Deposit it in a container with a plastic liner. Avoid touching your face with your fingers.
16	Inner Glove Removal	Remove inner gloves and deposit them in a container with a plastic liner.
17	Inner Clothing Removal	Remove clothing, and place it in a container with a plastic-liner. Do not wear inner clothing off the site since there is a possibility that small amounts of contaminants might have been transferred in removing the fully encapsulating suit.
18	Field Wash	Shower if highly toxic, skin-corrosive, or skin-abrasive materials are known or suspected to be present. Wash your hands and face if a shower is not available.
19	Redress	Put on a clean uniform.

CASUALTY DECONTAMINATION

N-19. The CST can provide advice on casualty decontamination (see Table N-2). The CST is not designed or equipped to perform mass casualty decontamination. Normally, a contaminated casualty should not be placed in an ambulance or taken into a medical treatment facility (MTF) without first removing his clothing and processing him through a decontaminating station. Eighty percent of decontamination is accomplished by the removal of clothing. While removing clothing accomplishes partial decontamination of contaminated casualties, complete decontamination will require clothing removal (strip) and bathing with soap and water (flush). Wrap the casualty in a sheet or protective cover to protect him from the elements and possible recontamination (cover). Casualty decontamination considerations include the following:

- Decontamination will not be limited to the incident scene.
- Casualties should be provided containers (clear zipperlock plastic bags) for their valuables (watches, wallets).
- Some casualties may be uncooperative and resist decontamination or separation from family members. However, decontamination must be completed even if the individual must be restrained in order to complete the process.

Table N-2. Casualty Decontamination Considerations

- | |
|--|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Protect yourself and your fellow responders first.• Save lives by rapid decontamination.• Provide adequate staffing (can use nonmedical personnel for this task).• Prevent heat-related stress injuries for personnel in PPE. |
|--|

N-20. The best method of determining completeness of decontamination for a patient is through direct monitoring with the appropriate detection device. Direct observation of individuals (symptoms, colored or oily spot) who have completed the decontamination process enhances the verification that personnel are clean and will not transfer contamination outside of the incident site. Do not totally rely on the use of one verification method to certify that casualties are “clean.”

SITE LOCATION AND LAYOUT

N-21. Establish decontamination sites upwind and uphill from the incident. Areas should be flat and protected from public and media intrusion and should allow containment of decontamination runoff. If personnel and equipment allow, there may be four decontamination lines—

- Ambulatory casualties, asymptomatic.
- Ambulatory casualties, symptomatic.
- Litter casualties.
- Responders (this is known as technical decontamination).

N-22. Whenever possible, ambulatory and litter casualty decontamination lines should be located close to one another so that EMS personnel can easily

monitor multiple lines. The technical decontamination line should be isolated from the other lines and monitored by medical personnel to assist responders if necessary. All responders working in the decontamination area must have the proper training and PPE. To avoid cross contamination, ensure that workers do not cross the dividing line between clean and dirty areas.

MASS CASUALTY DECONTAMINATION

N-23. At the CBRNE incident site, a large number of contaminated casualties can be showered (cleaned) using a combination of ingenuity and current technologies. Examples include using mobile trailers designed for mass decontamination, portable showers, and collection pools. Also, set up long hoses in corridors to provide a fine spray corridors for victims to walk through. Use a deck gun with a wide-angle, low-pressure, fog spray to rinse as many people as possible simultaneously. Fire hose streams must be used with care to avoid injuries. Soap is needed to remove some agents.

NOTE: Soap and water do not neutralize or destroy CBRN agents or TIM; they only remove them. The agent is potentially still viable and can cause injury or disease in others exposed to the soap and water solution containing the agent.

DECONTAMINATION PROCEDURES FOR AMBULATORY CASUALTIES

N-24. Ambulatory casualties require no assistance and have few or no symptoms. Some of these casualties may need to shower sitting on a chair and/or may require additional supervision. Personnel performing casualty decontamination need to don appropriate PPE before making casualty contact. (Use the buddy system to don PPE.) EMT and other medical personnel performing initial triage in the warm zone will also need to don PPE. The IC should establish an initial triage area to enable EMT personnel to evaluate and assist casualties. Use the following steps:

Step 1. Instruct the casualty to remove all clothing, jewelry, and personal belongings. These items should be placed in appropriate containers, using plastic bags with labels for identification.

Step 2. Instruct casualty who is disrobing that outside clothing should not touch inside clothing to avoid additional contamination. If biological agents are suspected, a fine water mist can be applied to trap the agent in the clothing and prevent the spread of contamination (chemical agent must be ruled out before using this technique to prevent the spread of the agent over body areas).

Step 3. Direct casualty to the appropriate decontamination station (wash, rinse, etc).

NOTE: Ensure that the shower water is turned on, and instruct casualties to enter the shower and wash their entire body (head to toe). Each casualty should be directed to use soap and water or 0.5percent high-test hypochlorite (HTH) solution with sponges for 3 to 5-minutes, and then rinse. Prepare the 0.5 percent hypochlorite solution as shown in Table N-3.

CAUTION

Ensure that the HTH solution never enters the eyes, nose, or open abdominal, thoracic, or head wounds.

Table N-3. Prepare a Hypochlorite Solution

Water (Ounces)	Granular HTH (Spoonfuls)	OR	Household Bleach (Quarts)	HTH Solution Percentage in 5 Gallons of Water
6	*5		2	0.5%
48	40		**	5.0%
*These measurements are used when bulk HTH is used. To measure this preparation, use the plastic spoon supplied with your MRE. The amount of HTH to be used is a heaping spoonful (that is, all that the spoon will hold). Do not shake any granules off the spoon before adding to the water.				
** Do not dilute with water; household bleach is approximately a 5% solution.				

Step 4. Instruct casualty to pay attention to his groin, folds in the skin, and nails and to close his mouths and eyes during the decontamination procedure.

Step 5. Instruct the casualty to step out of the shower, and provide him a towel that should be disposed of appropriately.

Step 6. Reevaluate the casualty to determine the need for a second shower. Use gross-level chemical detectors or Geiger-type counters for remaining chemical or radiological contamination; no method exists for speedy detection of biological agents.

Step 7. Provide personnel who do not require additional showers with clothing and foot covers and direct them to a clean area for medical evaluation or evacuation. If no portable showers are available, first responders can use a fire hose with a fog nozzle and portable monitors.

DECONTAMINATION PROCEDURES FOR NONAMBULATORY CASUALTIES

N-25. Nonambulatory casualties are unable to sit or stand unattended. This line will require more time and personnel support than the ambulatory casualty line. Steps can include the following:

Step 1. Don appropriate PPE before making casualty contact. (Use the buddy system to don PPE.) Establish an initial triage point to evaluate and direct casualties.

Step 2. Perform lifesaving intervention.

Step 3. Remove all clothing, jewelry, and personal belongings; and place in their appropriate containers. Decontaminate as required, and safeguard. Use clear plastic bags with labels for identification.

Step 4. Carefully undress nonambulatory casualties, avoid spreading the contamination when undressing. Do not touch the outside of the clothing to the skin. If biological agents are suspected, a fine water mist can be

applied to trap the agent in the clothing and prevent the spread of contamination.

Step 5. Decontaminate splints in place to prevent bone displacement. Do not remove bandages where possible until after the decontamination process has been completed. Avoid additional bleeding if possible.

Step 6. Flush deep wounds with saline solution, and superficial, soft tissue wounds with a 0.5 percent hypochlorite solution.

CAUTION

Ensure that HTH solution is never introduced into the eyes, nose, or open abdominal, thoracic, or head wounds.

Step 7. Transfer the casualty to the nonambulatory wash area of the decontamination station on an appropriate backboard/litter device (can be two sawhorses, an elevation grid, a stationary roller system, or another device).

Step 8. Completely wash the casualty's entire body using handheld hoses, sponges, and/or brushes (soap and water or a 0.5 percent hypochlorite solution should be used for 3 to 5 minutes to decontaminate the casualty), and then rinse.

Step 9. Clean the casualty's groin, folds in the skin, and nails with special attention. Instruct casualty to close his mouth and eyes during wash and rinse procedures. Hot water may be unnecessary unless casualty hypothermia during decontamination is a concern.

Step 10. Transfer the casualty from the wash and rinse stations to a drying station after completing the decontamination process. Ensure that the casualty is completely dry, and monitor him for additional contamination using the appropriate detection device.

Step 11. Reevaluate the casualty's injuries (on-scene medical personnel).

Step 12. Transfer nonambulatory casualties to a clean ambulance for evacuation (personnel from the clean-zone).

DECONTAMINATION CLEANUP

N-26. The cleanup process is important to reduce the spread of contamination. Procedures for decontamination site cleanup include the following—

- Containerize casualty clothing, bandages, consumable medical items, paper and plastic items, nonreusable equipment, and used water.
- Label the waste containers and placing them in the center of the area used for decontamination.
- Advise the CST OPCEN that decontamination site cleanup has been completed and that coordination with the IC is required for appropriate disposal of contaminants.

Appendix O

Civil Support Team Equipment

This appendix provides descriptions of CST equipment used during operations.

SPECIAL-PURPOSE EQUIPMENT

MOBILE ANALYTICAL LABORATORY SYSTEM AND DISMOUNTED ANALYTICAL PLATFORM

O-1. The MALS and DAP provide analysis of samples obtained by the survey section. They provide the capability to further analyze a broad range of CB contaminants. The medical and survey sections work together to gather and analyze samples. The information derived from survey and sampling operations will be used to assist the IC. The lab includes two work stations, internal and external lighting, sampling and preparation kits, a generator, a refrigerator, a microscope with fluorescent capabilities, HHA tickets, a GC/MS, a glove box (MALS), and filter system, and an interface to the UCS for the transmission of digital sample information. The DAP consists of a dismounted package including a GC/MS, sampling collection and preparation kits, and HHAs.

O-2. With the MALS/DAP and UCS, team members can function as on-site observers for experts from around the country and can take the samples, readings, and observations that enable responsive and accurate assistance to the IC.

UNIFIED COMMAND SUITE COMMUNICATIONS VAN

O-3. The UCS is a highly mobile, fielded communications system. It is a nondevelopmental item (NDI) that is a variant and reconfiguration of the joint base station. The UCS operates in urban and undeveloped areas, utilizing both portable and fixed equipment. The UCS provides real-time voice, data, and video access (unclassified through top secret) among CST members, local and state emergency response agencies, LFAs, and supporting military activities.

O-4. The UCS consists of a combination of standard, commercial, off-the-shelf (COTS); NDIs; and existing military equipment to provide a full range of communications necessary to support the CST mission.

O-5. The UCS vehicle carries the communications-electronics suite, on-board power generation and distribution equipment, two operators. The UCS can be loaded onto military transport aircraft. The UCS commercial vehicle platform provides the most cost-effective solution, provides a low signature, and is supported through the GSA.

O-6. The UCS includes tactical voice equipment to provide a line-of-sight (LOS) voice circuit for the exclusive use of the survey teams. It also includes voice circuits for fire, local law enforcement, and emergency service interoperability. The radio frequency (RF) communications subsystem supports the following circuits:

- VHF LOS voice net with a base station radio, a repeater system, and hand held radios that are compatible with the base station.
- UHF LOS voice net with three base station radios, hand held radios, and additional adapters and antennas.
- Telephone subsystem, to include a cellular phone (nonsecure), one terminal that provides wide-area telephone connectivity, a secure phone, and desktop terminals to support tactical planning and reporting.
- Automated data processing (ADP) subsystem, to include LAN/WAN connectivity to military and commercial systems, providing both secure/nonsecure operations full interoperability with standard DOD and federal architectures and protocols.
- Ancillary equipment subsystem including antennas, an RF patch, and feed-through panels that provide connections for patching both mobile and fixed antennas to their associated transceivers.
- Power generation subsystem providing electrical power for on board circuit architecture and environmental control units (includes an internal and external power source).

O-7. The UCS is the primary means of communications support for the CST and acts as a hub to provide a common operational picture (COP) for planning and executing an incident response. It serves as the node that controls communications with the survey teams at the incident site and passes critical, time-sensitive information between the CST and the ICP. The UCS will also provide reach-back communications for connectivity with higher authority and technical support agencies. Its critical role in the C² architecture of CM requires that the UCS be designed to deploy with CSTs, communicate while en route to an incident and, once on scene, provide a communications capability. The design of the UCS considers the need for flexibility in establishing communications with many agencies and activities. The UCS is capable of utilizing all necessary frequency bands to ensure adequate voice and data connectivity. Wideband communications and a cellular and landline telephone system permit rapid and complete transfer of large data files to support mission planning and reporting. A family of hand held radios and base stations ensure radio connectivity with local emergency service units.

O-8. The UCS is employed by the unit at the tactical level, to provide for tactical, operational, and strategic communications connectivity.

O-9. UCS unit level maintenance includes the replacement of locally repairable units, fuses, and bulbs. Standard, built-in test equipment will aid in identifying defective assemblies. As coordinated by the Defense CMSUPCEN, defective units are forwarded to the selected depot level support center for repair, replacement, or calibration. Depot level

maintenance will consist of all tasks that are considered to be beyond the capability or support concept for the unit level.

RESPONSE VEHICLES

O-10. The team is organized and equipped to rapidly respond to the scene in unit response vehicles. Most of the equipment is stored in the vehicles for rapid deployment and is designed to be removable for maximum flexibility. The vehicles and equipment should be certified for air transport.

O-11. Due to the sensitive nature and special management of WMD terrorism, military support requires a low signature. The open display of military force may disclose imminent military support or cause undue concern by the civilian population. Hence, the WMD CST maintains a low or discreet military signature using commercial vehicles. Additionally, a cost benefit analysis demonstrated that commercial vehicles were more cost effective than military vehicles. The commercial vehicles are under a GSA, full-service lease, which includes fuel, wash, maintenance, and replacement. The remaining six vehicles consist of two 9-passenger sport utility vehicles, two 4-wheel-drive pickup trucks, and two cargo vans. The vehicles are equipped with after-market modifications, which include emergency lights and bumpers, winches, tow packages, and caps for the trucks.

NONSTANDARD EQUIPMENT SET

O-12. Operations in the US involve working in an environment that contains a multitude of substances and chemicals that cause IDLH. Coupled with CW and BW agents, military response forces are required to maintain PPE sets above those commonly provided for military force protection against all hazards. Though exempt from the applicable civil regulations for personal protection, military response forces voluntarily equip to civil standards in order to operate in an area containing unknown contamination. Additionally, higher-end detection equipment is required for a greater range of substances in order to identify TIC and organic substances versus CW and BW agents. The following is an example of nonstandard CDE that is interoperable with the first responders that these units support:

- Boots, HAZMAT.
- Breathing apparatus (SCBA).
- Camera, digital, still.
- Compressor for SCBA.
- GC/MS portable.
- Gloves, HAZMAT.
- Gloves, silver shield.
- HHA.
- Helmet, HAZMAT.
- Photoionization detector (PID)/monitor, multigas.
- Pressure test kit.
- Protective suit (Level A).
- Protective suit (Level B).
- Pump, water, and hose.

- Rebreather system.
- Sample collection kits.
- Training suit (Level A).
- Vest, cooling.

STANDARD EQUIPMENT SET

O-13. The military standard issue of NBC detection, protection, and decontamination equipment provides the unit with the ability to detect and protect against a number of CBRNE agents. Sample equipment includes—

- Alarm, chemical agent, automatic, M22.
- Kit, decontamination, M291.
- Kit, decontamination, M295.
- Kit, detector, chemical.
- Mask, CB, M40A1.
- Power supply for the automatic chemical agent detector alarm (ACADA).
- Protective mask test kit.
- Radiac set, AN/PDR77.
- Radiac set, AN/UDR13.
- Radiac set, AN/VDR2.
- ICAM.

AUTOMATED DATA PROCESSING EQUIPMENT

O-14. The CST is provided with computer equipment to handle automation requirements, modeling, logistics management, and administration.

O-15. ADP equipment is authorized in their TDA. All changes to the TDA must be requested through the chief of the NGB to ensure that each unit is standardized. Sample equipment includes—

- Desktop computer.
- Computer, laptop, modeling.
- Laptop with docking station.
- Liquid crystal display projector, portable.
- Monitor, color.
- Printer, portable, color.
- Printer, laser.

TACTICAL EQUIPMENT

O-16. Tactical equipment is provided to the unit to conduct their mission. Light sets for area illumination, pagers for rapid recall, cell phones for key leader communications, hand trucks, and other equipment support all missions which the unit performs. Sample tactical equipment includes—

- Bag, EMS gear.
- Binoculars, modular.
- Compass, magnetic, unmounted.
- Digital multimeter.

- Generator, one-man portable.
- Hand trucks.
- Light set, portable.
- Litter stretcher.
- Multipurpose shelter, rigid frame.
- Navigation set, GPS receiver.
- Pistol, 9 mm, automatic, M9.
- Radio, two-way, digital, secure.
- Tool kit, ADP equipment.
- Tool kit, general mechanics, automotive.

Appendix P

Incident Action and Site Safety and Health Plan Template (Samples)

This appendix provides a sample incident action and a site safety and health plan briefing template that can be tailored to each CST and mission. It is essential that safety be of the utmost concern during CST operations. The lives of CST members, other responders, and civilians at the incident site depend on safe and effective operations.

CIVIL SUPPORT TEAM INCIDENT ACTION PLAN (SAMPLE)

P-1. The sample CST IAP is furnished in a series of figures that can be adapted for local use. These figures address the following areas:

- Preparing map sketches (see Figure P-1, page P-2).
- Providing an incident site and description template (see Figure P-2, page P-2).
- Monitoring the personnel and equipment status (see Figures P-3 and P-4, page P-3).
- Preparing vehicle assignments (see Figure P-5, page P-4).
- Coordinating the linkup with the IC and planning for the CCIR (see Figures P-6 and P-7, page P-5).
- Identifying the IC organizational and coordination POCs (see Figure P-8, page P-6).
- Coordinating with the IC to update the CST linkup checklist (see Figure P-9, page P-7).
- Establishing the priorities of work (see Figure P-10, page P-8).
- Preparing for site setup and downrange operations (see Figure P-11, page P-9).
- Identifying manning requirements for onsite operations (see Figure P-12, page P-10).
- Identifying hot-zone entry objectives and personnel (see Figure P-13, page P-10).
- Identifying objectives and personnel for follow-on hot-zone entry (see Figure P-14, page P-11).
- Establishing control measures for on-site operations (see Figure P-15, page P-12).
- Evaluating hazardous situations (see Figure P-16, page P-12).
- Identifying required PPE levels (see Figure P-17, page P-13).
- Establishing communications procedures (see Figure P-18, page P-14).

- Providing for decontamination operations (see Figure P-19, page P-15).
- Furnishing training verification (see Figure P-20, page P-15).

Incident Name: _____ Incident Number: _____ Prepared By: (Name/Rank) _____ Map/Sketch: (Include maps drawn here or attached, showing the total AO, the incident site/area, overflight results, trajectories, impacted shorelines, or other graphics depicting situational and response status.)	Date: _____
--	--------------------



Figure P-1. Map Sketch Template (Sample)

Incident Location: _____ Route to Incident Location: _____ Incident Description: _____ Hazards (General Statement): _____ Topography (Optional): _____ Weather Conditions: Wind Direction: _____ Wind Speed: MPH _____ Temperature: _____ ° F Relative Humidity: _____ Temperature Gradient: ☐ Inversion (Stable) ☐ Neutral ☐ Lapse (Unstable) Forecast: _____ Surrounding Population: _____ Additional Information: _____
--

Figure P-2. Incident Site and Description Template (Sample)

Battle Roster	Call Sign	Name	Rank	Duty Position	✓	Remarks
01	06			Commander		
02	05			Deputy Commander		
03	30			Operations Officer		
04	31			Senior Operations NCO		
05	32			Operations NCP-Modeling		
06	33			Assistant Operations NCO		
07	40			Logistics NCO		
08	41			Administration NCO		
09	50			Communications NCO		
10	51			Information System Analyst		
11	10			Physician Assistant		
12	11			Medical Operations Officer		
13	12			Medical Science Officer		
14	13			Medical NCO		
15	20			Survey Team Leader		
16	21			Survey Team NCO		
17	22			Survey Team Chief (A)		
18	23			Survey Team Member		
19	24			Survey Team Member		
20	25			Survey Team Chief (B)		
21	26			Survey Team Member		
22	27			Survey Team Member		

Personnel Authorized _____ Assigned _____ Available _____

Figure P-3. Personnel Status

Key Identified Equipment Shortages	
Item	Remarks

Figure P-4. Equipment Status











<u>Vehicle Assignments for Movement</u> Vehicle Order of Movement 1) _____ 2) _____ 3) _____ 4) _____ 5) _____ 6) _____ 7) _____ 8) _____		 Vehicle Driver _____ Passenger _____ Passenger _____ Passenger _____ Phone Mount _____
 Vehicle Driver _____ Passenger _____ Passenger _____ Passenger _____ Phone Mount _____	 Vehicle Driver _____ Passenger _____ Passenger _____ Passenger _____ Phone Mount _____	
 Vehicle Driver _____ Passenger _____ Phone Mount _____	 Vehicle Driver _____ Passenger _____ Phone Mount _____	 Trailer
 UCS Driver _____ Passenger _____ Passenger _____ Phone Mount _____	 Van Driver _____ Passenger _____ Phone Mount _____	 Trailer
	 MALS/APV Driver _____ Passenger _____ Phone Mount _____	

Figure P-5. Vehicle Assignments Template (Sample)

IC Linkup Party	(Name) _____
	(Name) _____
	(Name) _____
	(Name) _____
CRA Check Party	(Name) _____
	(Name) _____
	(Name) _____
CRA Check Backup	(Name) _____
	(Name) _____
	(Name) _____

Figure P-6. Incident Command Linkup Manning Plan

Commander's Critical Information Requirements.

- 1.
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.
- 5.
- 6.
- 7.
- 8.

Figure P-7. CCIR Worksheet

- Incident Commander _____
- Incident Safety Officer _____
- Incident LNO _____
- Incident Information Officer _____
- Incident Operations _____
- Incident HAZMAT Leader _____
- Incident Planning _____
- Incident Finance _____
- Incident LOGISTICS _____
- Staging Area POC _____
- Fire POC _____
- HAZMAT POC _____
- Police POC _____
- County EOC POC _____
- State EOC POC _____
- WMD CST Mission Commander _____
- Liaison to IC _____
- Site Safety Officer _____
- Operations Cell Leader _____
- Decontamination Team Leader _____
- Survey Team Leader _____
- Medical Treatment Leader _____
- Scientific Analysis Leader _____
- Record Keeper _____

Figure P-8. On-Site ICS Organization and Coordination POCs

1. Introduction.
2. Capabilities briefing to IC (if required).
3. Proof of CST member qualifications.
4. Incident information.
 - a. Incident.
 - (1) Incident location.
 - (2) Incident name/identification.
 - (3) Incident description.
 - (4) Incident type (terrorist, criminal, accidental).
 - b. Victims\potential exposures.
 - (1) Number.
 - (2) Identification.
 - (3) Location.
 - (4) Signs/symptoms.
 - (5) Decontaminated (if so, method).
 - (6) Any potentially contaminated equipment/effects on scene (location).
 - c. Hazards.
 - (1) Weather.
 - (a) Temperature.
 - (b) Wind speed and prevailing direction.
 - (c) Forecast.
 - (2) Environmental monitoring conducted (if so, instruments used/readings).
 - (3) Downwind population.
 - (4) Location of power, gas, fuel tanks, and ventilation systems on scene.
 - (5) Status of utilities (request shutdown and lockout of electricity, gas, ventilation systems).
 - (6) Control of contaminated waste/runoff:
 - d. Medical.
 - (1) EMS transport available (location).
 - (2) Hospital transfer available (method).
 - (3) Hospital location/phone.
 - (4) Medical POCs.
 - e. LEA.
 - (1) Identification of LEA lead.
 - (2) Location on scene.
 - (3) Special requirements for evidence handling or crime scene preservation.
 - (4) Evidence collection required.
 - f. Communications.
 - (1) IC communications POC (location).
 - (2) Frequencies utilized on scene.
 - (3) Emergency signals established on scene (evacuate).
 - (4) Communications support required by the IC.

Figure P-9. CST Linkup Checklist

g. Notifications.

- (1) Local population (method/information given).
- (2) State EOC.
- (3) State health, morgue, NG.
- (4) Federal (FBI, NCA, CDC, USPHS).
- (5) Press (IC instructions on contact with the press).

h. POCs name/location/contact number or call sign.

- (1) IC.
- (2) HAZMAT.
- (3) Safety.
- (4) Logistics.
- (5) Public affairs.

i. Request.

- (1) On-site organization, coordination plans.
- (2) Emergency response and safety plans.
- (3) Incident location information (building maps/photos).
- (4) Maps of surrounding area.
- (5) LEPC information on buildings (including surrounding buildings).

j. Synchronize time with the IC's watch.

Figure P-9. CST Linkup Checklist (continued)

1. _____
2. _____
3. _____
4. _____
5. _____
6. _____
7. _____
8. _____
9. _____
10. _____
11. _____

SOP Standards for Priorities of Work (Sample):

1. Establish initial TOC/IC liaison.
2. Establish an EPDS/verify that the CRA is clean.
3. Move the main body into the site.
4. Conduct a section leader brief.
5. Establish decontamination line, MALS, and emergency decontamination.

6. Establish a communications area, medical treatment area, and survey area.
7. Brief the survey leader on entry objectives.
8. Medically monitor and dress-out survey.
9. Improve the TOC.
10. Issue the site safety plan (60-minute mark).
11. Conduct an initial-entry party briefing.
12. Conduct the first entry.

Figure P-10. Site Setup Priorities of Work

1. During the site setup, the following personnel are assigned as specified or will perform the following tasks:

- Mission Commander _____
- IC Liaison _____
- Safety _____
- OPCEN Leader _____
- Modeler _____
- Recorder _____
- Operations Setup _____
- Decontamination Setup _____
- MALs Setup _____
- Medical Setup _____
- Communications Setup _____
- Survey Setup _____

2. At ____ minutes, the following backup and decontamination personnel begin to dress out:

- | | |
|----------|----------|
| a. _____ | f. _____ |
| b. _____ | g. _____ |
| c. _____ | h. _____ |
| d. _____ | i. _____ |
| e. _____ | j. _____ |

3. At ____ minutes, all personnel rally at _____ for a site safety briefing.
4. At ____ minutes, the survey team back-briefs its first entry at the end of the decontamination line.
5. The target time for the first entry is _____.

Figure P-11. Site Setup and Preparation for Downrange Operations

During continuing on-site operations, the following personnel are assigned on the specified teams and will perform the following tasks:

Mission Commander: _____

IC Liaison: _____

Safety: _____

OPCEN Leader: _____

Operations: _____

A&L: _____

Communications: _____

Team Members: _____

MALS Personnel: _____

Figure P-12. On-Site Operations Manning

Entry Number 1 Objectives 1. _____ 2. _____ 3. _____ 4. _____ 5. _____ Equipment _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ PPE Entry – A B C D Backup – A B C D Decontamination – A B C D NOTES:	Entry Personnel Entry Team A _____ _____ _____ Entry Team B _____ _____ _____ Survey Control in TOC _____ Rest/Bottle Refill _____	Support Personnel Decontamination Line _____ _____ _____ Backup _____ _____ _____ Medical Monitoring _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____
--	---	--

Figure P-13. Hot-Zone Entry Plan Template

Entry Number ____ Objectives 1. _____ 2. _____ 3. _____ 4. _____ 5. _____ Equipment _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____	Entry Personnel Entry Team A _____ _____ _____ Entry Team B _____ _____ _____	Support Personnel Decontamination Line _____ _____ _____ Backup _____ _____ _____ Medical Monitoring _____ _____ _____
Survey Control in TOC _____ Rest/Bottle Refill _____		
PPE Entry – A B C D Backup – A B C D Decontamination – A B C D		
NOTES:		
Entry Number ____ Objectives 1. _____ 2. _____ 3. _____ 4. _____ 5. _____ Equipment _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____	Entry Personnel Entry Team A _____ _____ _____ Entry Team B _____ _____ _____	Support Personnel Decontamination Line _____ _____ _____ Backup _____ _____ _____ Medical Monitoring _____ _____ _____
Survey Control in TOC _____ Rest/Bottle Refill _____		
PPE Entry – A B C D Backup – A B C D Decontamination – A B C D		
NOTES:		

Figure P-14. Follow-On, Hot-Zone Entry Plan Template

On-Site Control: All personnel arriving or departing the site will logistics in and out with the record keeper. All activities on-site must be cleared by the CST commander through the operations section.

_____ (security office) has been designated to coordinate control and access on-site. A safe perimeter has been established at:

- Grid coordinates/map reference are _____.
- The security perimeter is marked with _____.
- No unauthorized personnel shall be in this area.
- The IC CP is located at _____ (grid coordinate) _____.
- The CST CP is located at _____ (grid coordinate) _____.
- The staging area is located at _____ (grid coordinate) _____.
- The prevailing winds are out of the _____ at _____ mph. The security office/ CP location is upwind from the exclusion area.
- Control boundaries have been established and are located and identified as follows:
 - Hot-zone (exclusion zone) _____.
 - Warm-zone (CRA) _____.
 - Cold-zone (support zone) _____.

Figure P-15. On-Site Control

The following are substance(s) known or suspected to be involved, and the primary hazards of each.

Substance Involved	Concentration	Primary Hazard

The following additional hazards are expected or may exist:

HAZMAT data sheet(s) have been completed and are attached: (☐Y)(☐N)

Figure P-16. Hazard Evaluation

The following protective clothing materials and levels of protection are required for the involved substance(s):

Substance Involved	Concentration	PPE Material Recommendation
1. _____	_____	_____
2. _____	_____	_____
3. _____	_____	_____
4. _____	_____	_____
5. _____	_____	_____

All hazard zones have been staffed, and the levels of PPE for each job function have been established as outlined in the hot-zone entry plan.

Specific PPE for each level of protection is as follows:

Level A _____
 Level B _____
 Level C _____
 Level D _____
 Other _____

If air-purifying respirators are required or used, _____ is the appropriate canister for use with the involved substances and concentrations.

NOTE: No changes to the specified levels of protection shall be made without the approval of the site safety officer.

Figure P-17. PPE Levels

Element	Primary Channel	Secondary Channel
Operations		
Hot-zone		
Warm Zone		
MALS/DAP		

- Personnel in the hot-zone will remain in constant radio communications with or within sight of the backup team. Any failure of radio communications requires an evaluation by the operations section to determine if downrange operations can continue.
- Only downrange personnel and authorized cold-zone personnel (operations) are authorized to transmit on the hot-zone frequency.
- Instructions to leave the hot-zone will be transmitted primarily via radio. The secondary signal to leave the hot-zone will be a series of single, long horn blasts.
- The following standard hand-and-arm signals will be used in case of radio communications failure:
 - LOOK = Gesture towards your eyes with index and middle fingers then point toward the object.
 - LOW AIR = Make a choking motion towards your own throat.
 - OUT OF AIR = Make a knife slashing motion across your own throat.
 - GOOD TO GO or I UNDERSTAND = Thumbs up.
 - NOT GOOD TO GO or DO NOT UNDERSTAND = Thumbs down.
 - SAMPLE = Ice cream-scooping motion.
 - UNIVERSAL DISTRESS = Hands and arms crossed above your head.
- To communicate locations in the hot-zone, use a clock method to communicate the position in downrange operations. Initial approach to the incident site from the decontamination line is from 6 o'clock. Layouts of any room will be described utilizing the clock method. The clock orientation for each room will differ as each is described from the entry point.
- Telephone communications to the CP should be established as soon as practical. The telephone number is Commander () - , Deputy Commander () -

Figure P-18. Communications Procedures

Personnel and equipment leaving the hot-zone will be thoroughly decontaminated. The decontamination protocol will operate according to the CST SOP. SOPs should generally address—

- Decontamination solutions or methods.
- Contact times.
- Casualty decontamination procedures.
- Decontamination stations locations.

Figure P-19. Decontamination Procedures

Training

All personnel have received training to perform the function assigned. (☐ Y) (☐ N)

The work parties were briefed on the contents of this plan at _____.
(Time, Date)

Figure P-20. Training Verification

SITE SAFETY AND HEALTH PLAN BRIEFING (SAMPLE)

P-2. The sample site safety and health plan briefing identifies representative information such as site safety and medical personnel, hospital locations, emergency medical information for various substances, results of environmental and personnel monitoring, medical monitoring, date, and emergency procedures (Figure P-21). The site safety packet may also include an evacuation route template (Figure P-22, page P-21) and a downrange manifest (Figure P-23, page P-22).

The following site safety and health plan will be briefed to all personnel on site prior to the start of hot-zone operations:

1. _____ is the designated site safety officer, and is directly responsible to the CST mission commander for safety recommendations on site.
2. There are _____ qualified CST medical personnel on site.
Names and qualifications:

_____	_____
_____	_____
_____	_____
3. Hospital. _____ Hospital is located _____ minutes from this location. The hospital has been contacted at _____ hours and briefed on the situation, the potential hazards, and the substance(s) involved.
Hospital Telephone Number _____
Hospital Fax Number _____
Hospital POCs _____
4. Emergency medical information for the substance(s) involved.
Substance _____
Exposure symptoms _____
Decontamination _____
Treatment _____

Substance _____
Exposure symptoms _____
Decontamination _____
Treatment _____

Figure P-21. Site Safety and Health Plan Briefing

5. Environmental monitoring

Environmental monitoring instruments will be used on site at the specified intervals:

Hazard Type	Detector Type	Interval	Remarks
CGI Monitor	PID		
O ² Monitor	PID		
Corrosives	pH Paper		
CAM	ICAM ACADA M8 M256		
Radiation	UDR 13 AN/PDR 77 VDR 2 Handheld Gamma Spec		☐ Alpha ☐ Beta ☐ Gamma ☐ Isotope
TIC/TIM	PID Colormetric Tubes HazCat Kit Inficon Hapsite		
Biological	HHA Microscope		
Other			

6. Personnel monitoring.

Personnel monitoring will be according to the SOP. The following personnel monitoring will be in effect on site:

a. Preentry:

- | | |
|---|--|
| (1) Recent medical history. | (6) Skin. |
| (2) Mental status. | (7) Neurologisticsical. |
| (3) Head, eyes, ears, nose, and throat. | (8) Weight, temperature, pulse, blood pressure, respiration. |
| (4) Lungs. | (9) Dosimeter (UDR 13) reading. |
| (5) Cardiovascular. | |

b. Postentry:

- (1) Weight, temperature, pulse, blood pressure, respiration at 5-/10-/20-minute intervals.
 (2) Dosimeter (UDR 13) reading.

Figure P-21. Site Safety and Health Plan Briefing (continued)

7. Medical monitoring.

- a. The expected air temperature is _____.
- b. If it is determined that heat stress monitoring is required (mandatory over 70°F), control measures will be followed.
- c. Personnel in chemical suits will have pre/post entry vitals completed and documented by qualified personnel. The medical section will maintain records.
- d. Designated medical recorder is _____.
- e. Baseline medical vitals complete: YES NO
- f. The incident medical aid stations are (indicate location for monitoring, treatment, rehabilitation).

8. Emergency Procedures. The following emergency procedures will be used by on-site personnel. The safety officer will be notified of any on-site emergencies, and will be responsible for ensuring that the appropriate procedures are followed.

NOTE: Hot-zone/AP operations will be conducted using teams of at least two men.

- a. Report criteria (example).
 - While downrange, maintain communication with the TOC to keep it informed.
 - Radiation readings increase 2 mR above the background.
 - A reading of 5 Rem/hr or greater (egress except for lifesaving - 25 Rem/hr).
 - An LEL reading of 10 percent (possible egress condition).
 - Oxygen levels above 22 percent or below 19 percent (possible egress condition).
 - Potential secondary devices (possible egress condition).
 - Other elevated readings.
- b. Abort criteria (example).
 - Man down (injury/PPE breach/failure).
 - Communications loss (3-5 minutes without visual contact or radio traffic).
 - Fire/ explosion.
 - In the event of a decontamination line or downrange emergency, all hot-zone operations cease.
- c. SOP for all emergencies (injury/PPE failure/fire/explosion) in the hot-zone.
 - (1) Upon notification of an emergency in the hot-zone, use the following designated emergency signal:
 - Primary: Radio call of "abort mission."
 - Secondary: A series of single, long horn blasts _____ will be sounded.
 - (2) All site personnel will assemble at the cold end of the decontamination line. If a radio call of "man down" is given, the rescue team (backup) will enter the hot-zone to remove the affected person to the decontamination line.
 - (3) The medical personnel will evaluate the nature of the injury, and the affected person will be decontaminated to the extent possible prior to movement to the cold-zone.
 - (4) The medical team will initiate the appropriate medical care, and contact will be made with the designated medical facility, if required.
 - (5) No one will reenter the hot-zone until the cause of the injury/symptoms is determined.
 - (6) For fires/explosions, the safety officer will meet with the operations officer or commander and will assist any way possible with firefighting activities.

Figure P-21. Site Safety and Health Plan Briefing (continued)

- d. Personnel injured in the warm-zone: Upon notification of an injury in the warm-zone, the medical personnel will assess the nature of the injury.
- (1) If the cause of the injury or the loss of the injured person does not affect the performance of on-site personnel, operations may continue. The medical section will initiate the appropriate medical care and necessary follow up.
 - (2) If the injury increases the risk to others, use the following designated emergency signal:
 - Primary: Radio call of "abort mission."
 - Secondary: A series of single, long horn blasts_____ will be sounded.
 - (3) All site personnel will assemble at the cold end of the decontamination line.
 - (4) Activities on the site will stop until the added risk is removed or minimized.
- e. Chemical alarm. In the event of a chemical alarm sounding or a series of three horn blasts and radio traffic indicating "gas," all personnel will mask and seek shelter immediately.
- (1) Survey and decontamination line personnel will use the APD 2000 or ICAMS as a point chemical monitor to check for contamination at their location.
 - (2) A buddy team will don protective gear and move forward with chemical detectors to check the alarm.
- f. Site evacuation. Use the following signals:
- Primary: Radio call "evacuate."
 - Secondary: A series of two long horn blasts.
- (1) Personnel will move along the designated route to rally point_____.
 - (2) At the rally point, the senior member of each section will report the section status (personnel and equipment) to the senior available member of command (alternate is operations).
- g. Other equipment failures. If any other equipment on-site fails to operate properly, the safety officer will be notified and he will determine the effect of the failure on continuing the operation. If the failure affects the safety of the personnel or prevents the completion of the work plan, all personnel will leave the hot-zone until the situation is evaluated and the appropriate action is taken. If any of the previous situations occur, the safety officer will notify the operations officer or the commander immediately.
- h. Emergency escape routes. The following emergency escape route is designated for use in those situations where egress from the hot-zone cannot occur through the decontamination line:
- _____.
- i. Safe refuge areas. The following areas are designated as safe refuge areas for the entry team in situations where egress from the hot-zone cannot occur through the decontamination line:
- _____.
- j. The time is now _____. What are your questions?
- k. Unit personnel were briefed on the contents of this health and safety plan at _____.
- (Time, Date)

Figure P-21. Site Safety and Health Plan Briefing (continued)

Endorsements Prepared by (name, rank) _____ Signed _____ Date _____ Time _____ This Site Safety and Health Plan is Approved by the Following: Incident Commander Or Designated Safety Officer _____ Date _____ Time _____ Documents Attached (1) Evacuation route according to medical plan. (2) Downrange equipment manifest.
--

Figure P-21. Site Safety and Health Plan Briefing (continued)

Evacuation route sketch (strip map). Indicate the incident site, the emergency escape route, safe refuge area, the site evacuation route, and the rally point.




Figure P-22. Medical Plan Evacuation Route Template

Entry Number:		Date/Time:	
Entry Team Members			
Name	Air Pressure	Name	Air Pressure

Equipment	
<u>VOC Detection (Chemical Agents and TIC/TIM)</u> ☐ CAM serial number _____ ☐ CAM serial number _____ ☐ CAM (Decontamination) serial number _____ ☐ ACADA/alarm serial number _____ ☐ ACADA/alarm serial number _____ ☐ ACADA/alarm serial number _____ ☐ ACADA/alarm serial number _____ ☐ ACADA/alarm (decontamination) serial number _____ ☐ MultiRAE PID serial number _____ ☐ MultiRAE PID serial number _____ ☐ HAPSITE serial number _____ ☐ M256A1 Kit ☐ M8 Paper ☐ Draeger colormetric tubes <u>Biological Detection</u> ☐ HHA (number of tickets) _____	<u>Radiation Detection</u> ☐ VDR-2 serial number _____ ☐ VDR-2 serial number _____ ☐ AN-PDR-77 serial number _____ ☐ AN-PDR-77 serial number _____ ☐ Handheld gamma spec <u>Other</u> ☐ Digital camera serial number _____ ☐ Digital camera serial number _____ ☐ Camcorder serial number _____ ☐ Infrared thermometer ☐ Sampling cart with accessories ☐ Hapsite cart with accessories ☐ Environmental stainless steel sampling kit ☐ Mirror

Figure P-23. Sample Downrange Equipment Manifest

Appendix Q

Diverse Environments and Situations

When conducting operations, a CST may operate in very diverse environments or in unique situations that will impact mission execution. This appendix will briefly present some of these situations and environments, along with some of the unique challenges they present. Further discussion and guidance on this subject can be found in various CBRNE-related doctrinal manuals, to include FMs 3-4, 3-5, and 3-19.

SPECIAL ENVIRONMENTS

Q-1. CSTs will operate in diverse (special) environments that range from various climatic zones to various geographical locations (such as maritime, federal or military installations). These special environments may necessitate additional mission analysis to determine the impact of that environment on CST mission operations and what countermeasures will be used to assure effective and safe mission execution.

Q-2. **Desert and subtropical.** Selected operational considerations that could impact working in a desert environment are—

- Work/rest cycles.
- Downrange time.
- Possible equipment limitations (such as equipment that has limited operating temperature ranges).
- Equipment.
- Condensation in PPE.
- Storage of PPE and samples.
- Water supply.
- Shelter ventilation and environmental controls.
- Battery life.
- Excess dust and sand.

Q-3. **Urban.** Selected operational considerations that could affect working in an urban environment are—

- High-rise buildings.
- Subways, sewers, and other subterranean areas.
- Schools, stadiums, malls, and other high-density population areas.
- TIM.
- Congested terrain.

- Transportation networks.
- Forested areas.
- Government buildings (federal, state, and local infrastructure).
- Public works.

Q-4. **Cold.** Selected operational considerations that could affect working in a cold-weather environment are—

- Collecting samples.
- Heating shelters.
- Maintaining hydration.
- Assessing the impact on equipment (such as diesel engines, battery life).
- Assessing decontamination requirements (such as dry versus wet decontamination).

Q-5. **Maritime.** Selected operational considerations that could affect working in a Maritime environment are—

- Operating in confined spaces.
- Establishing a foothold or boarding in Level A.
- Assessing the effects of salt water on equipment.
- Assessing the impact of jurisdictional issues.
- Conducting decontamination/ waste disposal.
- Selecting PPE for below-decks operations.

Q-6. **Sensitive locations.** Jurisdictional and interoperability considerations could affect working in sensitive locations. Sensitive locations could include—

- Embassies (in the US).
- Border crossing points.
- Indian reservations.
- Restricted (classified) areas.

Q-7. **Military or federal property.** Selected considerations that could affect working on military or federal property are—

- Weapons control.
- C² issues.
- Jurisdictional issues.
- Restricted areas.
- Nuclear-area exclusion zones.

Q-8. **High altitude.** Selected considerations that could affect when working in a high-altitude environment are—

- Persistence of agents.
- Work-rest cycles.
- Altitude sickness.

Q-9. **Remote locations.** Selected considerations that could affect working in a remote location are—

- Absence of infrastructure.
- Requirement for extended long-range communications.

- Lack of transportation, medical resources, power generation, or other logistics shortages.

SPECIAL SITUATIONS

Q-10. CSTs may operate in special situations that range from responding to high-priority national events (using mission analysis to identify the requirement) to task-organizing CST assets to meet the mission requirements.

Q-11. **High-priority national events.** Selected considerations to be considered when working in support of situations such as national events are—

- Jurisdictional issues.
- C².
- PA.
- OPSEC.
- VIPs.
- Requirement for forward-deployed personnel.

Q-12. **Task-organizing CST assets.** Selected considerations to be considered when task-organizing CST element operations are—

- Modular nature of CSTs (such as survey section, medical section).
- Support requirements (such as unique resupply and maintenance needs).
- Multiple CSTs operating together.

Glossary

The glossary lists acronyms and terms with Army or joint definitions, and other selected terms.

A&L	administration and logistics
AAR	after-action report
AC	active component
ACADA	automatic chemical agent detector and alarm
ACLS	advanced cardiac life support
ACP	access control point
ADCON	administrative control
ADMIN	administration
administrative control	Direction or exercise of authority over subordinate or other organizations in respect to administration and support, including organization of Service forces, control of resources and equipment, personnel management, unit logistics, individual and unit training, readiness, mobilization, demobilization, discipline, and other matters not included in the operational missions of the subordinate or other organizations. Also called ADCON. (JP 1-02)
ADP	automated data processing
ADT	active duty for training
ADVON	advanced echelon
aerosol	A liquid or solid composed of finely divided particles suspended in a gaseous medium. Examples of common aerosols are mist, fog, and smoke. (JP 3-11)
AFB	Air Force base
AFFOR	Air Force forces
AFIERA	Air Force Institute for Environment, Safety, and Health Risk Analysis

AFM	Air Force manual
AFRRI	Armed Forces Radiobiological Research Institute
AFSC	Air Force specialty code
AGR	active guard/reserve
AIT	aeromedical isolation team
AL	Alabama
ALARA	as low as reasonably achievable
ALOG	Army logistics
amb	ambulatory
AMS	Aerial Measuring System
ANG	Air National Guard
AO	area of operation
AOI	area of interest
AOR	area of responsibility
AR	Army regulation
ARAC	Atmospheric Release Advisory Capability
ARC	American Red Cross
area assessment	The commander's prescribed collection of specific information that commences upon employment and is a continuous operation. It confirms, corrects, refutes, or adds to previous intelligence acquired from area studies and other sources prior to employment. (JP 3-05)
area of interest	The area of concern to the commander, including the area of influence, areas adjacent thereto, and extending into enemy territory to the objectives of current or planned operations. This area also includes areas occupied by enemy forces who could jeopardize the accomplishment of the mission. Also called AOI. (JP 1-02)
area of operations	An operational area defined by the joint force commander for land and naval forces. Areas of operation do not typically encompass the entire operational area of the joint force commander, but should be large enough for component commanders to accomplish their missions and protect their forces. Also called AO. (JP 1-02)

area of responsibility	The geographical area associated with a combatant command within which a combatant commander has authority to plan and conduct operations. Also called AOR. (JP 3-0)
ARNG	Army National Guard
ARTEP	Army Training and Evaluation Program
ASCC	Army Services Component Command
ASI	additional skill identifier
assign	1. To place units or personnel in an organization where such placement is relatively permanent, and/or where such organization controls and administers the units or personnel for the primary function, or greater portion of the functions, of the unit or personnel. 2. To detail individuals to specific duties or functions where such duties or functions are primary and/or relatively permanent. (JP 1-02)
AT	antiterrorism
ATLS	advanced trauma life support
ATSDR	Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry
avoidance	Individual and/or unit measures taken to avoid or minimize nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) attacks and reduce the effects of NBC hazards. (JP 1-02)
BDRP	Biological Defense Research Program
BIDS	Biological Integrated Detection System
BII	basic issue items
biological agent	A microorganism that causes disease in personnel, plants, or animals or causes the deterioration of materiel. (JP 1-02)
biological threat	A threat that consists of biological material planned to be deployed to produce casualties in personnel or animals or damage plants. (JP 3-11)
biological weapon	An item of materiel which projects, disperses, or disseminates a biological agent including arthropod vectors. (JP 1-02)
blister agent	A chemical agent which injures the eyes and lungs, and burns or blisters the skin. (JP 1-02)
blood agent	A chemical compound, including the cyanide group, that affects bodily functions by preventing the normal utilization of oxygen by body tissues. (JP 1-02)

BLS	basic life support
BW	biological warfare
C²	command and control
C⁴I	command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence
CAM	chemical agent monitor
CAS	chemical abstract service
CB	chemical and biological
CBD	chemical and biological defense
CBIRF	chemical-biological incident response force
CBRNE	chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives
CBRRT	chemical-biological, rapid response team
CBRT	chemical-biological response team
CCA	contamination control area
CCI	classified cryptological information
CCIR	commander's critical information requirements
CCT	contamination control team
CD	counterdrug
CDC	Center for Disease Control and Prevention
CDE	chemical defense equipment
CDRG	catastrophic disaster response group
CDTF	chemical decontamination training facility
CEOI	communications-electronics operating instructions
CFR	Code of Federal Regulations
CG	commanding general
chemical agent	Any toxic chemical intended for use in military operations. (JP 1-02)

chemical defense	The methods, plans, and procedures involved in establishing and executing defensive measures against attack utilizing chemical agents. (JP 1-02)
chemical warfare	All aspects of military operations involving the employment of lethal and incapacitating munitions/agents and the warning and protective measures associated with such offensive operations. Since riot control agents and herbicides are not considered to be chemical warfare agents, those two items will be referred to separately or under the broader term “chemical,” which will be used to include all types of chemical munitions/agents collectively. Also called CW. (JP 3-11)
chemical weapon	Together or separately, (a) a toxic chemical and its precursors, except when intended for a purpose not prohibited under the Chemical Weapons Convention; (b) a munition or device, specifically designed to cause death or other harm through toxic properties of those chemicals specified in (a), above, which would be released as a result of the employment of such munition or device; (c) any equipment specifically designed for use directly in connection with the employment of munitions or devices specified in (b), above. (JP 3-11)
CHPPM	Center for Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine
CHRIS	Chemical Hazards Response Information System
CIRG	critical-incident response group
CJCS	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
CJCSI	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction
CJTF	commander, joint task force
CM	consequence management
CMAT	consequence management advisory team
CMSUPCEN	consequence management support center
CNO	Chief of Naval Operations
CO	commanding officer
COA	course of action
COCOM	combatant command (command authority)
cold-zone	The cold-zone contains the command post and such other support functions as are deemed necessary to control the incident. This zone is also referred to as the clean zone or support zone in other documents. (NFPA 471)

combatant command (command authority)	Nontransferable command authority established by Title 10 (“Armed Forces”), United States Code, section 164, exercised only by commanders of unified or specified combatant commands unless otherwise directed by the President or Secretary of Defense. Combatant command (command authority) cannot be delegated and is the authority of a combatant commander to perform those functions of command over assigned forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the command. Combatant command (command authority) should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders. Combatant command (command authority) provides full authority to organize and employ commands and forces as the combatant commander considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. Operational control is inherent in combatant command (command authority). Also called COCOM. (JP 1-02)
command	1. The authority that a commander in the Armed Forces lawfully exercises over subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment. Command includes the authority and responsibility for effectively using available resources and for planning the employment of, organizing, directing, coordinating, and controlling military forces for the accomplishment of assigned missions. It also includes responsibility for health, welfare, morale, and discipline of assigned personnel. 2. An order given by a commander; that is, the will of the commander expressed for the purpose of bringing about a particular action. 3. A unit or units, an organization, or an area under the command of one individual. (JP 1-02)
command and control	The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission. Command and control functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures employed by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission. Also called C ² . (JP 1-02)
commander’s critical information requirements	A comprehensive list of information requirements identified by the commander as being critical in facilitating timely information management and the decision making process that affect successful mission accomplishment. The two key subcomponents are critical friendly force information and

	priority intelligence requirements. Also called CCIR. (JP 1-02)
communications security	The protection resulting from all measures designed to deny unauthorized persons information of value that might be derived from the possession and study of telecommunications, or to mislead unauthorized persons in their interpretation of the results of such possession and study. Also called COMSEC. (JP 1-02)
COMSEC	communications security
concept of operations	A verbal or graphic statement, in broad outline, of a commander's assumptions or intent in regard to an operation or series of operations. The concept of operations frequently is embodied in campaign plans and operation plans; in the latter case, particularly when the plans cover a series of connected operations to be carried out simultaneously or in succession. The concept is designed to give an overall picture of the operation. It is included primarily for additional clarity of purpose. Also called CONOPS. (JP 1-02)
concept plan	An operation plan in concept format. Also called CONPLAN. (JP 1-02)
confinement	Those procedures taken to keep a material, once released, in a defined or local area. (NFPA 471)
CONOPS	concept of operations
CONPLAN	concept plan
consequence management	Those measures taken to protect public health and safety, restore essential government services, and provide emergency relief to governments, businesses, and individuals affected by the consequences of a chemical, biological, nuclear, and/or high-yield explosive situation. For domestic consequence management, the primary authority rests with the States to respond and the Federal Government to provide assistance as required. Also called CM. (JP 3-0)
containment	The actions taken to keep a material in its container (e.g., stop a release of the material or reduce the amount being released). (NFPA 471)
contaminant	A hazardous material that physically remains on or in people, animals, the environment or equipment, thereby creating a continuing risk of direct injury or a risk of exposure. (NFPA 471)
contamination	1. The deposit, absorption, or adsorption of radioactive material, or of biological or chemical agents on or by structures, areas, personnel or objects. 2. (DOD only) Food and/or water made unfit for consumption by humans or animals because of

	the presence of environmental chemicals, radioactive elements, bacteria or organisms, the byproduct of the growth of bacteria or organisms, the decomposing material (to include the food substance itself), or waste in the food or water. (JP 1-02)
contamination control	Procedures to avoid, reduce, remove, or render harmless (temporarily or permanently) nuclear, biological, and chemical contamination for the purpose of maintaining or enhancing the efficient conduct of military operations. (JP 3-11)
contingency plan	A plan for major contingencies that can reasonable be anticipate in the principal geographic subareas of the command. (JP 1-02)
control	1. Authority that may be less than full command exercised by the commander over part of the activities of subordinate or other organizations. 2. In mapping, charting, and photogrammetry, a collective term for a system of marks or objects on the Earth or on a map or a photograph, whose positions or elevations (or both) have been or will be determined. 3. Physical or psychological pressures exerted with the intent to assure that an agent or group will respond as directed. 4. An indicator governing the distribution and use of documents, information, or material. Such indicators are the subject of intelligence community agreement and are specifically defined in appropriate regulations. (JP 1-02)
CONUS	continental United States
COP	common operational picture
COTS	commercial, off-the-shelf
counterterrorism	Offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism. Also called CT (JP 1-02)
CP	command post
CPT	captain
CPX	command post exercise
CRA	chemical reduction area
crisis management	Measure to resolve a hostile situation and investigate and prepare a criminal case for prosecution under federal law. Crisis management will include a response to an incident involving a weapon of mass destruction, special improvised explosive device, or a hostage crisis that is beyond the capability of the lead federal agency. (JP 3-07.6)
CSD	chemical support division

CSM	chemical surety material
CSS	combat service support
CST	civil support team
CTC	combat training center
CW	chemical warfare
CWC	Chemical Weapons Convention
DA	Department of the Army
DAP	dismounted analytical platform
DART	disaster assistance response team
DC	District of Columbia
DCO	defense coordinating officer
DCS	Deployable Communications System
DCSLOG	Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics
DECL	declassify
decontamination	The process of making any person, object, or area safe by absorbing, destroying, neutralizing, making harmless, or removing chemical or biological agents, or by removing radioactive material clinging to or around it. (JP 1-02)
DED	detailed equipment decontamination
deliberate planning	1. The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System process involving the development of joint operation plans for contingencies identified in joint strategic planning documents. Deliberate planning is accomplished in prescribed cycles that complement other Department of Defense planning cycles in accordance with the formally established Joint Strategic Planning System. 2. A planning process for the deployment and employment of apportioned forces and resources that occurs in response to a hypothetical situation. Deliberate planners rely heavily on assumptions regarding the circumstances that will exist when the plan is executed. (JP 1-02)
detection	1. In tactical operations, the perception of an object of possible military interest but unconfirmed by recognition. 2. In surveillance, the determination and transmission by a surveillance system that an event has occurred. 3. In arms control, the first step in the process of ascertaining the occurrence of a violation of an arms control agreement. 4. In nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) environments, the act

	of locating NBC hazards by use of NBC detectors or monitoring and/or survey teams. (JP 3-11)
DFO	disaster field office
DHHS	Department of Health and Human Services
DISN	Defense Information Systems Network
DNBI	disease and nonbattle injury
DNWS	Defense Nuclear Weapons School
doctrine	Fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application. (JP 1-02)
DOD	Department of Defense
DODD	Department of Defense directive
DOE	Department of Energy
DOJ	Department of Justice
DOL	directorate of logistics
DOMS	director of military support
DOS	Department of State
DOT	Department of Transportation
DRAGON	Deployable Response And Graphics Operations Network
DRCD	domestic-response casualty decontamination
DTG	date-time group
DTRA	Defense Threat Reduction Agency
ECBC	Edgewood Chemical-Biological Center
EEFI	essential elements of friendly information
EFI	enemy forces information
EFR	emergency first responder
EHS	extremely hazardous substance
electromagnetic pulse	The electromagnetic radiation from a strong electronic pulse, most commonly caused by a nuclear explosion that may couple with electrical or electronic systems to produce damaging

	current and voltage surges. Also called EMP. (JP 1-02)
EMA	emergency management assistance
EMAC	emergency management assistance compact
emergency decontamination	The physical process of immediately reducing contamination of individuals in potentially life-threatening situations without the formal establishment of a contamination corridor. (NFPA 471)
Emergency Management Assistance Compact	A mutual aid agreement and partnership between states recognized by Congress in 1996 as a legally binding, contractual arrangement which makes states that ask for help responsible for reimbursing all out-of- state costs and liable for out-of-state personnel (Public Law 104-321).
EMI	Emergency Management Institute
EMP	electromagnetic pulse
EMS	emergency medical services
EMT	emergency medical technician
EOC	emergency operations center
EOD	explosive ordnance disposal
EPA	Environmental Protection Agency
EPDS	emergency personnel decontaminating station
EPLO	emergency preparedness liaison officer
ERAMS	Environmental Radiation Ambient Monitoring System
ERC	equipment readiness condition
ERG	emergency response guide
ERP	emergency response plan
ERT	emergency response team
ESF	emergency support function
essential elements of friendly information	Key questions likely to be asked by adversary officials and intelligence systems about specific friendly intentions, capabilities, and activities, so they can obtain answers critical to their operational effectiveness. Also called EEFI. (JP 1-02)
EST	emergency support team
ETA	estimated time of arrival

EXORD	executive order
explosive ordnance disposal	The detection, identification, on-site evaluation, rendering safe, recovery, and final disposal of unexploded explosive ordnance. It may also include explosive ordnance which has become hazardous by damage or deterioration. Also called EOD. (JP 1-02)
exposure	The process by which people, animals, the environment, and equipment are subjected to or come in contact with a hazardous material. The magnitude of exposure is dependent primarily upon the duration of exposure and the concentration of the hazardous material. (NFPA 471)
F	Fahrenheit
FAC	Forensic Analytical Center
FAX	facsimile
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FDA	Federal Drug Administration
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
FFIR	friendly force information requirements
FH	frequency hopping
FL	Florida
FM	field manual; frequency modulated
FMFM	Fleet Marine field manual
force protection	Actions taken to prevent or mitigate hostile actions against Department of Defense personnel (to include family members), resources, facilities, and critical information. These actions conserve the force's fighting potential so it can be applied at the decisive time and place and incorporate the coordinated and synchronized offensive and defensive measures to enable the effective employment of the joint force while degrading opportunities for the enemy. Force protection does not include actions to defeat the enemy or protect against accidents, weather, or disease. Also called FP. (JP 3-0)
FORSCOM	United States Army Forces Command
FOSC	federal on-scene coordinator
FP	force protection

FPC	force protection condition
FPD	flame photometric detector
FRAGO	fragmentary order
FRP	Federal Response Plan
FSB	forward staging base
FSG	family support group
FTX	field training exercise
FY	fiscal year
gal	gallon(s)
GB	sarin
GC	gas chromatograph
GC/MS	gas chromatograph/mass spectrometer
GD	soman
GENTEXT	general text
GPS	Global Positioning System
GSA	General Services Administration
hazard	A condition with the potential to cause injury, illness, or death of personnel; damage to or loss of equipment or property; or mission degradation. (JP 1-02)
hazard analysis	Used to obtain a clear understanding of what hazards exist and what risk they pose to people, property, missions, and the environment. It consists of determining where hazards are likely to exist, what places would most likely be adversely affected, what hazardous materials could be involved, and what conditions might exist during a spill or release. This section also assesses the probability of damage or injury. The information developed in a hazard analysis provides the basis for establishing priorities and subsequent planning and also provides the documentation to support hazardous materials planning and response efforts. (NFPA 473)
hazardous	Capable of posing an unreasonable risk to health, safety, or the environment; capable of causing harm (NFPA 471)
hazardous material	A substance (gas, liquid, or solid) capable of creating harm to people, the environment, and property. Also called HAZMAT. (NFPA 471)

HAZMAT	hazardous material
HD	mustard gas
HEENT	head, eyes, ears, nose, and throat
HF	high frequency
HHA	handheld assay
HMRU	hazardous materials response unit
hot-zone	The area immediately surrounding a hazardous materials incident, which extends far enough to prevent adverse effects from HAZMAT releases to personnel outside the zone, also called exclusion or restricted zone (NFPA 471)
HPV	high-production volume
HQ	headquarters
hr	hur(s)
HSAS	Homeland Security Advisory System
HSDB	hazardous substances data bank
HTH	high-test hypochlorite
HVAC	heating, ventilation, and air conditioning
i.e.	id est (that is)
IAP	incident accident plan; incident action plan
IC	incident commander
ICAM	improved chemical agent monitor
ICP	incident command post
ICS	incident command system
ICSC	International Chemical Safety Card
ID	identification
IDLH	immediately dangerous to life or health
IED	improvised explosive device
IEP	initial entry party
ILO	International Labor Organization

ILS	integrated logistics support
IMPAC	international merchant purchase authority card
improvised nuclear device	A device incorporating radioactive materials designated to result in the dispersal of radioactive material or in the formation of nuclear-yield reaction. Such devices may be fabricated in a completely improvised manner or may be an improvised modification to a US or foreign nuclear weapon. (JP 1-02)
incident	In information operations, an assessed event of attempted entry, unauthorized entry, or an information attack on an automated information system. It includes unauthorized probing and browsing; disruption or denial of service; altered or destroyed input, processing, storage, or output of information; or changes to information system hardware, firmware, or software characteristics with or without the users' knowledge, instruction, or intent. (JP 1-02)
incident command system	The model tool for command, control and coordination of a response and provides a means to coordinate the efforts of individual agencies as they work toward the common goal of stabilizing the incident and protecting life, property and the environment. (NFPA 472)
incident commander	The person responsible for all decisions relating to the management of the incident. The incident command is in charge of the incident site. This term is equivalent to the on-scene incident commander. (NFPA 471)
individual protective equipment	In nuclear, biological, and chemical warfare, the personal clothing and equipment required to protect an individual from biological and chemical hazards and some nuclear effects. (JP 1-02)
industrial chemicals	Chemicals developed or manufactured for use in industrial operations or research, by industry, government, or the academia. These chemicals are not primarily manufactured for the specific purpose of producing human casualties or rendering equipment, facilities, or areas dangerous for use by man. (JP 3-11)
INFOSEC	information security
INMARSAT	international maritime satellite
IPB	intelligence preparation of battlespace
IPCS	International Programme on Chemical Safety
IPE	individual protective equipment

IR	information requirements
IRF	initial response force
IRIS	Integrated Risk Information System
IT	individual training
IUR	inventory update rule
JACE	joint assessment and consequence evaluation
JAG	judge advocate general
JNACC	Joint Nuclear-Accident Coordination Center
JOA	joint operations area
JOC	joint operations center
Joint Task Force	A joint force formed at the direction of the Secretary of Defense, a unified commander, or another JTF commander. (JP 1.02)
JP	joint publication
JSOTF	joint special operations task force
JTF	joint task force
JTOT	joint technical operations team
JTTP	joint tactics, techniques, and procedures
KW	kilowatt(s)
LAN	local area network
LCD	liquid crystal display
LCM	life cycle management
LEA	law enforcement agency
lead agency	Designated among US Government agencies to coordinate the interagency oversight of the day-to-day conduct of an ongoing operation. The lead agency is to chair the interagency working group established to coordinate policy related to a particular operation. The lead agency determines the agenda, ensures cohesion among the agencies, and is responsible for implementing decisions. (JP 1-02)
LEL	lower explosive level

LEPC	local emergency planning committee
LFA	lead federal agency
LNO	liaison officer
LOC	line of communications
logistic support	Logistic support encompasses the logistic services, materiel, and transportation required to support the continental United States-based and worldwide deployed forces. (JP 1-02)
logistics	The science of planning and carrying out the movement and maintenance of forces. In its most comprehensive sense, those aspects of military operations that deal with: a. design and development, acquisition, storage, movement, distribution, maintenance, evacuation, and disposition of materiel; b. movement, evacuation, and hospitalization of personnel; c. acquisition or construction, maintenance, operation, and disposition of facilities; and d. acquisition or furnishing of services. (JP 1-02)
LOGSTAT	logistics status
LOS	line of site
LTC	lieutenant colonel
m	meter(s)
MAJ	major
MALS	Mobile Analytical Laboratory System
MARFORLANT	Marine Corps Forces, Atlantic
MCBAT	medical chemical-biological advisory team
MD	Maryland
MDMP	military decision-making process
MEAP	mobile environmental analytical platform
medical surveillance	The ongoing process of medical evaluation of hazardous materials response team members and public safety personnel who respond to a hazardous materials incident. (NFPA 473)
MEF	Marine Expeditionary Force
METL	mission-essential task list
METT-TC	mission, enemy, terrain, troops, time available, and civilian consideration

mg	milligram(s)
MHE	material handling equipment
min	minute(s)
mission-oriented protective posture	A flexible system of protection against nuclear, biological, and chemical contamination. This posture requires personnel to wear only that protective clothing and equipment (mission-oriented protective posture gear) appropriate to the threat level, work rate imposed by the mission, temperature, and humidity. Also called MOPP. (JP 3-11)
MMST	metropolitan medical strike team
MO	Missouri
MOA	memorandum of agreement
MOPP	mission-oriented protective posture
MOS	military operational specialty
MP	military police
mph	miles per hour
MRAT	medical radiobiology advisory team
MRE	meal, ready to eat
MSCA	military support to civil authorities
MSD	minimum safe distance
MTF	medical treatment facility
MTP	mission training plan
MTTP	multiservice tactics, techniques, and procedures
N	time of notification
NAERG	North American Emergency Response Guide
NBC	nuclear, biological, and chemical
NCO	noncommissioned officer
NCOIC	noncommissioned officer in charge
NCP	national contingency plan
NCS	National Communications System

NDI	nondevelopmental item
NEHC	Navy Environmental Health Center
NEIC	National Enforcement Investigations Center
NESDIS	National Environmental Satellite, Data, and Information Service
NEST	nuclear emergency search team
NET	new equipment training
NFA	National Fire Academy
NFPA	National Fire Protection Association
NG	national guard
NGB	National Guard Bureau
NGB-CS	National Guard Bureau-Civil Support
NIOSH	National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health
NIPRNET	nonsecure internet protocol router network
NJ	New Jersey
NLT	not later than
NMCC	National Military Command Center
NMRC	Navy Medical Research Center
NMRT	National Medical Response Team
NOAA	National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
NOS	National Ocean Service
NPL	national priorities list
NRC	National Response Center
NSC	National Security Council
NSF	National Strike Force
NSN	national stock number
nuclear, biological, and chemical defense	Defensive measures that enable friendly forces to survive, fight, and win against enemy use of nuclear, biological, or chemical (NBC) weapons and agents. US forces apply NBC defensive measures before and during integrated warfare. In

	integrated warfare, opposing forces employ nonconventional weapons along with conventional weapons (NBC weapons are nonconventional). (JP 3-11)
nuclear, biological, and chemical environment	Environments in which there is deliberate or accidental employment, or threat of employment, of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons; deliberate or accidental attacks or contamination with toxic industrial materials, including toxic industrial chemicals; or deliberate or accidental attacks or contamination with radiological (radioactive) materials. (JP 3-11)
NV	Nevada
NWS	National Weather Service
O²	oxygen
OADR	originating agency's determination required
OBC	officer basic course
OCONUS	outside the continental United States
OEG	operational exposure guide
OIC	officer in charge
on-scene commander	1. The person designated to coordinate the rescue efforts at the rescue site. 2. Federal officer designated to direct federal crisis and consequence management efforts at the scene of a terrorist or weapons of mass destruction incident. Also called OSC. (JP 1-02)
OPCEN	operations center
OPCON	operational control
OPLAN	operation plan
OPORD	operation order
OPREP	operational report
OPSEC	operations security
OSC	on-scene commander
OSHA	Occupational Safety and Health Administration
oz	ounce(s)
PA	public affairs, physician's assistant

PAO	public affairs officer
PDD	Presidential Decision Directive
PDP	personal deployment package
PEL	permissible exposure limit
PERSEC	personnel security
persistence	In biological or chemical warfare, the characteristic of an agent which pertains to the duration of its effectiveness under determined conditions after dispersal. (JP 1-02)
personal protective equipment	The equipment provided to shield or isolate a person from the chemical, physical, and thermal hazards that can be encountered at a hazardous materials incident. Personal protective equipment includes both personal protective clothing and respiratory protection. Adequate personal protective equipment should protect the respiratory system, skin, eyes, face, hands, feet, head, body, and hearing. Also called PPE. (NFPA 472)
PERSTAT	personnel status
PHYSEC	physical security
PI	principal investigator
PID	photoionization detector
PIR	priority intelligence requirements
planned response	The plan of action, with safety considerations, consistent with the local emergency response plan and an organization's standard operating procedures for a specific hazardous materials incident. (NFPA 472)
PMCS	preventive maintenance checks and services
PME	professional military education
POC	point of contact
POMSO	plans, operations, and military support office
potable	fit or suitable for drinking
POTUS	President of the United States
PPE	personal-protective equipment
ppm	parts per million

protection	1. Measures that are taken to keep nuclear, biological, and chemical hazards from having an adverse effect on personnel, equipment, or critical assets and facilities. Protection consists of five groups of activities hardening of positions; protecting personnel; assuming mission-oriented protective posture; using physical defense measures; and reacting to attack. 2. In space usage, active and passive defensive measures to ensure that United States and friendly space systems perform as designated by seeking to overcome an adversary's attempts to negate them and to minimize damage if negation is attempted. (JP 3-11)
PVNTMED	preventive medicine
qt	quart
R&S	reconnaissance and surveillance
RA	risk analysis
RAD	radiological
RADIAC	radiation detection, indication, and computation
radiological survey	The directed effort to determine the distribution and dose rates of radiation in an area. (JP 1-02))
RAP	Radiological Assistance Program
RAPID	ruggedized advanced pathogen identification device
RAT	radioanalytical assessment team
RC	reserve component
RCA	riot control agent
REAC/TS	radiation emergency assistance center/training site
REL	recommended exposure limit
RERT	radiological emergency response team
RF	radio frequency
RFA	request for assistance
RFS	request for support
risk management	The process of identifying, assessing, and controlling risks arising from operational factors and making decisions that balance risk cost with mission benefits. Also called RM. (JP 3-0)

RMC	regional medical command
RMP	risk management plan
ROC	regional operations center
ROE	rules of engagement
RRIS	Rapid Response Information System
RRT	rapid response team
RTAP	real-time analytical platform
RTECS	Registry of Toxic Effects of Chemical Substances
RTF	response task force
RTF-E	response task force-east
RTF-W	response task force-west
RTK	right-to-know
S1	adjutant
S2	intelligence officer
S3	operations and training officer
S4	logistics officer
S5	civil-military operations officer
SA	situational awareness
SAMHSA	Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration
SATCOM	satellite communications
SB	supply bulletin
SBCCOM	Soldier and Biological Chemical Command
SC	single channel
SCBA	self-contained breathing apparatus
SCO	state coordinating officer
SCPE	simplified collective protective equipment
SCT	Secretariat of Communication and Transportation of Mexico
SECDEF	Secretary of Defense

SEI	skill experience identifier
SIGSEC	signal security
SIOC	strategic information operations center
SIPRNET	secret Internet protocol router network
SITREP	situation report
SMART	special medical augmentation response team
SMART-CB	special medical augmentation response team-chemical/biological
SMART-PM	special medical augmentation response team-preventive medicine
SMART-V	special medical augmentation response team-veterinarian
SME	subject matter expert
SOF	special operations forces
SOI	signal operation instruction
SOP	standing operating procedure
SP	special police
SPECWAR	special warfare
SQI	skill qualification identifier
SROE	standing rules of engagement
SSP	site safety plan
STARC	state area coordinator
survey	The directed effort to determine the location and the nature of a chemical, biological, and radiological hazard in an area. (JP 3-11)
TACON	tactical control
tactical control	Command authority over assigned or attached forces or commands, or military capability or forces made available for tasking, that is limited to the detailed direction and control of movements or maneuvers within the operational area necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned. Tactical control is inherent in operational control. Tactical control may be delegated to, and exercised at any level at any level at or below the level of combatant command. When forces are

	transferred between combatant commands, the command relationship the gaining commander will exercise (and the losing commander will relinquish) over these forces must be specified by the Secretary of Defense. Tactical control provides sufficient authority for controlling and directing the application of force or tactical use of combat support assets within the assigned mission or task. Also called TACON. (JP 0-2)
TAG	The Adjutant General
TDA	table of distribution and allowances
terrorism	The calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological. (JP 1-02)
TET	theater epidemiology team
TEU	technical escort unit
TF	task force
TIC	toxic industrial chemical
TIM	toxic industrial material
TL	team leader
TNCC	trojan network control center
TO	theater of operations
TOC	tactical operations center
TRANSCOM	Transportation Command
TSCA	toxic substance control act
TTP	tactics, techniques, and procedures
UCMJ	Uniform Code of Military Justice
UCS	unified command suite
UHF	ultrahigh frequency
UNEP	United Nations Environmental Program
US	United States
USA	US Army
USACE	United States Army Corps of Engineers

USACMLS	United States Army Chemical School
USAF	United States Air Force
USAMEDCOM	United States Army Medical Command
USAMEDD&S	United States Army Medical Department and School
USAMRICD	United States Army Medical Research Institute for Chemical Defense
USAMRIID	United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases
USAR	United States Army Reserve
USASOC	United States Army Special Operations Command
USC	United States Code
USCG	United States Coast Guard
USDA	United States Department of Agriculture
USG	United States Government
USMC	United States Marine Corps
USN	United States Navy
USNG	United States National Guard
USPFO	United States Property and Fiscal Office
USPHS	United States Public Health Service
USRT	urban search and rescue team
USSOCOM	US Special Operations Command
USSS	United States Secret Service
USUHS	Uniformed Services University of Health Sciences
UXO	unexploded ordnance
VA	Virginia
VHF	very high frequency
VIP	very important person
VOC	volatile organic compound
WAN	wide-area network

warm-zone	The area of a hazardous material incident where personnel and equipment decontamination and hot-zone support takes place. It includes control points for the access thus assisting in reducing the spread of contamination institutional controls. Also called decontamination, contamination reduction or limited access zone. (NFPA 471)
weapon of mass destruction	Weapons that are capable of a high order of destruction and/or of being used in such a manner as to destroy large numbers of people. Weapons of mass destruction can be high explosives or nuclear, biological, chemical, and radiological weapons, but exclude the means of transporting or propelling the weapon where such means is a separable and divisible part of the weapon. Also called WMD. (JP 1-02)
WHO	World Health Organization
WMD	weapons of mass destruction
WMDAAC	Weapons Of Mass Destruction Assessment and Analysis Center
WO	warning order

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
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By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

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